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TO THE READER 
Jihadist activism has been the subject of considerably more attention in Finland in 
recent years, especially as a result of the conflict in Syria and Iraq and the related 
foreign fighter phenomenon. However, the absence of research-based information 
has made fact-based public debate and policy planning difficult. The purpose of this 
report is to provide the first overview of jihadist activism in Finland in the 2010s. 
The report has been commissioned by the Ministry of the Interior and it is mainly 
intended to support policies aimed at preventing radicalisation into violent extremism. 
We hope that the publication will also find a wider readership among those interested 
in learning more about the phenomenon. 
The report has been produced by the same research team as the report Jihadist 
online communication and Finland, which was simultaneously published. The report 
on jihadist online communication complements the overview of jihadist activism by 
examining the online content produced by jihadist groups and their supporters and its 
links to Finland.  
The authors would like to extend warm thanks to all persons interviewed for this study 
and those contributing to its preparation. Our special thanks go to the steering group 
chaired by Tarja Mankkinen from the Ministry of the Interior, whose comments were of 
considerable help throughout the research. The steering group comprised Marko 
Juntunen (University of Helsinki), Timo Kilpeläinen (National Police Board), Marja 
Tiilikainen (Migration Institute of Finland), and Oussama Yousfi (Radinet). 
We would also like to thank our research assistants Fairuz Muthana, Taru 
Tervahauta, and Lauri von Pfaler, as well as our many colleagues who commented on 
the draft reports at different stages. 
Leena Malkki and Juha Saarinen 
University of Helsinki, Centre for European Studies 
March 2019 
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Abstract 
The purpose of this study is to provide an overview of jihadism in Finland and how it 
has developed in the 2010s. As jihadism is a highly international phenomenon and 
Finland is located at the periphery of these activities, this report begins with an 
examination of the evolution and manifestations of jihadism in Europe and globally. 
The study is based on open data sources, which have been supplemented with 
interviews. 
When compared to many other Western European countries, jihadism in Finland is 
still a small-scale phenomenon. However, the number of individuals involved in 
jihadist activities has grown significantly during the 2010s. The single most important 
factor contributing to this trend has been the conflict in Syria and Iraq. This period of 
upheaval has prompted more individuals to travel from Finland to the conflict zone 
than any previous armed conflict involving jihadist groups. Whereas in the past, 
jihadist activities in Finland were disparately concentrated around various conflicts 
and issues, the conflict in Syria and Iraq and the caliphate project of ISIS have served 
as a unifying cause for activists and supporters from different backgrounds. 
The influx of asylum seekers to Finland in 2015–2016 has undoubtedly increased the 
number of persons with ties to jihadism. Accurate estimates of how and to what extent 
this phenomenon has impacted the situation in Finland are hard to produce by relying 
solely on open sources. The growing interest in jihadism among women and women 
becoming more actively involved in the movement may have had a similar effect. 
Jihadism in Finland remains a predominantly small-scale and non-violent 
phenomenon, primarily involving recruitment and fundraising. A notable increase in 
travel to the conflict zones in Syria and Iraq is the most significant change in the 
nature of these jihadist activities. To-date, the stabbing incident in Turku in August 
2017 is the only jihadist attack to have taken place in Finland. However, the 
perpetrator is not known to have links with jihadist networks in Finland. Moreover, 
there have been no known serious terrorist attempts or plans to carry out attacks in 
Finland. There have, however, been several cases of threats to carry out attacks 
having been posted online, although these threats have later proved unfounded. 
Even though there has been increasingly extensive networking among people 
interested in jihadism in Finland in recent years, jihadist activism in the country is still 
quite fragmented and disorganised. There are still no organisations openly engaged in 
jihadist activism in Finland. Indeed, there appears to be only a few key activists that 
are capable of and willing to organise and encourage these activities. It should 
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nevertheless be remembered that such activists tend to be very security-conscious 
and prefer to operate clandestinely. 
While men still constitute the majority of all individuals involved in jihadism, there are 
also indications in Finland that women are becoming increasingly interested and 
actively involved in jihadist activities. This is most evident in the context of the 
mobilisation of individuals to Syria and Iraq. 
The opportunities provided by social media have also influenced Finland’s relation to 
the international global jihadist movement. It has become easier to obtain jihadist 
material and to establish connections with people over regardless of geographical 
location. Such activities are still possible even though they have become increasingly 
difficult after jihadist communications have moved to closed channels. 
However, physical connections established with, for example, friends and family 
members, are still the most probable route to involvement in jihadist activities. A 
potentially significant change to this is the way in which current and former residents 
of Finland now maintain closer links with jihadist groups operating in the conflict zones 
in Syria and Iraq. This may make it easier to channel more support from Finland to 
ongoing conflicts in other parts of the world. 
The most active growth phase connected to the conflict in Syria and Iraq would 
appear to have ended in early 2019. However, the growth in jihadist activism 
accompanying the conflict has left a permanent mark on the jihadist milieu in Finland. 
A similar period of strong growth is not expected in the near future. 
It is worth bearing in mind that there are still substantial gaps in our knowledge of 
jihadism in Finland. Open sources offer little information about the topic and, even 
after the initial overview of jihadism in Finland provided by the present study, there 
remains a need for further research. The lack of information does not merely apply to 
the body of knowledge in the public domain. In fact, it would appear that not even the 
authorities currently have a comprehensive sense of the extent to which individuals 
are mobilising to Syria and Iraq. Indeed, it is likely that we will only fully understand 
recent events in the future. 
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1 Introduction  
In recent decades, political and religious extremism has been considered to be a 
marginal phenomenon in Finland. Moreover, jihadism has historically been viewed as 
a distant problem. In Toby Archer’s report International Terrorism and Finland 
published in 2004, the threat of jihadist terrorism in Finland was considered low. This 
was also the view of the Finnish Security Intelligence Service (SUPO). When Finland 
started developing its counter-terrorism capabilities after 2001, the main motivation 
was to ensure that the obligations specified in international counter-terrorism 
agreements were met.1 
Attention on jihadism has substantially increased in recent years. The main reason for 
this has been the fact that people living in Finland have also began traveling to the 
conflict zones in Syria and Iraq to take part in the activities of jihadist groups 
(especially ISIS). Foreign fighters received a great deal of publicity in summer 2014, 
when a man who had travelled from Finland to Syria appeared in an ISIS video. The 
extensive news coverage of the ISIS-linked attacks in Europe in recent years, 
changes in threat assessments on Finland, and the trials in Finland of individuals 
suspected of terrorist offences have also aroused attention and concern. 
Despite growing interest in the topic and extensive media coverage, the nature, forms 
and background of jihadism in Finland have only been superficially touched upon. 
Furthermore, only a limited number of books on jihadism have been published in 
Finnish. One purpose of this report is to fill some of these knowledge gaps. Indeed, 
this report has been written as an introduction to the phenomenon of jihadism for 
those readers interested in societal phenomena who are unfamiliar with research 
literature on this topic.  
The aim of the report is to provide an overview of the manifestations and development 
of jihadism in Finland, especially in the 2010s. As jihadism is a highly global 
phenomenon, and Finland is located at the periphery of the related activities, we also 
examine the evolution and forms of jihadism in Europe and globally. The report was 
commissioned by the Ministry of the Interior and its main purpose is to support 
policies aimed at preventing radicalisation into violent extremism. It is also hoped that 
the document will provide those working with the phenomenon of jihadism and the 
public at large with much-needed information. For this reason, every effort has been 
made to avoid the use of complicated academic expressions and the inclusion of 
                                                     
 
1 Leena Malkki, ‘International pressure to perform: Counterterrorism policy development in Fin-
land’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 39, no. 4 (2016). 
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Arabic terms. Indeed, attempts have been made throughout this report to insert an 
English translation of these terms (in brackets).2 
The same team of researchers has also written the report Jihadist online 
communication and Finland and the two documents have been published 
simultaneously. The report on jihadist online communication complements the picture 
of jihadism by examining the online material produced by jihadist groups and their 
supporters and the way in which this material relates to Finland. 
1.1 Research topic and objectives 
The term jihadism refer to a phenomenon that is closely associated with many of the 
violent attacks carried out in Europe in recent years, such as the attacks against the 
office of the Charlie Hebdo newspaper and the Bataclan concert hall in Paris (2015), 
Brussels Airport and metro (2016) and the Berlin Christmas market (2016). The 
stabbings in the centre of Turku in August 2017 are also part of the same 
phenomenon. Jihadist activism is also the main reason that so much attention is 
currently being paid to the prevention of violent radicalisation.  
Jihadist activism refers to the activities of such groups as Al-Qaeda and ISIS.3 In 
jihadism, the aim is to overthrow the existing social and world order and to establish a 
society based on Islam. Justifying violence and the view of what an Islamic society 
should be like and how it should be established are based on the salafist 
interpretation of Islam. Jihadism and salafism are examined in more detail in the next 
chapter. 
This study focuses on analysing the activism carried out within the jihadist framework. 
This includes various modes of action. In violent activism, which has attracted the 
most attention, individuals have travelled to the conflict zones in Syria and Iraq as 
foreign fighters and terrorist attacks have been planned and carried out outside the 
                                                     
 
2 The original Finnish language report used the Finnish translations of Arabic names and terms 
that have become established in the Finnish media. Translations of terms that did not already have 
established Finnish translations deferred to those already in common use in the English language 
research literature on this topic. In the case of organisations, media outlets, or names of individual 
people (e.g. of foreign fighters), the name used by the party in question was used. 
3 ISIS (also known as ISIL and Daesh) has had several names during its history. Even though the 
group changed its name from ISIS into Islamic State in summer 2014, the group is exclusively 
referred to as ISIS in this report because this name is well-established in the public realm. The 
other names used by the group during its history or their versions and translations established in 
the research literature are Monotheism and Jihad (1999⎼2004), Al-Qaeda in Iraq (2004⎼2006), 
Mujahideen Shura Council (2006), Islamic State of Iraq (2006⎼2013), Islamic State of Iraq and as-
Sham (2013⎼2014), and the Islamic State (from summer 2014).  
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region. However, jihadist activism also involves extensive non-violent support work, 
such as the recruitment of new supporters, activists and fighters, and fundraising.  
This report focuses on the ways in which this international phenomenon relates to 
Finland. This means that the report analyses the types of jihadist actors that operate 
or have operated in Finland, the forms of activism that have been identified in Finland 
or are otherwise relevant to Finland, and the transnational connections of networks 
that operate or have operated in Finland. In accordance with the commission received 
from the Ministry of the Interior, the report specifically examines developments in the 
2010s. However, a review of the years in the preceding decade is also included as 
background information. The report aims to provide answers to the following 
questions:  
• How has jihadist activism manifested in Finland in the 2010s?  
• How does the development of jihadist activism in Finland relate to similar 
trends elsewhere in Western Europe? 
• What explains the growth of jihadist activism in Finland? Which societal 
trends that are relevant to Finland and have a wider impact on Europe have 
contributed to changes in the jihadist environment?  
We have decided to use the term jihadism for the phenomenon examined in this 
report. There is no single well-established name for the phenomenon and such terms 
as radical islamism, Islamic extremism, and violent islamism have also been used. 
The Ministry of the Interior and SUPO have also used a variety of names for the 
phenomenon in their documents. In academic research, the term (salafi) jihadism is 
well-established, especially in English-language research, even though not all 
researchers use the same terms for the phenomenon. 
The broad variety of different terms used reflects the fact that none of them is 
universally accepted. Different views of the origins and explanations of the 
phenomenon lie at the core of these disagreements. In fact, in the interviews 
conducted for this study, representatives of Finland’s Muslim community also 
expressed their concern over the association between violence and Islam arising from 
these concepts. 
The use of the concepts containing the words ‘Islam’ and ‘Jihad’ have been 
particularly strongly criticised by Muslim communities because they create an 
association between violent activities and Islam as a religion and especially the 
religious teachings of Jihad and give the misleading impression that the 
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interpretations of the main teachings of Islam popular among jihadists are typical of 
Islam as a religion. The use of the word ‘jihadism’ has also been opposed because it 
is the term used by the jihadist movements themselves. Using the term has been 
claimed to indirectly reinforce the belief that the movements and their religious 
thinkers possess special expertise and authority of the kind that permits them to 
interpret Jihad. 
It has been proposed that instead of the term ‘radical islamism’ or ‘jihadism’, the term 
‘kharijites’ (literally meaning ‘those who went out’) should be used. This term has its 
origins in the power struggles and doctrinal disputes during the first century of Islam 
and it was used for the movement that broke away from the mainstream religion as a 
result of these disputes. Kharijites are considered to have an uncompromising attitude 
towards those that do not accept their religious interpretations and they are also seen 
as opponents of the caliphate. The term is, however, problematic when the sole aim is 
to describe or analyse jihadism as a phenomenon because it has been specifically 
used to express contempt for the phenomenon.4 
In this study, the authors have decided to use the term jihadism mainly because it is 
the most precise of the terms available. In this context, the term ‘radical islamism’ 
would be too broad an expression, as it refers to a phenomenon that is broader and 
more diverse than the one examined in this study. 
In fact, it should be emphasised that the jihadism discussed in this report and many of 
the interpretations of Islam and its core religious teachings (especially Jihad) included 
herein differ significantly from those of the major branches of Islam even though they, 
too, are based on historical traditions. While the objectives and justification of jihadist 
movements are strongly based on their interpretations of the holy scripts of Islam, 
these interpretations have failed to be broadly accepted, especially among Islamic 
religious scholars. 
1.2 Previous research 
A great deal of research has been conducted on jihadist activism over the past twenty 
years. The areas studied have covered such issues as the development of the 
ideology and social activism connected with the phenomenon, its causes, the 
operating practices of different armed groups, networks and organisations, as well as 
                                                     
 
4 Shiraz Maher, Salafi-Jihadism: A History of an Idea (London: Hurst, 2016), pp. 77–78. See also 
Nelly Lahoud, The Jihadis’ Path to Self-Destruction (London: Hurst, 2010). 
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the way in which they are organised and methods for combating them.5 A significant 
proportion of the research has been devoted to developments in regions outside 
Europe, which is logical, as, until recently, our continent was on the side lines of these 
activities. 
Islamist Terrorism in Europe: A History by Petter Nesser (2015, revised edition 2018), 
is probably the most extensive study of the history of jihadist activism in Europe. It 
discusses the growth of jihadist networks from the early 1990s to 2010s. The United 
Kingdom, Belgium, and France, long-time centres of jihadist activism, are the 
European countries with the longest research traditions on these activities.6  
Even though jihadist activism has been extensively studied in Europe since the early 
2000s, the volume of research on the topic in the European context only started to 
increase in the aftermath of the attacks in Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005. There 
was another substantial increase in the research when people started to travel to the 
conflict zones in Syria and Iraq. In the 2010s, research into jihadism has expanded to 
include countries that have been considered marginal in the context of jihadist 
activism. In recent years, research has turned its attention to the phenomenon of 
foreign fighters and especially to the reasons prompting thousands of young Muslims 
                                                     
 
5 Recommended reading on jihadism and its evolution: David Cook, Understanding Jihad (Berke-
ley: University of California Press, 2005); Gilles Kepel & Jean-Pierre Milelli (ed.), Al-Qaeda in its 
Own Words (London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2008); Assaf Moghadam, 
The Globalization of Martyrdom: Al Qaeda, Salafi Jihad, and the Diffusion of Suicide Attacks (Bal-
timore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008); Lahoud, The Jihadis’ to Self-destruction; 
Thomas Hegghammer, Jihad in Saudi Arabia: Violence and Pan-Islamism since 1979 (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010); Assaf Moghaddam & Brian Fishman (ed.), Fault Lines in 
Global Jihad: Organization, strategic, and ideological fissures (London: Routledge, 2011); Bruce 
Hoffman & Fernando Reinares (ed.), The Evolution of The Global Terrorist Threat: From 9/11 to 
Osama bin Laden’s Death (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014); Mustafa Hamid & Leah 
Farrall, The Arabs at War in Afghanistan (London: Hurst, 2015); Maher, Salafi-Jihadism; Brian 
Fishman, The Master Plan: ISIS, Al-Qaeda, and the Jihadi Strategy for Final Victory (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2016); Barak Mendelsohn, Jihadism Constrained: The Limits of Transna-
tional Jihadism and What it Means for Counterterrorism (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 
2019). 
6 Recommended reading on Jihadism and its growth in Europe: Quintan Wiktorowicz, Radical 
Islam Rising: Muslim Extremism in the West (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005); 
Peter R. Neumann, Joining al-Qaeda (Adelphi Series 399, London: Routledge, 2009); Frazer 
Egerton, Jihad in the West: The Rise of Militant Salafism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2011); Rik Coolsaet, Jihadi Terrorism and the Radicalisation Challenge: European and American 
Experiences (London: Routledge, 2011); Daniela Pisoiu, Islamist Radicalisation in Europe: An Oc-
cupational Change Process (London: Routledge, 2012); Angel Rabasa & Cheryl Benard, Euroji-
had: Patterns of Islamist Radicalization and Terrorism in Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 2014); Petter Nesser, Islamist Terrorism in Europe: A History (London: Hurst, 2015, 
revised edition 2018); Sam Mullins, ‘Home-Grown’ Jihad: Understanding Islamist Terrorism in the 
US and UK (London: Imperial College Press, 2016); Peter R. Neumann, Radicalized: New Ji-
hadists and the Threat to the West (London: I.B. Tauris, 2016); Olivier Roy, Jihad and Death: The 
Global Appeal of the Islamist State (London: Hurst, 2017); Gilles Kepel, Terror in France: The Rise 
of Jihad in the West (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017); David Thomson, The Returned: 
They Left to Wage Jihad, Now They’re Back (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2018).  
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to turn their backs on the liberal Western societies in which they have grown up and to 
travel to conflict zones to create a conservative society based on religion despite the 
considerable risk of losing their freedom and/or being injured or even killed.7 At the 
same time, there has been relatively little research on jihadist milieus and networks in 
Europe and the way in which they have developed in recent years.8  
There has been virtually no research on jihadist activism in Finland. One probable 
reason for this is the lack of research into political and religious violence in Finland in 
general. This research topic has not been a priority area at any research institute and 
no specialisation studies in this field have been offered by any university. The details 
provided by the public authorities and particularly the (often brief) comments issued 
by SUPO are still the main source of information on the bearing of the phenomenon 
on Finland. This picture has been supplemented (and partially also questioned) by 
media reports, mainly produced by the Finnish Broadcasting Company (Yle) and the 
Helsingin Sanomat newspaper. However, when compared to other countries, there 
has been relatively little investigative journalism on the topic in Finland. 
The aforementioned report International Terrorism and Finland compiled by Toby 
Archer and published in 2004 and the SYPONUR study9 (2016), which discussed 
travel from Finland to Syria and Iraq, come closest to the topic of this study. In 
addition, Kristiina Koivunen has written a book called Suomen nuoret jihadistit – ja 
                                                     
 
7 The phenomenon of foreign fighters, their mobilisation in Europe and the Middle East and their 
flow to Syria and Iraq has been extensively studied in the following articles: Jakob Sheikh, “‘I Just 
Said it. The State’: Examining the Motivations for Danish Foreign Fighting in Syria”, Perspectives 
on Terrorism 10, no. 6 (2016); Edwin Bakker & Roel de Bont, ‘Belgian and Dutch Jihadist Foreign 
Fighters (2012–2015): Characteristics, Motivations, and Roles in the War in Syria and Iraq’, Small 
Wars & Insurgencies 27, no. 5 (2016); Sean Reynolds & Mohammed Hafez, ‘Social Network Anal-
ysis of German Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq’, Terrorism and Political Violence (2017); Lorne 
Dawson & Amarnath Amarasingam, ‘Talking to Foreign Fighters: Insights into the Motivations for 
Hijrah to Syria and Iraq’, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 40, no. 3 (2017); Amir Rostami et al., ‘The 
Swedish Mujahideen: An Exploratory Study of 41 Swedish Foreign Fighters Deceased in Syria 
and Iraq’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism (2018).  
8 There has been some research on European-based activities in the years preceding the war in 
Syria and in the early years of the conflict. In these studies, the focus is on Western European 
countries, especially Germany and the United Kingdom. See, for example, Guido Steinberg, Ger-
man Jihad: On the Internationalisation of Islamist Terrorism (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2013); Raffaello Pantucci, ‘We Love Death as You Love Life’: Britain’s Suburban Terrorists 
(London: Hurst, 2015); Nesser, Islamist Terrorism in Europe; Mullins, Home-Grown Jihad. Of the 
situation in Norway, see Brynjar Lia & Petter Nesser, ‘Jihadism in Norway: a Typology of Militant 
Networks in a peripheral European Country’, Perspectives on Terrorism 10, no. 6 (2016). Of the 
situation in Denmark, see Ann-Sophie Hemmingsen, ‘Plebeian Jihadism in Denmark: An Individ-
ualisation and Popularization Predating the Growth of the Islamic State’, Perspectives on Terror-
ism 10, no. 6 (2016).  
9 Marko Juntunen, Karin Creutz-Sundblom & Juha Saarinen, Suomesta Syyrian ja Irakin konflikti-
kentälle suuntautuva liikkuvuus. Publications of the Government´s analysis, assessment and re-
search activities 43/2016, https://tietokayttoon.fi/documents/10616/2009122/43_Suomesta+ Syyr-
ian+ja+Irakin+konfliktikent%C3%A4lle+suuntautuva+liikkuvuus.pdf/c3211f98-4522-49728867-
8ece7664d9ec?version=1.0. 
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miten radikalisoituminen torjutaan10 (Finland’s young jihadists and how to combat 
radicalisation). However, despite its name, only a small part of the book is devoted to 
the situation in Finland. The topic is also discussed in a small number of articles, 
although mostly at quite a general level.11 Jihadist activism, its prevention and media 
coverage are also addressed from a variety of perspectives in a small number of 
academic theses.12 
1.3 Data and methods 
Studying violent political and religious campaigns and their support activities poses a 
number of challenges and this has also been the case with the preparation of this 
report. 
Securing access to research data has been the most difficult challenge. It is typical of 
European jihadist activism that only a relatively small number of people is privy to the 
details of the activities and those involved are often extremely reluctant to talk to 
outsiders. Access to confidential documents produced by intelligence and security 
agencies is one way of improving the situation. From the perspective of academic 
research, this material is not without its problems either; for example, in most cases 
the information source remains unknown. 
This report is almost entirely based on open sources, which means that no official 
documents classified as confidential have been used. The authors have addressed 
the data accessibility problems by using different types of data in parallel (by applying 
document triangulation). The acquisition of the data has partially been made in 
                                                     
 
10 Kristiina Koivunen, Suomen nuoret jihadistit - ja miten radikalisoituminen torjutaan (Helsinki: Into 
Kustannus 2016). 
11 For example, Anssi Kullberg, ‘Radikalismi Suomen muslimiyhteisöissä: ulkomaisten konfliktien 
ja kansainvälisen islamin vaikutus’, in Anssi Kullberg (ed.), Suomi, terrorismi, SUPO: Koira joka ei 
haukkunut (Helsinki: WSOY, 2011); Juha Saarinen, ‘Vierastaistelijailmiö islamilaisessa maail-
massa Afganistanista Syyriaan’, in Antti Paronen & Olli Teirilä (ed.), Vihatkoon kunhan pelkäävät: 
Näkökulmia terrorismiin ilmiönä. Department of Strategic and Defence Studies, Series 2: Re-
search Reports No 51 (Helsinki: National Defence University); Juha Saarinen, ‘The Finnish For-
eign Fighter Contingent in Syria’, CTC Sentinel 7, no. 3 (2014); Juha Saarinen, ‘Finland Raises 
Terror Alert as Jihadist Scene Grows More Complex’, Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor 
14, no. 7 (2016). 
12 For example, Daniel Sallamaa, The human bombs next door: Finnish media portrayals of home-
grown terrorism’s causal dynamics 2005–2011. Master’s thesis, University of Helsinki (2014); Miia 
Kauppila, Väkivaltaisen ekstremismin ennaltaehkäiseminen Suomessa. Master’s thesis, 
University of Tampere (2016); Ann-Sofie Nyström, Till Syrien och tillbaka. En kvalitativ studie om 
unga vuxnas resor till Syrien, deras livssituationer, behov och möten med myndigheter efter 
hemkomsten. Master’s thesis, University of Helsinki (2017); Sara Kupsala, “Toiset kutsuu sitä uh-
rautumiseks”: Narratiivinen tapaustutkimus radikalisoitumiseksi kutsutun prosessin yksilöllisistä 
merkityksistä. Master’s thesis, University of Lapland (2018).  
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conjunction with the study Jihadist online communication and Finland. The most 
important data used in this study is as follows: 
• Internet and social media – especially the Finnish-language material and the 
material produced by individuals living in Finland and individuals connected to 
Finnish networks. 
• Relevant public documents, such as documents on court proceedings and 
criminal investigations. 
• Interviews with actors connected to the phenomenon in various ways, such as 
representatives of Muslim communities, journalists, actors involved in the 
prevention of violent extremism, security authorities, and people closely 
associated with individuals participating in jihadist activities. About 40 
interviews were conducted for this report and about half of them were made 
with representatives of Muslim communities. The aim was to interview 
individuals who the research team understood to have access to information 
essential for this study through their work, other activities or social 
connections. This cohort of interviewees was supplemented on the basis of 
the tips received from earlier interviewees. It would have been possible to 
conduct more interviews; however, the resources allocated to this project did 
not facilitate this. The purpose of the interviews was to supplement the 
information obtained from written sources. 
• Existing literature and media sources – research literature discussing the topic 
from the Finnish perspective and providing background information on the 
Finnish situation, reports, and news coverage of jihadist activism and Finland 
in the domestic and international media. 
• Research on European jihadist networks and their global links, and 
consultations with leading international researchers, in order to provide 
information on the international context and the international connections 
between these networks. The research team was in contact with a large 
number of researchers monitoring developments in jihadist activism in 
Europe. 
With the research permit granted by the National Police Board, the research team 
was able to conduct interviews that provided it with access to official police 
information that was not necessarily available via open sources. Access to information 
held by SUPO was beyond the scope of the permit. 
By using the aforementioned data, the research team has attempted to produce a 
detailed overview of the jihadist actors and networks in Finland and the relationships 
PUBLICATIONS OF THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR 2019:31 
 
21 
 
 
between these networks and other relevant actors. The reliability of the data collected 
from different sources has been assessed in accordance with the practices governing 
academic research, using the principles of internal and external source criticism and 
by making comparisons between the data. The observations have been collated into a 
comprehensive body of data by using models and theories of jihadist activism in 
Europe developed in academic research. 
1.4 Limitations of the study 
Even though a broad range of different sources were used in the study and new 
information was produced (e.g. through interviews), the study also came with major 
limitations. Most of these limitations do not only apply to this study alone, but rather to 
all research on this topic. Some of these limitations concern the nature of the 
phenomenon examined, while others pertain to the state of the research and official 
reporting on it, especially in Finland.  
This research project was launched at a time when there was very little publicly 
available information on jihadist activism in Finland. As a result, most of the publicly 
available information has originated from official sources or the media. The 
information content of these sources, too, is extremely limited. 
This is not a unique starting point when the research focus is on political movements 
that are still active or that have recently been dissolved, especially if the persons 
involved in them have tried to keep the operations secret. It is well-known in research 
on political violence that new information on what has happened tends to continue 
emerging even after several decades. For example, the information on the flow of 
foreign fighters to Syria and Iraq remains scarce, and not only in Finland. 
Even after taking the aforementioned factors into consideration, there is still unusually 
little publicly available information on the topic in Finland. Indeed, compared to many 
other Western European countries, only a limited amount of information on jihadist 
activism based on official sources is publicly available. This is primarily the result of 
the limited number of criminal investigations into terrorist offences in Finland that have 
resulted in charges and, consequently, led to information pertaining to these cases 
being made publicly available. Even though, from the perspective of academic 
research, the use of sources such as criminal investigation records is not without its 
problems, data of this kind has been highly useful in conducting research on the topic. 
The situation regarding the paucity of available information is not made any easier by 
the fact that the authorities provide little information on terrorism-related 
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developments even though a more open approach has been adopted, especially over 
the past five years.13 SUPO has been by far the most active communicator in this 
respect. Having said this, SUPO remains relatively tight-lipped and much of the 
information supplied by the agency is of a general nature and is so ambiguous and 
obscure that even researchers specialising in the phenomenon have struggled to 
decipher it. For example, it is not always easy to understand what is meant by the 
brief and generalised comments. This is regrettable, as it is not always possible to 
discern what the statements and reports are referring to and, for this reason, it is very 
difficult for outsiders to confirm or question these accounts. This situation has also 
frequently led to misunderstandings in the news reports and public debate on the 
topic. 
It would be desirable, both from the perspective of the development of research and 
the public debate on the topic, that the grounds for the assessments on jihadist 
activism would be elaborated in more detail and public reporting made more 
extensive. The practical needs concerning counter-terrorism operations and privacy 
protection do, however, impose necessary and justifiable limitations on what can be 
publicly shared. Finland could nevertheless adopt a more open communications 
policy. Indeed, in contrast, many Western countries have published substantially more 
comprehensive and detailed reports on jihadist activism in their territory. 
Despite the considerable increase in reporting on this topic over the past five years, 
news coverage of jihadist activism and Finland has historically been rather limited. 
Such issues as the background of the individuals travelling to Syria and Iraq have 
been discussed more extensively in the news reports than in the information released 
by the authorities. At the same time, journalists have not been particularly active in 
seeking information on the topic. There remains, however, only a small number of 
journalists with in-depth knowledge of the subject. For the most part, the news 
coverage of jihadist activism in Finland has been based on the information supplied 
by the authorities. Furthermore, investigative journalism in Finland has tended to 
focus on individuals and cases about which official information has been available 
(individuals subject to criminal investigations and those on trial). 
As a whole, reporting on jihadist activism has not been particularly extensive. Only a 
small minority of the foreign fighters that have travelled from Finland to Syria and Iraq 
have been the subject of notable media coverage. At the same time, there has been 
little reporting on the individuals that have taken part in non-violent support activities, 
                                                     
 
13 In 2013, the Ministry of the Interior started publishing situation overviews of violent extremism, 
and as a result, there is now significantly more official information available on the topic.  
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except for the trial connected to Al-Shabaab and the activities of Ansar al-Islam and 
Rawti Shax.  
Furthermore, no overview of jihadist activism in Finland has been available until now. 
Consequently, the current study began by piecing together the information fragments 
on the topic. The remaining gaps in the resulting picture were filled by means of 
additional research. While many gaps in our knowledge persist, it was beyond the 
scope of this study to attempt to fill them all. 
The issue of our knowledge of jihadist activism is compounded by the extremely 
limited amount of research information available on many of the issues that would 
have constituted essential background information for this study. Perhaps the most 
important of these is the scant research on the level of political and religious activism 
of Muslims living in Finland and the fact that practically no research has been 
conducted on the evolution of salafism in Finland. 
Consequently, there are aspects of the phenomenon that have not been covered in 
this report and should be studied in future research. To this end, the analysis provided 
by this report should be considered as a preliminary and approximated assessment of 
the development of jihadist activism in Finland in the first two decades of the 2000s. 
What are the gaps in our existing knowledge then? First of all, we know a great deal 
more about jihadist activism in the 2010s than about jihadist activism in the preceding 
decades. The SUPO annual report, which was first published in 1994, is to some 
extent the only official information source on jihadist activism in Finland in the 1990s 
and the first decade of the 2000s. However, until recent years, the chapter of the 
report describing counterterrorism has almost exclusively focused on changes in the 
international operating environment and improvements in counter-terrorism efforts. 
The situation in Finland is usually described in only a few sentences of a highly 
general nature. 
It should also be noted that, for many years, the resources allocated to 
counterterrorism were extremely limited and substantial increases have only been 
introduced in recent years. Therefore, it is quite possible that not even the authorities 
have been aware of all activities taking place inside Finland’s borders. Media sources 
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add little to this picture. Almost without exception, journalism based on the information 
acquired by the reporters themselves was non-existent until 2013.14  
The second disparity concerns operating practices. The official reports and news 
articles have focused on violent activism (planning and carrying out attacks and the 
phenomenon of foreign fighters), whereas much less attention has been paid to non-
violent support activities. This is the case even though, at least in other countries, 
non-violent support activities have carried out on a larger scale than the planning of 
attacks and travelling as fighters to conflict zones. 
Thirdly, it is by no means certain that the media attention has been focused on the 
phenomena and individuals that are the most central to the jihadist activities. The 
attention has been on individuals subject to criminal investigations or on those that 
have appeared on such platforms as the websites of armed jihadist groups. This has 
increased the likelihood of actors that are less important to our understanding of the 
phenomenon being the focus of attention while those networks and individuals of 
greater importance have attracted less publicity. 
1.5 Research ethics 
Consideration of ethical issues is fundamental to research carried out in accordance 
with the principles of academic research. This report was prepared in accordance with 
the ethical principles observed in field of humanities research. The University of 
Helsinki Ethical Review Board in Humanities and Social and Behavioural Sciences 
was also asked to provide a preliminary assessment of the study. In terms of the 
methods and data used, this study is a reasonably typical example of social sciences 
research. However, owing to the nature of the phenomenon under examination, it has 
been necessary to consider several perspectives unique to the topic in question. 
This specificity particularly applies to the conducting of the interviews. Interviews are 
extensively used as a research method in social sciences and especially in research 
on phenomena that are difficult to study (solely) on the basis of written data. There 
are well-established good practices regarding the use of interviews in research and 
these were also applied in this study. The objectives of the study were 
comprehensively described to the interviewees and they were offered the opportunity 
                                                     
 
14 The most important exceptions have been the MOT television document on Ansar al-Islam ac-
tivism in Finland produced by Yle around 2004 and the stories in the Helsingin Sanomat newspa-
per in 2009 of a man deported from Sweden to Finland due to suspected involvement in terrorism. 
These reports are discussed in sub-chapter 4.1. 
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to give the interviews anonymously so that they cannot be identified in the 
publications generated by this study. Moreover, the interviews conducted for this 
study done so confidentially, researchers involved being responsible for ensuring the 
privacy of the interviewees. In accordance with this consideration, the interview 
transcripts and recordings have been stored in such a way that only the research 
team members are able to access them. Ensuring the strict confidentiality of the 
interviews was of particular importance owing to the sensitive nature of the research 
topic. 
Furthermore, in accordance with the principles of ethical research, the research 
material may only be used and disclosed for research purposes. The principles also 
state that it is particularly reprehensible to disclose details contained in the research 
material or disclose information in such a way that it could impact the treatment or 
status of the research participants or the way in which they are assessed. The 
principles also state that details of the individuals covered by the research may not be 
disclosed to tax authorities, social welfare authorities or the police.15 The purpose of 
humanities research is to produce scientific information on social phenomena and the 
researchers involved are primarily responsible for ensuring the privacy of the 
interviewees. The obligation of every citizen to report serious offences that are in the 
process of being committed and can still be prevented is an exception to this rule. 
There may also be circumstances provided for in the Child Welfare Act in which the 
confidentiality obligation is not absolute. These principles have also been strictly 
observed in this study. 
The issues concerning the protection of privacy and social stigma have influenced the 
way in which this report has been written. Individuals connected to terrorism in one 
way or another and the people closely associated with them are often strongly 
stigmatised. Such stigmatisation may have a significant effect on the lives of the 
identified persons and people close to them, irrespective of whether this 
stigmatisation is based on facts or whether the stigmatised persons are actually 
involved in jihadist activities. It should also be emphasised that not all the activities 
addressed in this study are illegal, even though many of the organisations that have 
been supported by the networks and individuals operating in Finland have been 
defined as terrorist organisations. Consequently, many of the activities around them 
have been criminalised (such as recruitment and fundraising).  
                                                     
 
15 The Finnish National Board on Research Integrity, the ethical principles for research on human-
ities, social sciences and behavioural sciences and a proposal for ethical preview (2009, viewable 
at http://www.tenk.fi/sites/tenk.fi/files/eettisetperiaatteet.pdf; in Finnish). 
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For this reason, individual persons are not named or otherwise described in a manner 
that would make them identifiable in this report. This particularly applies to information 
that has not yet been made public. The report only names individuals whose 
involvement in jihadist activism is already public knowledge and has been confirmed 
or who have, for example, disseminated or produced openly accessible jihadist online 
material under their own names. This is also in line with the purpose of this study. The 
purpose of this study is not to determine who has been involved in jihadist activism 
but, rather, to determine the types of jihadist activism that are carried out in Finland. It 
is perfectly possible to satisfactorily answer this question without naming specific 
individuals. 
Another reason for not describing specific individuals in detail is our intention not to 
associate the phenomenon with specific activists or to give these activists a higher 
standing within the jihadist milieu by giving them visibility in this report. 
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2 The relationship between jihadism, 
islamism and salafism  
Before turning our attention to jihadist activism, itself, it is necessary to clarify what 
this report refers to as jihadism and how it relates to some of the other phenomena 
and concepts that are often mentioned in the Finnish debate on the related 
phenomena. There has been a lack of clarity in the public debate as a result of 
jihadism, salafism and, more broadly, radical islamism being discussed in such a way 
that these concepts and their relationship to each other are rarely clearly defined. The 
conceptual variance and vague definitions are probably both a reason for and a 
symptom of this lack of clarity. 
2.1 Islamism  
Throughout its history, Islam has been interpreted in such a way that it also 
incorporates a socio-political system defining social order. Islam was an inseparable 
part of the administrative systems of Islamic societies until the 20th century, even 
though they have always existed alongside secular law and the local culture. Indeed, 
even though Islam has, in this sense, incorporated a clear political dimension for 
many centuries, the origin of the phenomenon often referred to as islamism (or 
political Islam) is significantly more recent.  
In part, islamism was a response to the encounter between Islam represented by 
declining Muslim societies and the modernity represented by technologically, 
scientifically, economically, and institutionally superior European empires. This led to 
European powers being increasingly influential in Islamic societies, especially from 
the 19th century onwards. This imbalance prompted Muslim intellectuals to analyse 
the reasons for the decline of Muslim societies and the growing disparity between 
them and European countries. The key question arising in this debate was whether 
the traditional Islamic socio-political system was actually superior. 
While islamism itself is an ideology born in the 20th century, it can be characterised 
as one reaction to the cultural and social influences brought by European empires. 
Growing Western influence gave rise to a broad range of different reactions in Islamic 
societies. In some places, it led to violent protests, while elsewhere it gave a boost to 
fundamentalist (and even Messianic) movements promoting a return to ‘pure Islam’ 
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free of outside influences.16 In a small number of cases, fundamentalist movements 
guarding the purity of Islam tried to achieve their goals by violent means by targeting 
Muslims that they considered heretics or infidels.  
One example of such thinking can be found in the early period of the religious 
movement that is now known as wahhabism.17 The aim of the group of followers 
gathering around Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab in the late 18th/early 19th century 
was to establish a religious community in the Arabian Peninsula (in cooperation with 
the Ibn Saud family, which founded Saudi Arabia) and to eradicate from the region all 
Muslims and Islamic movements that they considered heretic, especially the Shias, 
Sufi Muslims and their shrines.18  
Even though the movements promoting religious purity by violent means largely 
remained an exception, movements aiming to achieve the same goal through non-
violent means gained ground, especially in the latter half of the 19th century. 
However, few of these movements were political or revolutionary, as most of them 
focused on teaching and missionary work in their own communities. This started to 
change in the early part of the 20th century with the emergence of islamism.  
The roots of islamism can be traced back to the growing political and cultural 
influence of the Western powers in societies with Muslim majorities, the decline in the 
global influence and weight of the historical Islamic powers (especially the Ottoman 
Empire) and, in particular, the abolition of the caliphate, tied to the Ottoman Empire, in 
the 1920s.  
The key feature of the islamist ideology is the definition of Islam as a system covering 
all areas of life and not merely as a personal belief. According to the ideology and its 
representatives, the reactionary nature (in relation to the Western countries) and 
problems of Muslim societies (especially their political and cultural subservience to 
non-Islamic Western powers) were basically due to the fact that Muslims had rejected 
‘true Islam’ and their Muslim identity. In the islamists’ view, the answer to these 
problems was the return to ‘true’ Islam and the adoption of its principles in the 
creation of an Islamic society and state.19  
                                                     
 
16 Neumann, Radicalized: The New Jihadists, p. 35. 
17 Of wahhabism, its history and similarities and differences between wahhabism and salafism, 
see David Commins, ‘From Wahhabi to Salafi’, in Bernard Haykel, Thomas Hegghammer and 
Stéphane Lacroix (ed.), Saudi Arabia in Transition: Insights on Social, Political, Economic and 
Religious Change (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), pp. 151⎼166. 
18 Cook, Understanding Jihad, pp. 74⎼75. 
19 Dale Eickelman and James Piscatori, Muslim Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1996), pp. 44⎼45. 
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The best-known and most historically significant of the islamist movements is the 
Muslim Brotherhood, which was established in Egypt in 1928. During the 20th 
century, a diverse islamist social movement arose around the islamist ideology and 
this movement includes the Muslim Brotherhood, which has spread to other Arab 
states, as well as a wide range of political Islamic actors, which are ideologically, 
theologically, and organisationally different while predominantly being characterised 
by conservative values. The islamist world view also often includes beliefs based on 
conspiracy theories, according to which Islam is threatened by an external conspiracy, 
and anti-Western and anti-Semitic themes. Islamism is also characterised by 
collectivism, which means that members must be fully committed to the official line of 
their organisations.20  
Islamism is a highly diverse phenomenon and it has been strongly influenced by local 
contexts.21 Some of the islamist actors have taken part in party politics in their own 
countries as legal opposition parties, while others have remained outside political life, 
concentrating instead on social activism and charity. At the same time, others have 
focused on transnational activism. This has often been the case in countries that 
guarantee them freedom of action provided that they do not try to direct their activism 
against their local governments or criticise their rulers.22 This also means that islamist 
movements have differing opinions on how the establishment of an Islamic state and 
society should be promoted and what this state and society should look like.  
A small minority of the islamist movements have tried to achieve their aims through 
violent and revolutionary means, especially in the latter half of the 20th century. These 
violent islamist groupings are often referred to as Islamic extremism, violent islamism 
and, in particular, radical islamism. 
  
                                                     
 
20 Mohammed Hafez, Why Muslims Rebel: Repression and Resistance in the Islamic World (Boul-
der: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), p. 200; Lahoud, The Jihadis’ Path, pp. 116⎼117. 
21 Anders Strindberg and Mats Wärn, Islamism (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2011), pp. 205⎼206. See 
also Khaled Hroub (ed.), Political Islam: Context versus Ideology (London: SAQI, 2010). 
22 Especially the islamists of Saudi Arabia have emphasised the international dimension of the 
islamist movement and in particular, the solidarity between Muslims. This was highlighted during 
the flow of foreign fighters to Afghanistan in the 1980s. One reason for this was that they were 
only allowed to operate in Saudi Arabia if they refrained from criticising the royal family or did not 
try to gain political influence in the country. Hegghammer, Jihad in Saudi Arabia, pp. 16⎼30. 
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2.2 Radical islamism 
In public debate, research literature, and in official reports, the term ‘radical islamism’ 
has been used in many different meanings. As Thomas Hegghammer, a Norwegian 
researcher specialising in jihadism, has pointed out, in its broadest form, radical 
islamism has been understood in such a way that it refers to all islamist actors that 
use violence as part of their activities.23 Thus, when used in this way, the term is not 
limited to armed groups, such as Al-Qaeda and ISIS, to which it has been commonly 
linked during the past two decades, and instead covers a large number of groups 
engaged in armed activities and which are very different in terms of their ideologies, 
theological thinking, and organisational structures.  
According to this broad view, in addition to Al-Qaeda and ISIS, radical islamism also 
includes Hezbollah, a Lebanese group that represents the radical islamism connected 
with the Shia regime of Iran, and Hamas, a Palestinian islamist group waging war 
against Israel and has historically been associated with the Muslim Brotherhood of 
Egypt and its ideology.24  
Broadly speaking, the roots of radical islamism can be traced back to the 1950s, when 
radical sections supporting violent activism started emerging within the Muslim 
Brotherhood of Egypt.25 Sayyid Qutb, a member of the organisation, played a key role 
in the articulation of an ideology emphasising armed revolution (revolutionary 
islamism) on the basis of the islamism represented by the group. Armed islamist 
groups emerged in Egypt to promote this ideology (see Chapter 3).26 For many years, 
radical islamist groups and their violence were a marginal though growing 
phenomenon in the Middle East. In fact, until the late 1970s, most of the political 
violence affecting countries with Muslim majorities related to secular ideologies and 
nationalism. In practice, this first historically important ideological phase of radical 
islamism (revolutionary islamism) ended by the 1990s.  
There are still numerous radical islamist groups in various parts of Africa, the Middle 
East and Asia. A substantial proportion of the armed groups operating in Muslim-
majority countries and justifying their violence with religion has, however, partially 
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adopted more international ideologies based on revolutionary islamism, which are 
often collectively referred to as jihadism. References to radical islamism in the public 
forum in the West have almost exclusively been references to jihadism and Al-Qaeda 
and ISIS (and their affiliates and associates as its representations. Using terminology 
that refers more broadly to islamist movements when solely talking about jihadism 
unnecessarily blurs the differences between them.  
2.3 Salafism 
Salafism has been one of the most commonly used and poorly understood concepts 
in the public debate on jihadism. Especially in some Western countries, there is a 
highly suspicious and reserved attitude towards salafism. Salafists have often been 
characterised as militants or extremists, which is partly due to their religious 
conservatism and their rejection of other interpretations of Islam in particular.27 
Countercultural salafist environments and communities have added to the negative 
attitudes in the West. This is due to their complex relationship with jihadism as a 
phenomenon and contemptuous and sometimes hostile attitude towards the values 
and standards of the societies in which they live.28 
In its simplest definition, salafism is a branch of Sunni Islam that follows and tries to 
revive the form and means of practising Islam originating in its first three generations, 
particularly by way of safeguarding the purity of the religion. In other words, salafists 
believe that progress can be achieved through regression and aim to bring Muslims 
back to form of Islam that they consider original and pure and that provides Muslims 
with the basis for a perfect life.29 In the view of salafists, Islam was in its purest form 
during the first generations of the religion and they believe that they can return to this 
by rejecting more recent traditions and ways of interpreting the key teachings of Islam. 
For this reason, salafists are often described as ultra-conservative and literalist (i.e. 
believing that the holy scripts must be interpreted literally).  
It should be noted that adopting the salafist interpretation of Islam does not in itself 
lead to a specific attitude towards politics or towards ways of achieving political 
influence.30 Indeed, despite common theological bases, there are many different 
approaches to politics and methods of influencing it within the salafist branch. As 
Shiraz Maher, a researcher specialising in the history of jihadist ideology, writes in his 
book on the history of the salafi-jihadist ideology, the religious scholars publicly 
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defending the religious authority of the Saudi Arabian royal family, the islamists 
opposing the scholars, and the royal family and the jihadists employing violent means 
to fight the two all meet the definition of salafism.31 There are, therefore, significant 
disagreements between different actors on the key issues concerning its religious and 
political involvement. As a result, salafist movements may simultaneously contribute 
to social stability in Saudi Arabia and to polarisation and friction in Western Europe 
while spreading havoc and suffering in Syria and Iraq.  
Maher has developed a typology that is particularly useful in this context, as it helps 
clarify the apparent disparate structure of salafism. According to Maher, there are 
three main types of salafist actors: 
• Quietists who provide rulers with advice behind the scenes (such as the 
religious scholars of Saudi Arabia). 
• Activists who openly challenge the politics of their own states and work 
towards reforming them. These include many of the salafist political parties 
that became active in the Middle East after the Arab Spring. 
• Rejectionists who deny the legitimacy of their own states and the general 
international on religious grounds and work to overthrow them by violent 
means (e.g. Al-Qaeda and ISIS).32  
Historically, most radical islamist movements have constituted activism; that is to say 
that they have accepted the legitimacy of the state even if they work to reform it by 
violent means. Jihadist activity, which is the topic of this report, belongs to the last 
category.  
Jihadism is often referred to as salafi-jihadism because many of the salafist religious 
scholars and texts have played a key role in its development. Jihadists (like islamists) 
also base their ideology on texts and scholars important to Islamic traditions. Scholars 
central to the most pious branches of Islam (salafism and wahhabism), such as 
Ahmad ibn Hanbal, Ibn Taymiyyah, and Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, are 
theologically important in this respect. Their texts created the basis for the strict 
observance of religious purity and orthodoxy among jihadists. The salafi-jihadist view 
that Muslims who do not share their interpretation of Islam are not true Muslims, is 
also based on the religious interpretation by Wahhab.33 At the same time, the 
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interpretations of jihadists’ own ‘religious scholars’ (few of whom have received the 
traditional education of religious scholars) have mostly remained without wider 
acceptance, especially among other Islamic religious scholars.  
2.4 Jihadism  
Jihadism as a modern ideology and a social movement that started taking shape 
within the radical wing of the islamist movement in the 1980s. As described in the next 
chapter, its roots can be traced back to the conflict in Afghanistan and the flow of 
foreign fighters to that country in the 1980s. Jihadism, which evolved into a global  
movement in the 1990s and adopted the salafist theological approach, is united by 
identity, culture, vocabulary, and a way of talking about political, strategic, and 
religious matters.34  
Even though the emergence of the jihadist movement is closely connected to the 
history of revolutionary islamism, the first significant branch of radical islamism, the 
social movements that have arisen around islamism and jihadism have since gone 
their own ways; both in terms of their activities and ideologies.35 At the same time, in 
research literature, jihadism is often also considered as a branch of radical islamism. 
The belief that Islam and politics are inseparable still unites them. Moreover, both aim 
to create a society in accordance with their own interpretation of Islam. They also 
share an anti-Western attitude, anti-Semitism, and a view that Islam is facing an 
existential threat in the form of various conspiracies against it.  
Despite their similarities, jihadism is, in many ways, a distinct phenomenon from 
radical islamism. In fact, for many years, the jihadist movement has mainly defined 
itself in contrast to islamists, especially in relation to the observance of religious 
purity.36  
One key difference is that, as a rule, islamists accept the legitimacy of states and the 
international political system, whereas jihadists categorically reject the legitimacy of 
both on religious grounds. The defining characteristic of the jihadism represented by 
Al-Qaeda and ISIS is the rejection of the surrounding social structure and international 
order as un-Islamic and the aim to overthrow them through forms of armed action, 
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such as insurgency and terrorism, in order for an Islamic society to be established.37 
Thus, they do not only reject the legitimacy of laws drafted by humans but also the 
system of government. This means that jihadists consider contemporary Muslim 
states as un-Islamic constructs.  
Theologically, the islamist movement (including its radical representatives) 
encompasses a wide range of orientations and interpretations of Islam. At the same 
time, nearly all jihadist groups are theologically salafist even though there are different 
interpretations of the application of religious doctrines within the jihadist movement. 
Strategically, islamist actors (including a number of radical islamist actors, such as 
Hamas) mostly take part in party politics in their states and engage in social activism, 
while jihadists try to achieve change through armed action. Conversely, social 
activism and missionary work has also assumed an increasingly important role in the 
activities of jihadist groups in the 2010s in their attempts to govern the areas that they 
have temporarily occupied.38  
Jihadists have a distinctive interpretation of Jihad and, in many ways, this defines the 
entire movement, even though there are internal disagreements regarding 
interpretations. Interpreting Jihad as an armed struggle and the personal duty of every 
Muslim is typical of jihadism. Armed struggle is seen as a defensive measure 
because, in the jihadists’ view, Islam is facing a systematic attack that threatens its 
very existence. Consequently, all ongoing conflicts in Muslim countries are seen as 
part of this universal and global conflict between Islam and its many enemies.  
The belief that the armed struggle and participation in it are a significant form, if not 
the most significant form, of religious practice is also an essential part of the jihadist 
theology. Moreover, this is closely connected with the glorification of martyrdom, 
which, in historical terms, only played a minor role in Sunni Islam before the 
emergence of contemporary jihadism.39  
Over time, jihadist interpretations of the religion have also evolved alongside the 
developments in jihadist activities to justify the form and methods of violence 
necessitated and enabled by the strategic and political situations.40 The conflicts 
arising in such new situations and contexts between the observance of religious purity 
on the one hand and strategic and ideological opportunism on the other have led to 
the emergence of various branches within the movement. There are disagreements 
on key theological issues as well as ideological and strategic matters. These 
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disagreements have caused friction, disputes, and conflicts between the leading 
figures of the movement and even between armed groups. One example of this is the 
conflict between Al-Qaeda and ISIS (an offshoot of the former) in Syria, which erupted 
in 2013.  
There have been three main branches in the history of the jihadist movement. The 
first is the historically important classical jihadism, which is closely connected to the 
conflict in Afghanistan and the mobilisation of foreign fighters to that country and 
which formed the basis of the jihadist movement. The remaining two are the branches 
of global jihadism that have played a key role in recent world history: global jihadism 
linked to Al-Qaeda and the sectarian global jihadism, which is closely connected to 
ISIS.  
The global jihadism of Al-Qaeda had become the most influential branch within the 
jihadist movement at the beginning of the 2000s. For its part, the sectarian global 
jihadism linked to ISIS gained ground during the 2010s, especially as a result of the 
conflict in Syria and Iraq and the military successes and expansionary drive of ISIS  
the period 2013–2015.41 Even though these two branches do not define the 
phenomenon or its history as a whole, they have played a key role in its development 
and manifestations in different contexts.  
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3 Jihadist activism as a global and 
European phenomenon  
This chapter will provide an overview of the history and development of jihadism, its 
manifestations and background, from the start of the 20th century to the present day. 
Before reviewing the main jihadist ideologies (the classical jihadism of Abdullah 
Azzam, the global jihadism linked to Al-Qaeda, and the global sectarian jihadism 
represented by ISIS), the chapter introduces the history of revolutionary islamism, 
which is a key form of radical islamism.  
The purpose of the chapter is not to provide a comprehensive and detailed report on 
the aforementioned branches and the armed groups connected to them but, rather, to 
offer an overview of the diversity of jihadism, the key features of each branch, and the 
ways in which they have developed. The chapter then moves on to examine the 
manifestations of jihadism in Western Europe from the 1990s to the present day, with 
a focus on the impact of the conflict in Syria and ISIS on Europe.  
3.1 Revolutionary islamism  
The emergence and development of the international forms of jihadism can only be 
understood in relation to a broader historic context. This process is fundamentally 
connected to the birth of islamist ideology in the early years of the 20th century and in 
particular to the formation of the revolutionary branch of radical islamism in the latter 
half of the 20th century in Egypt, which have been described earlier in this report. 
Accordingly, the revolutionary islamism discussed in this chapter is one faction of 
radical islamism.  
Despite the popularity of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, it did not manage to 
achieve an influential position in the party politics or Islamise its system of 
government. The efforts of the group to Islamise the Egyptian society were more 
successful, however. In fact, the relationship between the Muslim Brotherhood and 
the Egyptian government became more problematic during the rule of President 
Gamal Abdel Nasser (1954⎼1970). Frustration with its own failures and the harsh 
measures employed by the regime served to boost radicalism within the organisation. 
So much so that voices expressing more accepting attitudes towards violent activism 
gained strength.  
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One of the most important figures voicing such opinions was Sayyid Qutb. His writings 
(especially Milestones and In the Shade of the Qu’ran) built a violent revolutionary 
ideology on the basis of the islamism of Al-Banna and the Muslim Brotherhood, and 
served as an inspiration for other radical islamist (and later for jihadist) thinkers.42 In 
the view of Qutb, all other ideologies except Islam have led to failed social systems. 
He felt that contemporary Muslim societies had turned their backs on true Islam and 
reverted to the pre-Islamic ignorance (jahiliyyah).  
The solution that Qutb propagated for this situation included the revival of Islam and a 
struggle against the societies characterised by ignorance and governments 
considered as un-Islamic. He believed that the duty of the vanguard of Muslims was 
to impose divine authority in their societies and that this should be carried out 
ruthlessly and by means of armed action.43  
Even though Qutb was executed in 1966 for his role in an attempt to assassinate 
Nasser, his writings inspired radical islamists for many years after his death. The 
revolutionary islamism that he had created gained a foothold in Egypt and also spread 
to other countries in the Middle East (such as Syria, where a brief and failed uprising 
took place in the 1980s44) and to Algeria, where islamists started armed resistance to 
the country’s regime in the early 1990s after the army had refused to accept the 
election victory of the islamists.  
The ideas promoted by Qutb also spread to Saudi Arabia, where many of his 
supporters had settled after fleeing the persecution of Muslim Brotherhood members, 
especially in Egypt and, to some extent, in other Arab socialist dictatorships hostile 
towards islamists, too.45 Supported by these networks established in Saudi Arabia, 
thousands of Saudis took part in the conflict in Afghanistan. Many of them also joined 
the jihadist movement that emerged during the war and took part in conflicts in such 
countries as Algeria, Bosnia, Tajikistan, and Chechnya in the 1990s.46 
The assassination of President Anwar al-Sadat by the Egyptian Islamic Jihad in 1981 
marked the peak of the revolutionary islamism in Egypt. The assassination was part of 
a wider (and failed) operation the aim of which was to overthrow the Egyptian 
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government. The act led to mass arrests of islamists and radical islamists,47 which 
continued throughout the 1980s and 1990s. The operational prerequisites of local 
armed groups, such as Islamic Jihad and the Islamic Group, weakened significantly, 
especially towards the end of the 1990s. The groups that continued their activities 
ended up carrying out increasingly destructive and unpopular attacks and alienating 
their supporters (especially in the middle class). Furthermore, with less freedom to 
operate, the activities of many armed groups, such as the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, 
were increasingly directed from other countries (Sudan and Afghanistan), as most of 
the leaders operating in their home countries were in prison.  
Revolutionary islamism was the most significant form of violent extremism in the 
Middle East until the end of the 1990s. While it was at its strongest in Egypt, it also 
had a weaker presence in other Arab socialist dictatorships that had imposed 
restrictions on Islamic activism or that had taken tough measures against it.48 In these 
cases, too, the groups only had limited success. An exception to this was Hamas, 
whose legitimacy was based on local rule and (violent) resistance to Israel.49 By the 
end of 1990s, with the exception of Hamas, nearly all revolutionary islamist groups 
had given up violence or had become incapable of continuing their revolutionary 
campaigns.  
Despite their failures, the groups left behind a large number of highly motivated and 
experienced activists and fighters, many of whom wanted to continue fighting for an 
Islamic society. With the development of jihadist branches emphasising more 
transnational violent activism, some of these groups found a home in the new conflict 
zones (especially Afghanistan and Pakistan). 
3.2 Afghanistan conflict and classical 
jihadism 
The birth of radical islamism aiming at revolutions in individual states can be dated 
back to the 1950s. The more international phenomenon of jihadism, however, only 
emerged thirty years later, in connection to the conflict in Afghanistan (1978-1992).50 
Classical jihadism, which builds on the writings and activism of Abdullah Azzam, a 
long-time Muslim Brotherhood activist and religious scholar, is closely connected to 
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the historically extensive participation of foreign fighters in the war in Afghanistan and 
the community that formed around it.51  
Thousands of members of radical islamist groups that had until then focused on their 
own national campaigns (mainly in North Africa), and foreign fighters (from the 
Persian Gulf region, especially Saudi Arabia) that had travelled to Afghanistan in this 
new framework of Jihad, gathered in the conflict zone to defend fellow Muslims 
against the Soviet Union, a foreign invader and occupier. A large number of 
transnational fighter and activist networks were established within this community. 
These networks later developed into a broader jihadi social movement and played a 
particularly important role in the spread of the foreign fighter phenomenon to conflicts 
affecting Muslim countries and Muslim populations around the world; especially in the 
1990s but also in in the first decade of the 2000s in Chechnya and Iraq.52 
Azzam’s interpretation of Jihad is characterised as classical in the research literature 
by virtue of it being closer to the historical interpretations of Jihad than the later global 
interpretations of Jihad or the interpretations of revolutionary islamism preceding 
Azzam (see Appendix 1 to this report).53 Instead of emphasising the opposition to 
Muslim regimes considered as un-Islamic, for Azzam, the core of Jihad was the 
defence of Muslim regions and regions that had belonged to Muslims.54 He explained 
that if a region historically or currently belonging to Muslims anywhere in the world is 
attacked from outside, the situation requires an immediate armed intervention. In this 
view, participation in Jihad is not only the duty of the local population, but also a 
personal religious obligation of all Muslims. For Azzam, both the political elites and 
traditional religious scholars should support Jihad in such situations and if they are 
against an intervention, their opinions should be ignored.55 Furthermore, in his view, 
the true Islamic society of the early days and the Islamic world power could only be 
restored through armed Jihad.56  
The narrative that is put forward in Azzam’s writings continues to be repeated in the 
communication of different jihadist groups. According to Azzam, the community of 
Islam (umma) is facing an existential external threat. This is emphasised in the 
communication aimed at foreign fighters through the highlighting of the suffering 
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experienced by Muslim civilians and the destruction of religious symbols (such as 
mosques) in conflict zones. This helps to reinforce the impression that a global and 
total war is being fought between Islam and its enemies. In order to rectify the 
situation, Muslims must take up arms to assist fellow Muslims living in different conflict 
zones. In this view, this is necessary not only because it is required by Islamic Law 
but also because the enemy is so cunning and deceitful that no other solution is 
possible. Participation in armed action in conflict zones is presented as a personal 
duty of each (male) Muslim. Unlike the more recent branches of jihadism discussed 
below, Azzam did not yet accept armed activism outside conflict zones.57 
In addition to this, the emphasis on participation in armed struggle and particularly the 
religious importance of martyrdom were perhaps Azzam’s most important 
contributions to the development of the jihadist thought that emerged after him. This 
has been further developed within jihadism in recent decades.58 According to one of 
Azzam’s well-known sayings, the pride, honour, and natural status of Muslims as 
leaders of the international political system can only be restored through Jihad and 
the rifle, and not through negotiations, conferences or dialogue.  
Azzam was not only the key theologian of the new doctrine of Jihad but he also 
actively inspired and recruited new foreign fighters to the conflict in Afghanistan. 
During the conflict, he made preaching and recruitment trips to many Muslim-majority 
countries and a number of Western countries (including the United States). The 
material produced by the Afghan Services Bureau, an organisation established by 
Azzam, was disseminated and eagerly read in the Middle East and to a lesser extent 
in Western countries (including Nordic countries).  
Over time, Afghanistan became the destination of one of the largest flows of foreign 
fighters in history and it is estimated that up to 20,000 foreign fighters took part in the 
conflict.59 At the same time, some of these participants, such as Anwar al-Awlaki, who 
later became an important figure within the jihadist movement, only arrived in the 
conflict zone after the Soviet withdrawal and did not actually take part in the fighting.60 
This was also the case with Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, whose career is discussed later in 
this report. Even though, according to islamist and jihadist mythology, the mobilisation 
in Afghanistan was extensive, spontaneous, and almost immediate, Azzam’s writings 
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and active recruitment were, in practice, the main forces behind the process and they 
only started bearing fruit around the mid-1980s.61  
Based on the lessons learned in Afghanistan, Azzam intended to train an army of 
experienced Muslim volunteers that would participate in conflicts in areas which they 
thought belonged to Muslims but were the subject of an enemy attack (such as in 
Afghanistan) or were occupied by foreign invaders (such as in Israel). Thus, in 
Azzam’s interpretation of Jihad, the soldiers of the non-Islamic enemy operating in 
Muslim areas were the enemies. In this respect, his interpretation differs significantly 
from the forms of jihadism represented by Al-Qaeda and ISIS in which civilians of the 
enemy powers are also considered as enemies and justified targets of violence 
(especially) outside conflict zones.62  
The prominent role and importance of Azzam in the jihadi community were partially 
based on his charisma and the credibility drawn from his traditional religious 
education. His popularity also caused friction within the community, however; 
especially among those who did not share his views of Jihad. Azzam was killed by a 
car bomb in the city of Peshawar in Pakistan in 1989. Although not in the form of an 
organisation, his interpretation of Jihad did nevertheless outlive him.  
The assassination of Azzam left a power vacuum at the top of the jihadist movement; 
one which several persons attempted to fill. In the end, the struggle was won by 
Osama bin Laden from Saudi Arabia, who had cooperated with Azzam in the 1980s 
and who rose to fame with the attacks of 11 September 2001. This all happened 
despite the fact that he left Afghanistan several months before Azzam’s death (and 
did not return until 1996) and despite the first years of Al-Qaeda, the group he had 
established, being characterised by failures.  
3.3 Al-Qaeda and global jihadism 
The conflict in Afghanistan and the mobilisation of foreign fighters to that country were 
also key factors in the formation of the group known as Al-Qaeda. The origins of Al-
Qaeda can be traced back to a network of foreign fighters from Arab countries in the 
Middle East who gathered around Osama bin Laden in the late 1980s. By that time, 
Al-Qaeda had split from the Afghan Services Bureau established by Azzam. It only 
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achieved wider publicity, however, as a result of the attacks of 11 September 2001.63 
A more detailed examination of the history of Al-Qaeda is beyond the scope of this 
report. Indeed, its organisation, strategy, and ideology have evolved considerably 
over the past 30 years.64 This report confines its examination of Al-Qaeda in the form 
it occupied in the first decade of the 21st century, that is to say, as an organisation 
promoting its salafi-jihadist ideology and comprised of three separate but intertwined 
sections: the central leadership (the core), local affiliates, and a wider ideological 
movement built around them.65 
The central leadership refers to the core of Al-Qaeda and the part of its historic 
organisational structure that survived the war in Afghanistan, which began in 2001, 
and the counter-terrorism operations targeting the organisation since then. These 
operations have claimed the lives of many jihadist veterans belonging to the central 
leadership.66 As noted by Anne Stenersen, a Norwegian researcher specialising in the 
group’s history, the central leadership should primarily be understood as a 
revolutionary vanguard that throughout its existence has supported and trained 
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terrorism carried out in its name. It seems that Hoffman has the facts on his side: the 2014 book, 
jointly compiled by Hoffman and Fernando Reinares, provided empirical evidence that Al-Qaeda 
had a clear role in many of the terrorist attacks carried out in its name between 2001 and 2011. 
See Bruce Hoffman & Fernando Reinares (ed.), The Evolution of The Global Terrorist Threat: 
From 9/11 to Osama bin Laden’s Death (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014).  
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Muslim rebels taking part in different conflicts, as well as the armed groups 
representing them, in order to spread its jihadist ideology and to achieve its aim 
(revolutions in Muslim countries and ultimately the re-establishment of the 
caliphate).67 Despite becoming weaker, the Al-Qaeda central leadership continues to 
work actively to carry out terrorist attacks.68 
For a substantial part of its existence, Al-Qaeda has been guided by the idea of global 
Jihad, and international terrorism (especially highly-visible and destructive attacks 
against soft symbolic targets in the West) has been a key component of its activities.69 
Al-Qaeda’s strategic thinking has, however, evolved considerably throughout the 
organisation’s history, reflecting major changes in its operating environment and 
organisation, especially during and after the first decade of the 21st century.  
From the late 1990s to the early years of the 2000s, Al-Qaeda was a united 
organisation with a central leadership, and it had extensive networks in different parts 
of the world that specialised in recruitment and various types of activism. These 
networks were particularly strong in Afghanistan, where the organisation was able to 
operate freely between 1996 and 2001.70 The operational role of the group’s central 
leadership decreased as its recruitment, training, and attack infrastructures in different 
parts of the world were dissolved by the middle of the 2000s, as a result of 
increasingly intensive counter-terrorism operations.  
In order to be able to continue its activities and to maintain its influence after the loss 
of Afghanistan, Al-Qaeda’s central leadership systematically tried to expand its 
operations by sending its fighters to such countries as Saudi Arabia and Yemen in 
order to establish new local organisations or to bring existing armed groups under its 
control, which it was able to do in such countries as Algeria, Iraq, and Somalia.71 
These local organisations and allies have become increasingly important players in 
Al-Qaeda’s operations and, as a result, the objectives of the local organisations, 
which are often closely connected to their local contexts and operating environments, 
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have received a higher priority in Al-Qaeda at the expense of its global interests and 
strategy. This has been referred to as the hybridisation of Al-Qaeda’s ideology and 
strategy, which resulted in the boundary between nearby (local regimes considered as 
un-Islamic) and distant enemies (their foreign supporters and the United States and 
its allies), as well as the enemy hierarchy, becoming more vague in the rhetoric and 
activities of the local groups.72 Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), operating 
in Yemen, is the only one of Al-Qaeda’s local organisations that has systematically 
directed its message at target groups in the West and carried out international terrorist 
attacks even though in its case, too, most of these operations took place between 
2009 and 2011.  
There have been indications in the 2010s that Al-Qaeda has tried to bring armed 
groups operating in different conflict zones under its control in secret or less 
conspicuously.73 It seems that during the leadership of Ayman al-Zawahiri, Al-Qaeda 
has no longer demanded that its local organisations openly declare the organisational 
bond by adding Al-Qaeda to their name (such as Jabhat al-Nusra in Syria) or that its 
new allies publicly swear an oath of allegiance to Al-Qaeda. This has probably been 
done in order to ensure the functioning of its new strategy by focusing on local 
conflicts, unlike its earlier strategy, which was based on international terrorism. After 
the Arab Spring, local representatives of Al-Qaeda tried to operate as part of a 
broader front of rebels and gain support among the local population.74  
In addition to the local organisations, a less coherent social movement sharing the 
ideology and goals of Al-Qaeda emerged around the central leadership by the early 
years of the 2000s. Al-Qaeda has, with varying degree of success, tried to inspire and 
even support (mostly independent) individuals, cells, and networks belonging to the 
movement in the carrying out of terrorist attacks.75 Foreign fighters that have received 
combat experience or terrorist training in the ranks of Al-Qaeda have been particularly 
helpful to the organisation in the latter regard. These individuals have frequently acted 
as liaisons between local activists and groups operating in conflict zones. Historically, 
foreign fighters have played an important role in the establishment of independent 
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attack cells, in the carrying out of violent attacks, and in the building of extensive 
networks in Europe.76  
The years after the Arab Spring have been difficult for Al-Qaeda in many ways. This is 
largely due to the fact that ISIS, which has its origins in Al-Qaeda’s former local 
organisation in Iraq, has challenged Al-Qaeda’s leadership in the jihadist movement 
and replaced it as the key jihadist group in Syria, the recent focal point of the 
phenomenon.77 Moreover, as a result of the military action targeting the central 
leadership, many of key leaders of the group have been eliminated, including its 
founder and first leader Osama bin Laden who was killed in an US military operation 
in Abbottabad, Pakistan in 2011. Despite its setbacks, Al-Qaeda has patiently, 
systematically, and, in many ways, successfully expanded its operations in regions in 
which it was already active in the past, expanded to new regions, and exploited more 
extensively the instability in different parts of the Muslim world.78  
Even though ISIS has undoubtedly received more visibility over the past five years, 
Al-Qaeda, which is built on stronger strategical foundations, may still manage to 
replace ISIS (which has suffered a number of setbacks) as the symbolic leader of the 
jihadist movement. This may well happen if Al-Qaeda is able to maintain its image as 
a more ‘moderate’ alternative to ISIS within the jihadist movement and keep its local 
organisations more tightly under the control of the central leadership.  
The fact remains, however, that during the past five years, Al-Qaeda has been far 
less capable of inspiring its supporters to carry out terrorist attacks than ISIS, 
especially in the West.79 In this respect, the organisation is burdened by its ageing 
and uncharismatic leader Ayman al-Zawahiri and a communication infrastructure that 
seems badly outdated (especially in comparison to ISIS) in terms of the content it 
produces and its distribution channels. The group has attempted to address these 
deficiencies by giving Hamza, the son of Osama bin Laden, an increasingly visible 
role in its communications. This has fuelled speculation about his future role in the 
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organisation.80 Despite its strengths, Al-Qaeda faces major problems if it intends to 
successfully challenge the leading position of a weakened ISIS in the near future.  
3.4 Global sectarian jihadism of ISIS 
The organisation currently known as ISIS and its ideology represent the third major 
branch of jihadism. Its roots can also be traced back to the Afghanistan of the late 
1980s, when the leadership vacuum following the death of Azzam (and the return of 
bin Laden to Saudi Arabia) led to rivalry and disagreements and the formation of new 
interpretations within the jihadist movement. The interpretations originating in the 
“Jalalabad school” played a key role in the formation of the ideology of ISIS. It 
emphasised religious purity (especially the role of the takfir doctrine81), resistance to 
the authority of respected jihadist leaders, and a less restrictive use of violence in 
conflict situations, including its use against groups that had a more liberal attitude 
towards religious purity. The influence of this branch of jihadism was first felt in the 
brutal civil war of Algeria in the 1990s, in which it was particularly closely connected to 
the radical islamist group GIA and the jihadist group GSPC (an offshoot of GIA). 
GSPC joined Al-Qaeda in the first decade of the 2000s and adopted the name Al-
Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).82 
As an armed group, however, ISIS has only existed since 1999.83 It was then that Abu 
Musab al-Zarqawi, a former petty criminal from Jordan, established the group in 
western Afghanistan. Al-Zarqawi began his jihadist career in Afghanistan at the end of 
1980s. Even though al-Zarqawi travelled to Afghanistan for the first time in 1989, with 
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the intention of taking part in the Jihad against the Soviet troops that had left the 
country a few weeks earlier, he only joined the fighting in 1991 when Afghanistan was 
already in a state of chaos.84 After returning to Jordan in 1993, al-Zarqawi continued 
to engage in jihadist activities and was arrested one year later for planning a terrorist 
attack. He returned to Afghanistan after being released from prison in Jordan in 1999.  
Soon after arriving in Afghanistan, al-Zarqawi established a group of his own, which 
mostly attracted Arab jihadists from the Levant countries.85 The ‘start-up grant’ 
provided by Al-Qaeda helped al-Zarqawi to establish the group. Even though the 
group joined Al-Qaeda in 2004, it did not fully share its jihadist ideology and 
interpretation.86 Indeed, unlike Al-Qaeda, the strategic focus of al-Zarqawi’s group 
was not on external enemies and international terrorism; instead, its aim was to 
overthrow the governments of Jordan (al-Zarqawi’s home country) and other Levant 
countries.87  
As a result of the invasion of Afghanistan in autumn 2001, however, al-Zarqawi’s 
group lost its training facilities and scattered, with some of its members fleeing for 
Pakistan and others heading for the Kurdish areas of Iraq close to the Iranian border. 
At the time, the latter area was under the control of Ansar al-Islam, which consisted of 
Iraqi Kurds, and was friendly towards al-Zarqawi’s group. This is how al-Zarqawi 
arrived in Iraq in 2002; anticipating that it was only a matter of time before a US 
invasion and that this would create opportunities for opening up a new front. Even 
though the ideology of al-Zarqawi’s group was partially formulated during the years 
spent in Afghanistan (1999⎼2001), its current objectives and strategy only started 
taking shape after the invasion and occupation of Iraq, which began in 2003. The goal 
of Al-Zarqawi and his group was the establishment of a pure Islamic society in Iraq 
and the areas adjacent to it, and they tried to promote this objective by stirring up a 
sectarian civil war between the country’s Shia and Sunni communities.  
During the first months of the conflict, al-Zarqawi became known as an exceptionally 
violent but effective commander whose armed group (which mostly comprised foreign 
fighters from other Arab countries) was one of the most visible and effective groups in 
the ‘Sunni revolt’ against the American occupation.88 The group carried out a number 
of deadly terrorist attacks, targeting UN buildings and important Shia shrines and 
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leaders. The group even achieved notoriety in jihadist circles after sending Al Jazeera 
a video recording in which a man dressed in black (perhaps al-Zarqawi himself) 
executed Nicholas Berg, an American hostage dressed in orange clothes, by severing 
his head.89 The same symbolism was tragically repeated in 2014 when, in a video 
published by ISIS in August 2014, James Foley, wearing an orange uniform, was 
executed in the same manner. The execution was carried out by Mohammed Emwazi, 
a UK citizen known as ‘Jihadi John’. 
Al-Zarqawi’s group officially placed itself under the authority of Al-Qaeda in October 
2004 in order to benefit from its financing network and to use the Al-Qaeda brand in 
such activities as recruitment and fundraising.90 However, the ideological and 
strategic differences between the Al-Qaeda leadership and al-Zarqawi already 
became evident in 2005. These differences mainly stemmed from the fact that al-
Zarqawi and Al-Qaeda had different ideas about whom the jihadists should consider 
to be their main enemy. Whereas Al-Qaeda wanted al-Zarqawi to strike at the 
occupiers in line with the strategy of global Jihad, al-Zarqawi tried to provoke Shias to 
attack Sunnis. Al-Zarqawi thought that by doing this he could force Sunnis to defend 
themselves against Shias, whom he considered to be the worst enemies of Islam. Al-
Zarqawi was killed in a US air strike in June 2006 and the disagreements with Al-
Qaeda were forgotten. They resurfaced in 2013, however, provoked by the disputes 
around the civil war in Syria. 
Al-Zarqawi still achieved his aim and a deadly sectarian civil war broke out in Iraq. 
During the conflict, which was at its height between 2006 and 2008, the group itself 
was marginalised. It lost al-Zarqawi, its leader, in a US attack in June 2006 and 
unfavourable changes in the group’s operating environment led to major losses.91 
Prompted by these changes, the group ‘rebranded’ itself, changing its name to the 
Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) and tried to make its fighter profile more strongly Iraqi.  
The group nevertheless managed to survive through its most difficult years in Iraq. By 
the time its current leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, took charge of the group in 2010, it 
was already deeply rooted in the Sunni areas of Iraq and was considerably stronger 
than in during the period 2007–2008. Growing political tensions and the weakening of 
the security situation in Iraq, especially after 2009, as well as the withdrawal of the 
United States from the country at the end of 2011, were the catalysts for the group re-
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entering the international political scene.92 The second key reason and the factor that 
led to the ‘internationalisation’ of the group was the development of the Syrian 
uprising into an armed conflict.  
The group led by al-Baghdadi was involved in the Syrian conflict from the outset. 
Indeed, the networks it had established in Syria before and during the war in Iraq 
(2003⎼2008) helped the group gain ground. The group used these networks (often 
with the assistance of the Syrian intelligence) to smuggle weapons and foreign 
fighters into Iraq from Syria. From summer 2011 onwards, the direction of this influx 
was reversed, and ISI sent fighters from its Jabhat al-Nusra group to Syria with the 
aim of expanding its operations there by exploiting the increasingly unstable situation 
in the country.  
Jabhat al-Nusra split from ISI in spring 2013 and officially placed itself under the 
authority of Al-Qaeda. This was the same Al-Qaeda from which ISI, led by al-
Baghdadi, split in late 2006 (according to the group’s own account) when it and a 
number of smaller Iraqi jihadist groups established the Islamic State of Iraq. Prompted 
by open involvement in the Syrian conflict, it changed its name to ISIS. Encouraged 
by its military successes in Syria and Iraq, the group challenged Al-Qaeda’s 
leadership role in the jihadist movement. The declaration of the caliphate in summer 
2014 particularly served to make it the most visible, most influential, and best 
equipped armed jihadist group in the world (at a time when Al-Qaeda seemed to be 
weakening).  
ISIS has garnered a great deal of media attention, mainly due to the atrocities it has 
perpetrated and its state-building project, which culminated in the declaration of the 
caliphate. Even though there were still doubts about the state-building project of ISIS 
(in Finland it was characterised as a ‘purely rhetorical goal’93) in late summer 2014 
(when the caliphate had already been declared), ISIS had in fact consistently worked 
to strengthen its position in Iraq since 2006 in order to establish an Islamic state and, 
at a later date, create a caliphate.94  
In fact, this is the second key feature distinguishing ISIS from Al-Qaeda. Declaring the 
caliphate is the aim of both organisations. Whereas Al-Qaeda has intentionally 
avoided and instructed its local organisations to avoid the occupation of areas and the 
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establishment of administrative structures in them before conditions are favourable, 
ISIS has aimed to do precisely that.95 The key aim of its Jihad is to create a ‘pure’ and 
‘true’ community of Islam and, in its view, the conditions for establishing such a 
community already existed in 2006. 
In the branch of jihadism represented by ISIS, the observance of religious purity is 
based on an exceptionally strict and narrow interpretation of what it means to be a 
true Muslim, even when compared to other jihadist groups. This can clearly be seen in 
the activities of ISIS over the past five years. In its eyes, all those whose approach to 
Islam does not meet the criteria imposed by the group are not true Muslims and it is, 
therefore, religiously acceptable to subject them to violence.96 In fact, the group has 
openly used violence against Sunnis, who do not share its interpretation of Islam, 
minorities within Islam, and other religious groups with the aim of wiping them out 
from the areas under its rule. In this respect, it differs from Al-Qaeda, which has tried 
to avoid sectarian incitement and violence. While Al-Qaeda also considers groups 
such as Shias to be heretics, it also takes the view that heretic Muslims have 
forgotten what true Islam is and should, therefore, be guided back to it. In some 
areas, however, this principle has been less than faithfully observed, especially during 
the active period of the Iraqi Al-Qaeda.97 
It is well-known that the conflict in Syria and Iraq has also attracted a large number of 
people from outside these two countries. It is impossible to give any exact figures of 
the number of foreign fighters, yet, according to one estimate, more than 42,000 
people from more than 120 countries had travelled to Syria and Iraq in the period 
2011–2016 with the aim of joining ISIS.98 Most of those travelling to Syria and Iraq 
come from areas adjacent to the conflict zones (from the Middle East and North 
Africa), but a large proportion has also come from more distant countries. For 
example, it is estimated that more than 5,000 people have travelled to the region from 
Europe alone.99 
In addition to operating in Syria and Iraq, ISIS has also coordinated attacks outside 
the conflict zones (including against targets in the West) and also urged others to 
carry them out. In the wider public debate, the extending of these attacks to Western 
countries has been connected to the international campaign against ISIS because the 
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group only issued its first public calls for attacks after the campaign had been 
launched in August 2014. There is, however, a lack of evidence supporting such link 
because international terrorism has been part of the group’s strategic DNA from the 
outset. Al-Zarqawi, the founder of the group, tried to extend his network to Europe and 
individuals belonging to his network have lived at least in Germany and Sweden. For 
example, he planned a terrorist attack in Germany before the attacks of 11 
September, but the plan was never implemented. The group has also been involved in 
many attacks and failed attacks in the West during the 2000s. Furthermore, the first 
terrorist attack carried out by a probable member of ISIS in the West took place in 
Brussels in May 2014, before the campaign against ISIS got under way. The attacks 
in Paris in 2015 and in Brussels in 2016 should primarily be seen as part of this 
process. The military operation against the group has undoubtedly prompted ISIS to 
intensify its attempts to incite and inspire its supporters and activists outside the 
conflict zones in Syria and Iraq to carry out violent acts.  
Unlike other branches of jihadism, ISIS has adopted an ideology in which political and 
religious authority has been transferred from theoreticians, theologians, and leaders 
outside the battle zones to front line fighters. According to this interpretation, those 
who are fighting for their religion are better Muslims than those who fail to do so.100 
This has provided the group with a certain degree of credibility and the ethos of the 
group has also made its supporters less receptive to outside criticism. The same has 
occurred when criticism has been expressed by respected jihadist theologians and 
theoreticians, such as Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi from Jordan (al-Zarqawi’s first 
mentor), Abu Qatada al-Filistini, a distinguished jihadist theologian, and several top 
figures in Al-Qaeda.101  
Furthermore, ISIS’ ideology is primarily an ideology of redemption. In its messages, 
ISIS has also emphasised how the ‘struggle on the path of Allah’ will wash away one’s 
sins. This message has held particularly strong appeal for young Muslims with 
criminal backgrounds and possibly also for converts with life-management problems. 
The fact that an increasing number of Western jihadists travelling to conflict zones as 
foreign fighters have criminal backgrounds would appear to support this notion.102  
Moreover, unlike the elitist Al-Qaeda, which (at least before 2001) selected its new 
members carefully, ISIS took a populist approach, welcoming all newcomers to its 
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ranks.103 This has helped make ISIS more attractive within the jihadist movement, 
especially during the years in which it claimed the most success, and prompted 
people that were rarely seen in previous conflicts to take part in the struggle. For 
example, ISIS has been able to involve women in jihadist activities in an entirely new 
manner.  
ISIS has nevertheless suffered several painful defeats since the start of the 
international campaign against it, which was launched in August 2014. It has lost its 
caliphate and the symbolically important cities of Raqqa and Mosul. Even though the 
group maintains local organisations in different parts of the Muslim world, many of 
them are no longer active. Currently, the organisational structures of ISIS and Al-
Qaeda are in this respect almost identical even though the focus of ISIS’ activities is 
in the central organisation and social movement, whereas in the case of Al-Qaeda, 
local organisations that have a longer operational history and are more firmly 
established in their areas play a key role.  
ISIS has lost the victorious image that helped it attract thousands of new fighters from 
around world until 2015 and provided inspiration for countless terrorist attacks, 
especially in the period 2014–2017. Despite this, the group remains the most visible 
jihadist actor in the world and continues to operate in the conflicts in Syria and Iraq. 
ISIS is not the same thing as its caliphate. The group is especially deeply rooted in 
Iraq and its operating environment still provides a good basis for continued jihadist 
activities. The history of ISIS and its ideology as the main branch of Jihad is still far 
from over, however. It is not clear, though, how long the constantly weakening group 
can remain the flag-bearer of global Jihad in a situation in which it is increasingly 
challenged by a resurgent Al-Qaeda and as its key areas of impetus (conflict in Syria 
and the caliphate project) have lost much of their practical importance. 
3.5 Jihadist activism in Europe from the 1990s 
to the present  
Most of the media attention on jihadist activism has focused on its manifestations in 
the West, especially in Western Europe. At least until around 2005, however, Europe 
played a secondary role in jihadism. Theoretically, Europe has not been an 
insignificant area in jihadist thinking. For many years, there have been occasional 
references to the continent in connection with the reconquest of the areas previously 
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occupied by Muslims. However, there was little concrete action in this respect before 
the war in Iraq in 2003.  
Europe gradually assumed a larger role in jihadist thinking and communications after 
the war in Iraq. There has also been growing interest in jihadist activities and violence 
among European Muslims.104 Indeed, the phenomenon became more diverse and 
more complex partly as a result of these developments. This was also reflected in a 
substantial increase in the number of terrorist attacks and planned attacks in Europe 
in the period 2005–2010 and an increase in the number of people traveling from 
Europe to conflict zones with Muslim majorities. There was a further strengthening of 
the jihadist networks and communities as well as the wider jihadist social movement 
in Europe, which had already been boosted by the conflict in Syria and the attraction 
of ISIS. In fact, in recent years, Europe has been witnessing an unprecedented 
mobilisation of foreign fighters to Syria and Iraq and a wave of jihadist attacks, which 
has only shown slight signs of decrease by early 2019.  
3.5.1 Arrival of jihadism in Europe  
There has been radical islamist and jihadist activism in Europe at least since the 
1990s. While it is known that a number of individuals travelled from Europe to 
Afghanistan in the 1980s to take part in the conflict, the jihadist activities only became 
more organised in the 1990s. This was partially because many islamist and radical 
islamist activists (and subsequently also jihadist activists) emigrated to Europe in the 
1980s and 1990s, with the majority coming here as part of humanitarian 
immigration.105  
Among their number was Abu Qatada al-Filistini, a Palestinian from Jordan who was 
close to Al-Qaeda; Abu-Musab al-Suri, a Syrian jihadist veteran and well-known 
theoretician of global Jihad;106 as well as Hani al-Sibai, a member of the Egyptian 
Islamic Jihad who had fought in Afghanistan and supported Al-Qaeda and his 
compatriot Abu Hamza al-Masri who, for many years, preached his jihadist message 
in the Finsbury Park mosque in London and was one of the most important activists of 
the early years in Europe until his arrest in 2004. 
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Many of the persons mentioned above and early key activists connected to the 
phenomenon had fought in Afghanistan or received training in the camps of armed 
groups operating in that country in the 1980s and early 1990s. During those years, 
they established contacts with key armed jihadist groups and other actors central to 
the phenomenon. They mostly continued their activities independently in the relatively 
free operating environment in Europe. Jihadists living elsewhere also visited Western 
European countries (especially those in which activists promoting jihadism had 
settled) and many of these visitors were activists representing armed jihadist groups. 
There were also independent activists operating in different parts of Europe who did 
not have combat experience. These included Abdullah el-Faisal, a convert of 
Jamaican background and Omar Bakri Muhammad from Syria. Both of them lived in 
the United Kingdom. 
Activists visiting Europe and living there spread their ideology by speaking and 
sharing material in public events and radical mosques. They created, translated, and 
distributed material approved by armed jihadist groups and established networks of 
individuals with similar ideas — locally, regionally, and beyond.107 Small groups were 
established around charismatic activists and individuals with foreign fighter 
experience gained from terrorist training from the 1990s onwards and more extensive 
social networks, organisations, and communities developed on this basis during the 
first decade of the 2000s.  
While these developments were most visible in the United Kingdom, France, 
Germany, and Belgium, the phenomenon also spread to other countries (such as 
Scandinavia) in the 1990s, even if this development remained insignificant until the 
end of the following decade.108 London became the centre of jihadist activism in 
Europe during the 1990s. Activists belonging to many different armed groups 
operated relatively freely in the British capital and created a basis for a viable and 
active jihadist scene during the first decade of the 2000s.109  
There were several radical mosques in London (the city was jokingly called 
‘Londonistan’) and in the surrounding areas, such as the Finsbury Park mosque led 
by Abu Hamza. It was also the birthplace of al-Muhajiroun, which glorified jihadism 
and promoted the ideology with its own activism, which was mostly non-violent and 
legal by nature. Al-Muhajiroun had been established by Omar Bakri Muhammad as an 
offshoot of the Hizb ut-Tahrir organisation (the aim of which was to establish an 
islamist caliphate). In addition to Omar Bakri Muhammad, other key members of the 
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organisation included Anjem Choudary, who later became a well-known jihadist 
activist.110 
There were also radical mosques in other Western European countries and they 
played a key role in the phenomenon and its growth in Europe, especially between 
the 1990s and the early years of the 2000s.111 Such premises served as key 
recruitment points and the Imams of the mosques often played a central role in 
promoting these activities.112 This was especially true in openly radical mosques, in 
which Imams acted as the religious authorities of their groups, as recruitment 
magnets, and as points of contact between local networks and armed groups 
operating in the conflict zones.113 At the same time, the aim of the representatives of 
many armed radical islamist and jihadist groups was to bring mosques under their 
control so that they could be converted into recruitment and fundraising centres for 
their own groups or infiltrate the mosques to carry out more covert or unofficial 
support activities.  
A small number of radical islamist groups (and later also jihadist groups) also actively 
tried to establish networks in different parts of Europe, especially from the late 1990s 
onwards. The task of these networks was to radicalise and recruit new supporters, 
activists and fighters, raise funds, and produce and disseminate activist material. The 
aim was to create ‘strategic depth’ for the armed groups that often operated in 
significantly more challenging environments in the Middle East and South Asia.  
Violent activism in Europe preceding the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2011 was 
small scale and most of it took place in France. The reason for France becoming the 
target country for radical islamism was connected to the civil war raging in Algeria. In 
addition, an attempted terrorist attack connected to the armed jihadist group of Abu 
Musab al-Zarqawi took place in Germany. This attack was, however, foiled during its 
early stages.114 At this time, the violent international activism was mainly connected to 
the phenomenon of foreign fighters and especially the conflicts in Afghanistan and 
Bosnia. There are no comprehensive or reliable estimates of the extent of these 
mobilisations, although a few hundred people are thought to have mobilised to these 
areas.115 
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3.5.2 The decade-long evolution of jihadist activism: 
from the Afghanistan war to Syria  
As it attracted young second-generation Muslim immigrants and converts116 during 
the first decade of the 2000s, jihadist activism in Europe developed into a more 
indigenous phenomenon. Jihadist networks continued to expand, especially in 
countries in which jihadists had already been active in the 1990s, such as France, the 
United Kingdom, Belgium, and Germany. The phenomenon also became increasingly 
visible in Western European countries in which individuals connected to the 
phenomenon had been living since the 1980s and 1990s but had yet to witness more 
than a few well-established jihadist networks or communities (such as in the Nordic 
countries).117 European countries also started experiencing jihadist terrorist attacks.  
The formation of a jihadist social movement in Europe was the main factor behind 
these developments. This movement drew its inspiration from the ideology, activities, 
and messages of Al-Qaeda. Especially after the attacks in Madrid (in 2004) and 
London (in 2005), measures were introduced to significantly restrict the freedom of 
action of activists and networks that had openly promoted jihadism (for example, 
nearly all large European mosques openly associated with armed groups were closed 
by the year 2010118). However, the heightened interest in jihadism manifested in 
groups of young friendship groups attempting to contact jihadist networks and armed 
groups and subsequently participate in their activities.119  
A new generation of activists that had mainly worked outside mosques replaced the 
imprisoned and deported key activists (many of whom had served as radical religious 
scholars). The authority of this new generation was based on a mix of charisma, 
ideological expertise, and organisational skills, and was often tinged with combat 
experience and links to armed groups operating outside Europe.120 These activists 
played a key role in the establishment, maintenance, and expansion of jihadist 
networks and communities from the year 2005 onwards.121 Their aim was to radicalise 
and recruit individuals from within their own social networks but they also found 
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receptive audiences in countercultural salafist communities.122 New locations, such as 
universities, smaller prayer houses, reception centres for refugees and asylum 
seekers, and prisons also replaced mosques as sites of recruitment.123 
One of the most significant developments in Europe in the late 2000s and the early 
2010s was the spread of the salafist Sharia4 organisations from the United Kingdom 
to other European countries. The aim of these organisations was to promote the 
jihadist ideology openly and within legal bounds. The organisations were largely 
based on the model laid out by the al-Muhajiroun organisation. The aim of al-
Muhajiroun was to establish a caliphate in the United Kingdom by means of 
provocative activism (especially with a presence in the national media) and 
proselytising. Even though it aimed to be provocative, it also tried to remain within the 
law, at least in its public activities. Organisations modelled on Sharia4 were 
established in the late 2000s and early 2010s in such countries as Italy, France, the 
Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, Denmark, and Norway, helping to strengthen 
regional (and international) links between local networks and communities. These 
organisations helped to attract hundreds of activists from across Europe before they 
were banned after a few years. Many parts of the social networks behind the 
organisations remain active, however. 
The organisations’ relationship with violence has been complex. While they officially 
and publicly rejected violence, they nevertheless equally openly supported the jihadist 
ideology that praised and encouraged violence. They also praised its key figures 
(such as Mullah Krekar and Osama bin Laden) as well as jihadist acts of violence and 
the individuals carrying them out. For their members, they provided a favourable 
social environment and, in most cases, also an opportunity to participate in jihadist 
activities. This was because they had close links to the jihadist ideology and jihadist 
actors in various conflict zones.124 These groups and their networks have played a 
central role in the mobilisation of foreign fighters from Western Europe to Syria and 
Iraq, especially to the ranks of ISIS.125 The organisations also provided their members 
with opportunities to carry out acts of violence and participate in criminal activities 
connected to the phenomenon in their own operating environments.126 In fact, 
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members of these groups have taken part in terrorist attacks and other terrorist 
offences in different parts of Europe (especially in the United Kingdom).  
Despite the serious challenges faced by Al-Qaeda in Western Europe, it nevertheless 
played a major role in the attacks carried out in the period 2001–2011.127 In fact, there 
was a steady increase in jihadist terror attacks between 2001 and 2004, with the 
attack carried out in Madrid in March 2004 being exceptionally deadly.128 The number 
of jihadist terror attacks in Europe remained more or less constant in the period 2005–
2008, even though this period coincided with the huge publicity and outrage sparked 
by the Muhammad cartoons.  
The number of attacks and attempted attacks increased in the early years of the 
2010s. One reason for this was that, in its own communications, Al-Qaeda had begun 
to more forcefully encourage its supporters to independently carry out terrorist 
attacks. At the same time, the local Al-Qaeda organisation in Yemen (AQAP) 
attempted to carry out a small number of terrorist attacks in the West and inspire 
attacks by producing English-language material for its target audience in the West 
(the most important being the Inspire magazine). The aim of this activity was to inspire 
supporters living in Europe to independently carry out simple and low-cost attacks. 
Towards the end of this period in particular, the modus operandi used in terrorist 
attacks became more versatile, with knives and vehicles being used in the attacks 
alongside bombs and firearms.129 
At this time, the increasing influx of foreign fighters to conflict zones was also closely 
connected to the growth of jihadist activism. Afghanistan, Iraq, Chechnya, and 
Somalia were some of the countries attracting fighters. Most of the individuals 
travelling to the conflict zones came from countries in which jihadist activism had 
already surfaced in the 1990s. A small percentage of the returnees took part in 
terrorist attacks, adding to the success rate and the destructiveness of the attacks 
carried out in Europe.130 
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3.5.3 Conflict in Syria and Iraq, ISIS, and the impact 
on Europe 
The uprising in Syria, which began in early 2011, and the ensuing civil war has had an 
extremely strong impact on jihadist activism in Europe. At the start of the current 
decade, it was a commonly held belief that jihadist activism in Europe was on the 
wane. This was partially due to decline in the number of planned attacks the fact that 
there had not been any destructive terrorist attacks connected to Al-Qaeda since the 
bus and underground bombings in London in July 2005.  
In the years to follow, however, the developments taking place beneath the surface of 
the events were notably more important to the evolution of jihadist activism. In many 
countries (especially in Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and Belgium), the 
jihadist community and activity expanded considerably during these years and there 
was a substantial increase in cross-border networks and activism. In other words, 
jihadist activism became more widespread and more international. The spread of 
Sharia4 organisations (modelled on al-Muhajiroun) across Europe, including countries 
in which jihadist activism was less developed, was an essential part of this process.131  
The influx of individuals into Syria and Iraq was the most visible manifestation of the 
strong growth in jihadist activism. The first indications of the phenomenon could 
already be seen in 2011 when the uprising was transforming into an armed conflict. 
The conflict began in earnest in 2013 and gathered force during the second half of the 
year.132 At this stage, the conflict and the jihadist groups participating in it had already 
attracted an unprecedented number of foreign fighters from Europe. When ISIS 
declared its caliphate in the areas of Syria and Iraq that it had occupied in summer 
2014, the influx of individuals into the conflict zones increased and reached a record 
high. For example, according to the Soufan Group, nearly 6,000 individuals had 
travelled to the conflict zones from Europe by the year 2017.133 A large proportion of 
these people had joined ISIS.134 By comparison, according to a study by Thomas 
Hegghammer, a total of about 700 people left Europe as foreign fighters to join all 
conflicts in the Islamic world in the period 1990–2010.135 
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The reasons for the exceptional appeal of the Syrian conflict and ISIS have been 
extensively discussed in the public forum and by researchers alike.136 In short, local, 
regional, and international factors have all contributed to it. Local factors include the 
historically and religiously special position that Syria occupies in Islam (and in the 
Islamic prophecies of the end of days),137 changes in the dynamics of the conflict, and 
the state-building project culminating in the declaration of the caliphate by ISIS.138 
Regional factors include the heightening of tensions between Shias and Sunnis in the 
Middle East and, to a lesser extent, in Europe, which came to the fore in Syria at the 
same time as the influx of foreign fighters from Europe to Syria accelerated during the 
latter half of 2013.139 In addition to this, the mobilisation has been greatly facilitated by 
the role of Turkey as a country of transit and a strategic rear guard area for the armed 
groups taking part in the Syrian conflict (until 2015). The grass-root jihadist support 
networks in North Africa and Europe have also played an important role. 
Development of communications technologies have also had a crucial effect on the 
situation. Moreover, the spread of social media, smartphones,  and low-price and fast 
online connections have made the Syrian civil war the first conflict that people outside 
the war zone have been able to follow virtually, in near real time, and independently of 
the mainstream media.140 The images of the suffering endured by the Syrian civilian 
population and brutal violence against it have particularly strengthened the already 
strong emotional reactions to the conflict among Muslims around the world.141 Social 
media has also played an important facilitating role for those willing to become foreign 
fighters (especially among those who have joined ISIS). In fact, jihadist groups have 
eagerly seized the opportunities provided by technological advances, especially in 
their communications and recruitment activities. 
Even though most of the individuals leaving for Syria and Iraq have been young men, 
the factors referred to above have also prompted an exceptionally large number of 
women and older people to travel to these countries. A significant number of children, 
travelling with their parents, have also ended up in the area.  
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Syria and ISIS have become the focal point for European jihadist circles during the 
2010s. In fact, soon after the start of the conflict in Syria, there was also a sharp 
increase in the number of terrorist attacks and planned attacks in Europe. The first 
attack involving a perpetrator suspected to have fought in Syria took place in May 
2014, when four people were killed in a hail of automatic fire in the Jewish Museum in 
Brussels. During the three years that followed this attack, a total of 51 jihadist attacks 
(and dozens of failed and foiled attacks) took place in Western countries. Only one of 
them was connected to Al-Qaeda, while all others were inspired, supported or carried 
out by ISIS. Some of them even took place in countries that had not previously 
experienced jihadist terrorist attacks.142  
The attacks also continued after this period and Finland, too, experienced its first 
jihadist terrorist attack (in August 2017). In fact, the year 2017 marked the peak of the 
ISIS terror wave inspired by the war in Syria and, since then, there has been a decline 
in the number of attacks and attempted attacks. The number of attacks claiming a 
large number of lives has also decreased. Indeed, no attacks claiming more than ten 
lives have taken place in Europe since early autumn 2017. During 2018, the number 
of attacks and attempted attacks was still significantly higher than in the years before 
the war in Syria.143 
The connections between the attacks carried out in Europe in recent years to the 
wider jihadist networks or armed groups outside Europe have greatly varied in nature. 
Researchers have mapped this diversity by dividing the attacks into directed, 
networked, and inspired attacks.144 
According to this categorisation, directed attacks are those that are planned and 
carried out by armed groups themselves (sometimes in cooperation with other 
partners). In Europe, such attacks have been carried out by ISIS and Al-Qaeda, 
including its local organisation in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). A requirement for 
such a definition is that the armed groups involved have a European-based external 
operations wing. Attacks of this type have been rare but, on average, they have 
caused a great deal of destruction. Directed attacks include the bus and underground 
bombings in London in July 2005, the attacks in Paris in November 2015, and in 
Brussels in March 2016.  
For their part, networked attacks have been carried out by jihadists living in Europe 
that have connections to more extensive networks. They may even have acquired 
                                                     
 
142 See Lorenzo Vidino, Francesco Marone & Eva Entenmann, Fear Thy Neighbor: Radicalization 
and Jihadist Attacks in the West (Milano: Ledizioni LediPublishing, 2017). 
143 Petter Nesser, ‘Europe hasn’t won the war on terror’, Politico 5 December 2018. 
144 Clint Watts, ‘Inspired, Networked & Directed - The Muddled Jihad of ISIS & al-Qaeda post 
Hebdo’, War on the Rocks 12 January 2015.  
PUBLICATIONS OF THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR 2019:31 
 
62 
 
 
combat experience in war zones. These attacks are, however, carried out without the 
specific encouragement of any armed group and, in fact, such groups may not even 
have been aware of the attack plans. The attack against the offices of Charlie Hebdo 
in January 2015 was an example of a networked attack.145 
In inspired attacks, the perpetrators do not have any links to wider jihadist networks or 
armed groups. In other words, they are carried out completely independently. This 
has been the most common type of attacks in recent years, especially when also 
taking into account the planned attacks that have come to the attention of the 
intelligence authorities and have not been carried out. These attacks are described as 
inspired because, even though the linkage to ISIS and Al-Qaeda is absent, the 
attacks have been encouraged and inspired by these groups. Moreover, the 
perpetrators also state that they are acting in the name of ISIS or (less often) in the 
name of Al-Qaeda. On the basis of the current understanding of the jihadist stabbing 
that occurred in Turku, Finland, in August 2017, this attack would be defined as an 
inspired attack.  
Even though the number of jihadist attacks in Europe has decreased, at least 
momentarily, it is still too early to declare that jihadist violence is on a permanent 
decline. We will return to this point in the final chapter of this report.  
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4 Jihadist activities and Finland   
Finland has always been and still is at the periphery of jihadist activism in every way, 
both globally and in the European context. Whereas in the major centres of jihadism 
in Europe, the support activities for jihadism were already extensive in the 1990s, the 
first signs of such activities in Finland were not reported until the first decade of the 
2000s and were substantially smaller in scale. However, the situation has changed 
significantly during the 2010s, as the number of individuals involved has increased 
substantially and new networks have arisen around the phenomenon. Nevertheless, 
jihadist activities in Finland are still relatively small in scale when compared to many 
other Western European countries. 
The civil war in Syria and especially the highly visible role of ISIS in this conflict has 
had a major impact on jihadist activism in Finland. The fact that among the asylum 
seekers arriving in Europe in 2015 and 2016, there were people with ties to armed 
jihadist groups abroad, has also played a role in this development. Consequently, the 
ties between individuals living in Finland to the conflict zones and the support 
networks of the jihadist groups operating therein have become closer and more 
extensive.  
This chapter discusses the evolution of jihadist activities in Finland and the ways in 
which these activities manifest in our country. This chapter is divided into three parts. 
We begin by giving an overview of what is currently known about the jihadist activities 
that took place in Finland in the first decade of the 2000s. We then move on to 
examine the ways in which jihadist activities have evolved in Finland in the period 
between the outbreak of the conflict in Syria and early 2019. In the third part, we 
summarise the different forms of jihadist activism in Finland, with a focus on the 
conflict in Syria and Iraq and, the phenomenon of foreign fighters linked to ISIS.  
4.1 Background: jihadist activities in Finland 
in the 2000s 
It is widely believed that, until recent years, the activities of international, armed 
jihadist groups had little connection to Finland. This applies both to activities on 
Finnish soil and communications directed at Finland. This has historically been one 
reason for so little attention having been paid to jihadist activities in Finland. For many 
years, SUPO (in cooperation with the intelligence services and immigration services 
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of other countries) was the only Finnish body monitoring the situation.146 The possible 
connections between jihadist movements and Finland only started receiving public 
attention after the attacks of 11 September 2001. Since that date, international 
counter-terrorism activities and the exchange of information became significantly 
more extensive, even though the availability of resources lagged behind the workload 
that multiplied after the attacks.147 It is, therefore, quite possible that the authorities do 
not have a comprehensive understanding of the activities that took place in Finland in 
the preceding decades. There has been practically no research on the history of 
jihadist activism in Finland.  
This means that we still know little about the early history of jihadist activities and their 
development in Finland in the 2000s. Our current knowledge on the topic is reviewed 
below. This picture is probably not exhaustive, and it does not even provide a 
representative sample of the phenomenon in Finland. 
We do not know how and when jihadism emerged in Finland. It is highly likely, 
however, that the course of events has been more or less the same as elsewhere in 
Europe. In other words, the phenomenon probably arrived in Finland with activists or 
individuals connected with armed groups who either emigrated to or visited Finland. 
For example, until the end of the last decade, SUPO’ took the view (expressed in its 
annual reports) that the connections between armed groups and Finland were mainly 
limited to personal connections that some former members of the organisations or 
persons close to them living in Finland had.148  
The activism of such individuals has mainly been directed at those armed conflicts 
under way in their countries of origin that have involved armed radical islamist and 
jihadist groups as one of the parties involved. Most of the new supporters were 
recruited among people coming from these same areas. Whereas elsewhere in 
Western Europe, networks, communities, and small groups engaged in different types 
of activism arose around such individuals, it is believed that the activities in Finland 
were on a considerably smaller scale. In official reports, jihadist activism was 
characterised as a marginal phenomenon until the early years of the 2010s.149  
                                                     
 
146 For example, according to SUPO annual report for 1996, the focus in counter-terrorism activi-
ties had been on the monitoring of islamist extremist organisations and armed groups of Kurds. 
SUPO, Annual Report 1996. 
147 Of the development of counter-terrorism activities in Finland, see Leena Malkki, ‘International 
pressure to perform: Counterterrorism policy development in Finland’, Studies in Conflict and Ter-
rorism 39, no. 4 (2016). 
148 See, for example, SUPO, Annual Report 1997 and Annual Report 2011. 
149 See, for example, Ministry of the Interior, Violent extremism in Finland - situation overview 
1/2013, pp. 5–6. 
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At the same time, however, there were already signs of more organised activities in 
Finland before the 2010s. Such activities have involved Ansar al-Islam, an Iraqi-based 
Kurdish jihadist group, and Al-Shabaab, a group established in Somalia in 2006. 
There are also indications of activism connected to Al-Qaeda and the global jihadism 
that it represents.  
4.1.1 Ansar al-Islam and Rawti Shax 
Individuals living in Finland are known to have maintained links to Ansar al-Islam, an 
armed group operating in Iraq, and the organisation known as Rawti Shax and 
Didinwe, which later supported the fighting from Europe.  
Ansar al-Islam was established in late 2001 in the Kurdish areas of Iraq. From the 
outset, it maintained close links to the central leadership of Al-Qaeda through the prior 
activities of the individuals belonging to it. It is assumed that it received at least some 
logistical support and funding from Al-Qaeda.150 The aim of the group was to 
overthrow the Kurdistan regional administration and to replace it with an Islamic 
administration based on Sharia law. Before the outbreak of the 2003 war, the group 
also controlled a small area that included villages close to the border between Iraq 
and Iran. Most of the individuals involved in its activities were Kurds, even though 
groups with mainly Arab backgrounds have also joined it. During the war in Iraq, the 
organisation is known to have openly cooperated with a number of jihadist 
organisations operating in Iraq and it provided a safe haven and a base for Abu 
Musab al-Zarqawi and many of his Arab fighters between 2002 and 2003.  
Mullah Krekar (aka Najmuddin Faraj Ahmad) was the first leader of Ansar al-Islam. 
Krekar, who had been involved in the establishment of the group and had already 
been an active member of the Kurdish islamist movement in the 1980s. He arrived in 
Norway as a quota refugee in 1991 but continued to visit Iraq after that time. He also 
made trips to other European countries, especially Germany, to raise funds and to 
inspire and recruit additional people for its activities.151 In fact, the group has received 
support from followers living outside the region (in Europe and other Middle Eastern 
countries). The networks are known to have recruited fighters to the region among 
Kurds living in other parts of the world. There are also indications that attacks in 
                                                     
 
150 For a brief overview of Ansar al-Islam, see ‘Ansar al-Islam’, Mapping Militant Organisations, 
http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/13. See also Fishman, The 
Master Plan. 
151 US. Department of Treasury, ‘Treasury designations target terrorist facilitators’, 7 December 
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Europe have been planned but the plans known to have been made in the first 
decade of the 2000s were relatively unsophisticated.152  
Even though Mullah Krekar resigned from the leadership of the movement after the 
start of the Iraqi war and no longer travelled extensively outside Norway, he is known 
to have retained an important role in the European support networks of Ansar al-
Islam. In fact, he has even revived support networks under the auspices of a new 
organisation named Rawti Shax since the end of the 2010s. From his base in Norway, 
he also continued to encourage violent attacks in Iraq and Europe.153  Indeed, by 
2015, Krekar had also openly expressed his support for ISIS and stated that he 
considers its caliphate legitimate.154 Most of the members of Ansar al-Islam joined 
ISIS in 2014.  
The Norwegian authorities have characterised Krekar as a threat to the country’s 
security. He has been served with a deportation order, but it has not yet been carried 
out for a number of practical reasons.155 In Norway, he has received several prison 
sentences for glorifying and inciting terrorist attacks, for assisting terrorists, and for 
making illegal threats against Kurds and Norwegian politicians. Researchers generally 
view Mullah Krekar as one of the key jihadist activists in Europe.  
Whereas Ansar al-Islam has primarily been an armed group operating in Iraq, Rawti 
Shax has its operational focus on Western Europe. Its activities involve a large 
number of individuals living in different European countries who communicate with 
each other using such means as the Internet. According to European security 
authorities, Rawti Shax has been particularly active in Germany, Switzerland, the 
United Kingdom, Finland, Italy, Greece, Sweden, and Norway in addition to Iraq, Iran, 
and Syria.156  
Rawti Shax has engaged in public activities, such as the dissemination of Kurdish-
language political-religious texts on the Internet, especially on Facebook, PalTalk, and 
on its own website. The organisation has also maintained its own ‘online university’ for 
the study of religious and political topics.157 Supporters of the group have also 
repeatedly and vocally demonstrated support of Mullah Krekar, including demanding 
                                                     
 
152 Nesser, Islamist Terrorism in Europe, p. 136. 
153 Lia & Nesser, ‘Jihadism in Norway’, pp. 122⎼123. 
154 ‘Mullah Krekar: Only ISIS can fulfill Muslim ‘ambitions and dreams’, RUDAW 5 February 2015, 
http://www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/050220151. 
155 Yrjö Kokkonen, ‘Terrorihanketta johdettiin norjalaisesta vankilasta’, Yle 12 November 2015. 
156 Eurojust, ‘Joint action against radical Islamist terrorist group coordinated at Eurojust (Operation 
JWEB)’, http://www.eurojust.europa.eu/press/PressReleases/Pages/2015/2015-11-12.aspx. 
157 The organisation’s online activities are discussed in more detail in the report Jihadist online 
communication and Finland. 
PUBLICATIONS OF THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR 2019:31 
 
67 
 
 
his release from prison. Mullah Krekar himself has given polemic and provocative 
media statements that have attracted a great deal of attention.158  
Even though Rawti Shax is ideologically and operationally committed to global 
jihadism (especially ISIS), it is ethnically structured around shared Kurdish ethnicity 
(in the same way as Ansar al-Islam). In fact, young Kurds living in different countries 
have been the main target audience of Rawti Shax. A small number of people from 
other ethnic backgrounds are also involved in its activities but these people are 
probably only a small minority. In the 2010s, the aim of Rawti Shax has been to 
encourage young Kurds living in Europe to join the organisation and to travel to Syria 
and Iraq as fighters (particularly to fight in the ranks of ISIS) and to assist people 
leaving for the conflict zones in their travel arrangements. It is clear that it has tried to 
do this as inconspicuously as possible.  
It has also been reported that Rawti Shax has planned attacks in Europe with the aim 
of pressuring Norway to release the then-imprisoned Mullah Krekar, the leader of the 
group, by attacking Norwegian embassies and kidnapping diplomats.159 According to 
the available information, these plans were not particularly well-advanced. 
There have been reports of activities in support of Ansar al-Islam (and later Rawti 
Shax) in Finland since the first half of the 2000s. For example, according to the 2004 
annual report of SUPO, possible links between individuals residing in Finland and 
armed resistance in Iraq and its funding had attracted interest.160 This is probably a 
reference to the support networks of Ansar al-Islam discussed in the 2005 annual 
report. The annual report only states, however, that there have been observations of 
the support activities in other European countries and there are no comments on the 
situation in Finland.161  
There is very little detailed information available on the support activities of Ansar al-
Islam in Finland. For example, it was reported by the Finnish national broadcaster, 
Yle, in 2004 that there are about 20 Kurds in Finland with links to Ansar al-Islam. At 
the time, SUPO confirmed that it, too, had received information that supporting this 
                                                     
 
158 For example, Giulia Paravicini, ‘Busted jihadist network plotted to snatch diplomats: Arrests in 
‘Operation Jweb’ include Ansar al-Islam founder Mullah Krekar’, Politico 12 November 2015. 
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finding.162 Since then, similar claims have been presented several times in a variety of 
open sources.  
The support for the group probably finds its origins among those quota refugees who 
were accepted by Finland from the Kurdish regions of Iraq during the mid-1990s. In 
the Turku region in particular, a small group of people with Kurdish background has 
considered Mullah Krekar to be their spiritual leader for many years. These individuals 
have variously participated in the activities of Krekar-led networks supporting armed 
action. Furthermore, Awat Hamasalih, one of the key leaders of the organisation and 
a close associate of Mullah Krekar, lived in Turku between 2013 and 2014.163 Persons 
linked to the aforementioned activities have also lived in the Helsinki region. 
As is the case in other countries, Rawti Shax has also tried to carry out its support 
activities in Finland without attracting too much attention. This is also a reason that 
getting detailed information on the organisation’s activities is difficult. The activities in 
Finland are, however, probably limited to the recruitment, radicalisation, and 
fundraising activities that Rawti Shax has been carrying out within its own small 
community, which is largely separated from other local Kurdish communities. It was 
suggested in the MOT TV programme and the discussions carried out for this study 
                                                     
 
162 ‘Suomesta yhteyksiä terroriepäiltyyn?’ Yle 15 October 2004; Toby Archer & Ann-Nina Finne, 
‘Pizzaa islamisteille’, Ulkopolitiikka 4/2005. The persons mentioned in Yle’s MOT programme 
‘Pyhä sota Turussa’ discussing the matter sued Yle and the reporters behind the story. Ultimately, 
Yle and the reporters were ordered by the Finnish Supreme Court to pay compensations to the 
plaintiffs for libel (‘Korkein oikeus kovensi MOT-ohjelman tuomiota’, Yle 9 December 2010). The 
fact that the reporters refused to disclose their sources during the trial was taken into account by 
the court when considering the sentence. 
163 According to newspaper reports, Awat Hamasalih, who has also used the name Awat Karkuky, 
moved to the United Kingdom in 2002 and became a UK citizen in 2008. Hamasalih is known to 
have maintained a close relationship with Mullah Krekar for many years and he has been involved 
in the European networks led by Krekar since the early years of the 2000s. According to the Italian 
police, he has been a member of the organisation’s top leadership. Hamasalih seems to have 
been particularly active in the communication activities of Rawti Shax. He has probably also been 
responsible for the organisation’s finances and has had extensive knowledge of its activities. He 
also has links to other key jihadist figures in Europe. Hamasalih moved to Turku in spring 2013 
and married a woman living in Finland. He was ordered to leave the country because, according 
to SUPO, he endangered public order and safety with his activities. The decision to deport Ha-
masalih was made in early 2014 but because of an appeals process it was only carried out at the 
end of the same year. Hamasalih has also been banned from entering Finland for 15 years and it 
is reported that he has violated this ban at least once. Awat Hamasalih is currently serving a multi-
year prison sentence that he received in the United Kingdom in 2017 for ISIS membership and for 
supporting the organisation. See Anu Nousiainen, ‘Suomessa lietsotaan ääri-islamia: Turussa 
asuva mies julkaisi värväysvideon’, HS Kuukausiliite 4 October 2014; Rebekka Härkönen, ‘Poliisi 
pidätti Suomesta karkotetun ääri-islamistin Turussa’, Turun Sanomat 1 April 2015; for example, 
‘Birmingham man convicted of Islamic State membership’, BBC News 17 June 2017. Aine Fox, 
Lizzie Dearden, ‘Isis recruiter who acted as ‘ambassador’ to UK is jailed after sending jihadis to 
Syria’, Independent 4 August 2017. 
PUBLICATIONS OF THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR 2019:31 
 
69 
 
 
that at least at some point, they have also tried to gain influence over prayer houses 
frequented by Kurds.  
According to the news reports referred to above and the interviews conducted for this 
study, individuals living in Finland are also suspected of having raised funds for the 
organisation in the form of donations and proceeds from restaurant operations. There 
have also been suspicions that the support activities or individuals involved in them 
have received funding from outside Finland. For example, in 2004, it was also 
reported in the Norwegian media that a person who had previously lived in Finland 
and had connections to Ansar al-Islam had been arrested in Estonia on suspicion of 
planning an attack against the Norwegian embassy in Latvia.164  
It is also possible that persons connected to the support networks have carried out 
support activities in Iraq during the first decade of the 2000s. Indeed, according to the 
information presented in the MOT TV programme, three men with Kurdish 
backgrounds that had lived in Finland were arrested in Iraq in summer 2005 on 
suspicion of supporting jihadist activities. It is impossible to verify from open sources 
what they were doing in Iraq and the persons themselves have denied any guilt.  
It is nevertheless known that a small number of persons linked to Rawti Shax took 
part in the conflict in Syria and Iraq in the 2010s. There is little information available 
on the current situation of Rawti Shax. According to the interviews carried out for this 
study, it would seem that some of the individuals connected to the network are still 
living in Finland. This is also indicated by some of the claims made in the media.165 
The network is not known to have planned any attacks in Finland. According to 
SUPO, attacks in Finland are not likely.166 
4.1.2 Activities in support of Al-Shabaab 
Another area of activities that attracted considerable publicity in the first decade of the 
2000s was connected to the civil war in Somalia. There are suspicions that activities 
in support of Al-Shabaab, an organisation involved in the conflict, were carried out in 
Finland during the latter half of the first decade of the 2000s. The activities of Al-
                                                     
 
164 ‘Ansar al-Islam knyttes til terrortrussel: Ansar al-Islam, som tidligere ble ledet av mullah Krekar, 
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Shabaab have involved a strong local dimension and the organisation’s popularity 
was partially based on its ability to bring stability to the areas under its control and to 
fight Ethiopia, the arch enemy of Somalia, especially during the early years of its 
activities (since around 2005). At the same time, its key founders were sympathetic to 
Al-Qaeda from the outset, with many of them having fought in Afghanistan or received 
training at camps located in that country. This explained their close links to Al-Qaeda 
and its members. The themes of global Jihad have been particularly prominent in the 
communications Al-Shabaab has directed at people living outside Somalia. As an 
organisation, however, Al-Shabaab has mostly operated separately from Al-Qaeda. 
Indeed, it unsuccessfully attempted to join Al-Qaeda for many years before finally 
becoming an official part of the organisation in 2012.167  
The conflict in Somalia has also touched Somalis living outside their home country in 
many ways. This sympathy has occasionally manifested in the form of support for Al-
Shabaab. During the early years of the conflict between Al-Shabaab and Ethiopia, the 
attitudes towards the organisation were relatively positive and was viewed as a fight 
for the independence of Somalia and the restoration of order. The idea of global Jihad 
and the struggle against the United States (which was supporting Ethiopia), running 
parallel to nationalistic aspirations, provided an ideological basis on which 
international support could be built. Support for Al-Shabaab among Somali expatriates 
(including those living in the West) seems to have been at its peak during the early 
years of the organisation’s activities, between 2006 and 2009.168 
Support for Al-Shabaab manifested itself in the form of activities related to fundraising, 
volunteering as fighters, and recruitment. While most of the Al-Shabaab fighters have 
come from the local population, foreign fighters have also played an important role in 
the organisation’s activities. Indeed, many of the suicide attacks attributed to the 
organisation have been carried out by foreign fighters. Fighters have travelled to 
Somalia from the neighbouring countries and from the West, with most of the latter 
group being ethnic Somalis. Their total number has been estimated to be between a 
few hundred and slightly more than one thousand.169 
Websites and social media have served as important channels in communicating with 
activists living outside Somalia and recruiting them to the fight. Many of these 
websites have been maintained by Somalis living in foreign countries. The global 
aspect of Al-Shabaab’s ideology has played a prominent role in the online 
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communications.170 Al-Shabaab has also carried out extensive ‘offline’ recruitment 
activities. Such activities have been carried out in the United States (especially in 
Minnesota171) and in the Nordic region. According to Stig Jarle Hansen, the first 
recruiters in the Nordic countries operated in the Rinkeby district of Stockholm. In later 
years, Gothenburg became the centre of the recruitment activities. Recruiters 
operating in Sweden have also been active in Norway and Denmark. Mosques in 
Stockholm, Gothenburg, and Malmö have been key recruitment centres in Sweden, 
whereas in other Nordic countries, mosques are not believed to have been closely 
linked to recruitment activities.172 
Finland was also a site for activities in support of Al-Shabaab at the beginning of the 
2010s. Al-Shabaab and especially its relationship with Somalis living in Finland were 
only cursorily discussed in the publications of SUPO during the organisation’s early 
years. The first detailed references were made in 2011, when SUPO noted that Al-
Shabaab was also in the process of establishing itself in Finland and expressed the 
fear that young people sent from Finland to Somalia would end up as fighters or at 
training camps.173 
It is, however, probable that the support activities in Finland have been conducted on 
a significantly smaller scale and have been less organised than in countries such as 
Sweden. Representatives of Finland’s Somali community have systematically denied 
that support for Al-Shabaab in Finland is more than a marginal 
phenomenon.174Moreover, according to SUPO, there are no signs of organised al-
Shabaab recruitment activities in Finland. Foreign speakers have nevertheless visited 
various events in Finland and they may have encouraged participation in fighting in 
Somalia.175 For example, according to a media report in 2011 on the documents 
leaked to Wikileaks, Hassan Hussein, the spiritual leader of Al-Shabaab had visited 
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Finland in 2009 in order to seek support and recruit new members for the 
organisation. He reportedly visited Sweden and Norway during the same trip.176  
People living in Finland have also gone to Somalia in order to fight in the ranks of al-
Shabaab. Those monitoring the situation in Somalia have reported that people coming 
from Finland have been observed in the organisation’s ranks.177 It is hard to say with 
certainty how many people have gone to Somalia and when they have done so solely 
on the basis of the information available to the authors of this report. It is clear, 
however, that the number of people travelling to the East African country is 
considerably lower than the number of individuals travelling to Syria and Iraq. 
According to a Yle documentary programme shown in 2013, there were about half of 
dozen such people.178 People from Finland are not currently known to have taken part 
in suicide attacks.179  
Recruitment activities associated with Al-Shabaab (and later with ISIS) have been the 
source of great concern in the Somali community. Members of the community have 
been particularly worried about activities in which young people struggling with 
problems related to substance use and crime are targeted for recruitment.180  
Fighters originating from Finland are mentioned in three sources. In his book on Al-
Shabaab, Stig Jarle Hansen, a Norwegian researcher, mentions Amiir Musa Ibrahim 
from Finland as one of the foreign fighters killed in 2011.181 Secondly, a young man 
raised in Finland and presenting himself as Mohamed Muse is interviewed in a Danish 
documentary programme. The man discusses (in Finnish) the reasons that prompted 
him to travel to Somalia and become a foreign fighter.182  
A third reference can be found in the Yle documentary programme on Al-Shabaab’s 
recruitment activities shown in spring 2013. It presents the case of a young man 
named Ahmed. Ahmed came to Finland at primary school age. After quarrelling with 
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his family and encouraged by his friends, he ended up in criminal activities. In his own 
words, in that situation he had met nice people who showed that they cared about 
him, bought him things and gave him money. Ahmed travelled to Denmark and to the 
United Kingdom with them. When the people helping him said that they were going to 
Somalia to help starving young people there, Ahmed said that he would like to join 
them. However, when in Somalia he ended up in an Al-Shabaab training centre. It 
transpired that the persons helping him were Al-Shabaab recruiters from Denmark.183 
At the time the documentary programme was made, Ahmed was living in Kenya 
where he had fled Al-Shabaab.  
The first trial in Finland involving offences with terrorist intent concerned activities 
aimed at supporting Al-Shabaab. The first arrests in the case were made in autumn 
2011. Investigations connected with the case had continued for at least two years. In 
2014, four persons were charged with financing terrorism. The charges concerned the 
transfer of relatively small sums of money to Al-Shabaab through the Hawala system. 
The main defendant in the case was also charged with recruiting his brother as an Al-
Shabaab fighter and planning to take his brother’s children who were living in Finland 
to combat training at an Al-Shabaab camp in Somalia without their consent.184  
In December 2014, the Helsinki District Court sentenced the four defendants for 
terrorist financing and one for recruitment for a terrorist offence and for preparing a 
terrorist offence.185 The Court of Appeal rejected the charges in March 2016 because, 
in its view, no evidence for the transfer of funds required under the legislation on 
terrorist financing in effect at the time had been presented. It had been concluded that 
money had been sent to individuals who probably had links to Al-Shabaab but, 
according to the Court of Appeal, no evidence had been presented showing that the 
money was specifically intended to support terrorist activities. The Court of Appeal 
also stated that not enough evidence had been presented in relation to the charges 
raised for recruitment and human trafficking.186The main defendant and his family 
moved to Syria between the two court hearings.187 
Even though there were, according to the assessments carried out by SUPO, still 
people in Finland in 2015 willing to go to Somalia to fight in the conflict there, the 
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interest in Al-Shabaab has declined in Finland and elsewhere.188 The interest in 
jihadist activities has been mainly channelled to the jihadist organisations operating in 
Syria and Iraq (especially ISIS).  
4.1.3 Links to Al-Qaeda’s support networks 
There are indications that individuals with links to Al-Qaeda lived in Finland in the first 
decade of the 2000s. The best known of these is the Finnish citizen deported from 
Sweden in summer 2008. The deportation was based on the statement of the 
Swedish Security Service (SÄPO), according to which the man was a leading figure in 
a ‘radical islamist’ group based in Sweden that was funding and supporting terrorist 
activities.  
The man denied any links to terrorism and provided an account of the events in an 
interview with the Helsingin Sanomat newspaper in 2009, which was apparently given 
of his own accord. The man is of Moroccan background and had moved to Finland in 
the 1990s to live with his girlfriend. He was granted Finnish citizenship in 2000. He 
has since then divorced his first wife and married a woman living in Sweden. He has 
one daughter from this marriage, which also ended in divorce.189 
In talking about a radical islamist group, SÄPO were probably referring to what is 
known as the North African network, which has one its centres in the Brandbergen 
mosque near Stockholm. A group of veteran jihadists are at the core of this network 
and they have maintained close contacts with the leaders of Al-Qaeda and GIA 
(Armed Islamic Group), a radical islamist group that has operated in Algeria. Some of 
these leaders had spent time at Al-Qaeda’s training camps in Afghanistan in the 
1990s. The network has supported the activities of jihadist movements in Iraq and 
Algeria financially, by disseminating their material and message, and by recruiting 
fighters. In the early 2000s, individuals linked to this network joined islamist groups 
(especially the Iraqi Al-Qaeda) as fighters. At the time, Nordic countries seemed to 
play a relatively important role in the European fighter recruitment network, with one 
probable reason being the few restrictions imposed on their support activities in these 
countries. It is worth noting, however, that carrying out attacks in the Nordic region 
was not in the interests of the network in the 1990s nor in the early years of the 
2000s.190 
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Mohamed Moumou (also known as Abu Qaswarah) was one of the leading figures in 
the North African network and the man deported to Finland was said to be a long-time 
friend of his. Moumou was also of Moroccan background. He was extremely well 
connected and active in European jihadist circles and he had close links to many key 
jihadist figures in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, and North Africa. The contacts can 
probably be traced back to the 1990s, when he was training at Al-Qaeda’s camps in 
Afghanistan.  
Moumou’s name has been mentioned in several terrorist investigations in Nordic 
countries and he is known to have at least encouraged many individuals to travel to 
Afghanistan and Iraq as fighters or to go to training camps in those countries. 
Moumou himself also travelled to Iraq in 2006 and served in leading positions in the 
Iraqi Al-Qaeda until he was killed in a US military attack in Mosul in October 
2008.191Prior to this, he is likely to have been a close associate of Abu Musab al-
Zarqawi, the founder of the Iraqi Al-Qaeda and possibly even served as his 
representative in Europe.192 Moumou’s name has been mentioned in connection with 
many foreign fighters who have travelled to Syria and Iraq and joined ISIS. 
There is no doubt that the aforementioned man who had been deported to Finland 
knew Mohamed Moumou well, but the only evidence of him being a leading figure in 
jihadist networks in Sweden is the statement on this matter provided by SÄPO. He is 
not, however, among the names to have been publicly mentioned or that would be 
familiar to the researchers monitoring jihadist circles. What he did while living in 
Finland is also a mystery. The fact that he was granted Finnish citizenship indicates 
that his role in Afghanistan was not necessarily known by the authorities in the late 
1990s or that insufficient attention was paid to this matter. 
His current whereabouts are unknown. Furthermore, there were no indications during 
the preparation of this report that he would still be in Finland. Indeed, there were no 
indications that he would have played a key role in the development of jihadist 
activism in Finland during his time in the country. If the information collected by SÄPO 
is to be taken at face value, the man is an example of a ‘visiting jihadist’193 or a person 
                                                     
 
 
191 Moumou’s background is discussed in a number of blogs written by Per Gudmundson, who 
has monitored jihadist circles in Sweden for many years; for example, in ‘Terroranklagelserna 
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that stays in a country for a short period but has few contacts with local jihadist circles 
during the stay. 
4.1.4 Interest in the phenomenon in convert 
communities  
Salafist and wahhabist interpretations of Islam and conflicts in the Muslim world have 
also sparked interest among a small number of people to have converted to Islam in 
Finland. The interest in jihadist activities among the converts has also been noted by 
SUPO. According to the observations SUPO made in its 2007 annual report, the 
potential security threats arising from the convert phenomenon are not unknown in 
Finland either.194 Previous research in this area has shown that the number of 
converts involved in the European jihadist networks has been considerably higher 
than could have been assumed on the basis of the total number of converts.195 At the 
same time, however, only a fraction of the converts in Finland or in the West in 
general is in any way interested in jihadism.  
It is known that there have been converts, especially in the Helsinki region, interested 
in conflicts in Muslim-majority countries and the jihadist groups fighting in them; 
initially among the activists in the organisation Islamin aika (The Era of Islam) and 
later in the organisation Helsingin muslimit (The Muslims of Helsinki). The 
establishment of Islamin aika in 2006 can be seen as a further step in the organisation 
of Finnish-speaking converts and attempts to create structures that would serve their 
needs. The organisation carried out dawa (missionary) work through its educational 
activities and by producing and disseminating written material, mainly by translating 
key texts of the conservative interpretations of Islam (such as wahhabism and 
salafism). These texts have been published by such partners as the Iqra-Islam 
association. Islamin aika activists have also been among the small number of people 
travelling from Finland to Saudi Arabia each year to study Islamic subjects in the 
Islamic University of Madinah. Many of these persons were also among the founders 
of the Islamic party in Finland in 2007, although this organisation never met the 
requirements to become a registered political party.196 In 2010, Islamin aika changed 
its name to Helsingin muslimit. A mosque in the Helsinki district of Roihuvuori, 
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operated by the association, was established the same year. The mosque moved to 
the district of Malmi in 2016. 
The mosque in Roihuvuori has acquired a reputation as a ‘radical mosque’ in the 
public debate, especially because individuals that have visited it and met there have 
been among those travelling from Finland to Syria and Iraq. It also attracted attention 
in early summer 2015 when a banner declaring ‘Jesus was a Muslim’ was hung on its 
wall.197 There are good grounds for characterising the mosque as salafist-oriented but 
not jihadist. Partially because of the sermons held in Finnish and its Finnish-language 
membership, the mosque has attracted a large number of Finnish converts. As a 
community, it is multi-ethnic. The same also applies to the orientation of Islamin aika 
and Helsingin muslimit in general.  
Irrespective of the aforementioned factors, there has been a group of people active 
within the mosque and the association behind it who have shown interest in the 
activities of jihadist groups in conflict zones, as well as in supporting them and, in 
some cases, even in participating in their activities. It is, however, difficult to form a 
exhaustive overview of how extensively the community associated with mosque has 
been aware of this and what the reactions have been. The first known signs of interest 
in jihadist activities can be traced back to around 2005. At this time, the activists of the 
Islamin aika group followed the conflict in Chechnya with particular interest and 
sympathy. Those involved in the activities and those closely monitoring the 
community give varying accounts of the extent to which the interest developed into 
support or about how many people decided to go to a conflict zone in order to fight 
there or seriously considered this option. It is, however, known that at least one active 
member of this group attempted to take part in the Chechnyan conflict and that he 
was detained in Georgia.198 Abdullah Rintala, who is mentioned in the report Jihadist 
online communication and Finland, was also an activist in Islamin aika. He has 
produced a large amount of Finnish-language jihadist online material and has also 
appeared in court because of his writings.  
Later, after the outbreak of the conflict in Syria, many individuals active in these 
circles and their friends have gone to Syria and Iraq. These include the three persons 
charged with offences with terrorist intent that had travelled to Syria in summer 2013. 
In their own words, they had travelled to that country to carry out humanitarian work in 
the name of the Northern Relief organisation established for this particular purpose. 
Some of them were also charged with tax fraud and accounting offences, which were 
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carried out to finance the trip.199 The charges for terrorist offences were, however, 
rejected by the court.200 All three have returned to Finland (one of them already turned 
back before crossing the Syrian border). At least two other persons also travelled with 
the group. One of them, known by his nom de guerre Abu Anas al-Finlandi, died while 
fighting in the ranks of ISIS201 and the other was probably still in the area in early 
2019.202 
4.2 Jihadist activism in the 2010s  
As far as we know, jihadist activities were still very small-scale in the first decade of 
the 2000s. During the 2010s, however, the scene has become somewhat more active. 
Even though there were already indications of the growth of the phenomenon around 
the turn of the decade, the changes that have taken place are primarily connected to 
the conflict in Syria and Iraq and, to a lesser extent, to the influx of asylum seekers to 
Finland in 2015 and 2016. Manifestations of jihadist activities in Finland have become 
an object of significant interest since 2013⎼2014 and there is now considerably more 
information and public assessments on the development of the phenomenon than 
before.  
As a whole, there has been a significant increase in the number of individuals linked 
to the phenomenon and the activities have become more varied and organised and 
more closely connected to international jihadist actors and circles. Even though 
jihadist activism is still partially carried out by immigrants and targeted at their 
countries of origin and the conflicts under way in them, global jihadism (especially with 
connection to ISIS) has become substantially more widespread. It would appear that 
more extensive social networks connected to jihadist activities have been established 
in Finland. Social networks have played a key role in the influx of people to Syria and 
Iraq in particular. Growing jihadist activism has manifested in the form of the 
phenomenon of foreign fighting, but there are also indications of growth in non-violent 
support activities – both in terms of quality and quantity. Similar developments have 
also been witnessed in other Western European countries.  
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4.2.1 The number of individuals involved in jihadist 
activities  
It is difficult to define the extent and boundaries of jihadist activism as a phenomenon. 
The phenomenon is connected to a wide range of individuals, whose role in the 
development of jihadist activities also varies greatly. Links to jihadist activities range 
from passive support to continuous promotion of an ideology or the agenda of the 
actors that have adopted this ideology. In talking about participants in jihadist 
activities below, we are referring to individuals involved in the activities in one way or 
another. In addition to the explicit involvement in jihadist activities, it is also likely that 
there is at least some passive support for jihadism in Finland. It is, however, 
impossible to give any estimates of its scale.  
The total number of counterterrorism targets provided by SUPO constitutes the only 
estimate of the number of people involved in jihadist activities in Finland. This figure 
includes all persons listed as counter-terrorism target individuals. There are no exact 
figures on how many of those individuals listed as target persons of counterterrorism 
are connected to jihadist activism but SUPO’s communications implicitly suggest that 
most of these individuals are involved in jihadist activities. Obviously, this list of 
counterterrorism targets only includes those individuals about whom SUPO is aware 
and cannot, therefore, be assumed to be exhaustive. The list is continuously updated, 
meaning that individuals are also removed from the list if there are no longer any 
reasons to consider them as counterterrorism targets.203 
When the number of persons connected to jihadist activities first became a topic for 
public discussion in the aftermath of the attacks of 11 September 2001, SUPO stated 
that dozens of people that have or have had terrorist connections have lived in 
Finland.204 The first public comment with a more specific estimation of the number of 
people defined as counterterrorism targets dates back to 2014, when SUPO stated it 
had updated its previous survey from the year 2012. In 2012, the number of 
counterterrorism targets was estimated to be 200 and almost 300 two years later.205  
                                                     
 
203 By relying solely on open sources, it is impossible to produce a detailed picture of the criteria 
used by SUPO when identifying individuals as counter-terrorism targets. SUPO has, however, 
stated in its 2017 yearbook that a counter-terrorism target is an individual that is actively working 
to promote terrorism or pro-terrorist ideology. According to the yearbook, such activities may in-
clude participation in terrorist activities, receiving or imparting training, producing or disseminating 
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defined as a counter-terrorism target. SUPO, Yearbook 2017, p. 10. 
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The estimate of the number of counterterrorism targets identified by SUPO has risen 
each year and totalled about 370 at the end of 2017.206 At the same time, the number 
of counterterrorism targets mentioned in SUPO’s National Security Review published 
in December 2018 had remained unchanged. Based on this information, it can 
tentatively be assumed that the growth in the number of the targets has at least 
slowed down after an exceptionally rapid growth in the period 2012–2017.207 
According to SUPO, the main factors contributing to the growth in the number of 
counterterrorism targets have not only been the allure of ISIS and the conflict in Syria 
and Iraq, but also the arrival of an exceptionally large number of asylum seekers in 
Finland in 2015 and 2016. A small proportion of the asylum seekers (mainly those 
arriving from Syria and Iraq but also, to a lesser extent, those coming from other 
conflict zones, such as Afghanistan) had links to the phenomenon. There may also be 
a small number of individuals among the asylum seekers that have acquired combat 
experience in the ranks of different jihadist groups.208 It is not clear, however, how 
many of these individuals are included in SUPO’s list of counterterrorism targets or 
how extensively SUPO has been capable of monitoring the asylum seekers’ jihadist 
connections. For example, Abderrahman Bouanane, who carried out the terrorist 
attack in Turku in August 2017, was not on SUPO’s list of counterterrorism targets.209  
Individuals living in our country are not the only persons relevant to the situation in 
Finland.210 Persons visiting Finland and spending their holidays here may include 
jihadist activists that are only important from the Finnish perspective because SUPO 
is monitoring such travel as part of international cooperation.  
In addition to the individuals now living in Finland, there are also former residents of 
Finland that are currently living in other countries and may be relevant to the situation 
in Finland. It is likely that these individuals are also included in the total number of 
counterterrorism target individuals listed by SUPO. Individuals that have left Finland 
and play a key role in jihadist activities include the persons deported from Finland for 
security reasons, such as Awat Hamasalih, a UK citizen of Kurdish background and a 
senior member of the leadership of Rawti Shax, and individuals that have travelled to 
conflict zones from Finland and participated in the activities of jihadist groups. 
Hussein al-Maadidi, who arrived in Finland from Iraq as a quota refugee in 2007, is 
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probably also such a person. His writings that are sympathetic towards ISIS have 
appeared online.211 
There are also known cases of activists living in other countries having been invited to 
visit Finland to promote jihadist activities in this country. Moreover, there have been 
rumours of foreign recruiters visiting Finland to encourage young people to travel to 
Syria, but such reports are impossible to verify. There have also been attempts to 
influence individuals living in Finland through social media.  
Several Finnish citizens living abroad have also taken part in jihadist activities outside 
Finland and a small number of Finns have been arrested in other countries in 
connection with terrorist offences. For example, at least one Finnish citizen is known 
to have travelled from the United Kingdom to join the ranks of ISIS. He was later 
sentenced to prison in Denmark for the crimes he had committed in Syria.212 A 
second such individual trying to travel from the United Kingdom to the conflict zone 
was arrested in London in 2016.213 It is difficult to estimate the total number of such 
persons and their potential effect on the phenomenon in Finland. It is probable, 
however, that there have only been a small number of such cases and that they are 
mainly of marginal importance to jihadist activities in Finland.214  
It is difficult to give any exact estimates of the individuals involved in jihadist activities 
in Finland (and in connection to Finland) on the basis of the publicly available 
sources. The total number is probably between 500 and 1,000. Most of these 
individuals live or have lived in Finland for long periods of time. It is worth noting, 
however, that the numbers of individuals actively promoting the phenomenon have 
increased considerably over the past seven years. 
4.2.2 Individuals involved in jihadist activities 
As stated above, a few hundred persons living in Finland are involved in jihadist 
activities in one way or another. They channel their activism to different conflicts and 
are mostly loosely organised. It would, admittedly, be interesting to know more about 
the backgrounds and motives of these people and the activities in which they have 
                                                     
 
211 The total number of persons deported from Finland for security reasons is not publicly available 
and, despite requests, was not provided for this study. According to the information revealed in 
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participated or in which they would be willing to participate. Currently, there is so little 
information available on such individuals living in Finland that forming an exhaustive 
overview on the basis of open sources is virtually impossible.  
Some general observations can, however, be made. Based on research on jihadist 
activities in other European countries, it is known that the individuals involved in these 
activities have very different backgrounds and motives. This also seems to be case in 
Finland. According to the situation overview on violent extremism in Finland (1/2018) 
published by the Ministry of the Interior, there are two types of individuals in Finland’s 
jihadist circles. On the one hand, there are persons strongly committed to the jihadist 
ideology and who approve the use of violence. On the other hand, there are also 
individuals who have less of an ideological commitment and are involved in the 
activities for other reasons.215  
This reflects the view of the jihadist activities in Europe expressed in the relevant 
research literature, especially concerning the cells that have carried out terrorist 
attacks. In this body of literature, persons belonging to the first category are usually 
referred to as ‘entrepreneurs’ or key activists.216 These entrepreneurs play an 
important role in the formation of groups and networks and in the planning of activities 
and, thus, also influence the way in which jihadist activism has evolved and expanded 
to new areas. Moreover, these individuals have acted as contact persons between 
small local groups and more extensive networks on the one hand and foreign jihadist 
actors on the other. This is because many of them have taken part in fighting in the 
ranks of jihadist groups or stayed at training camps outside Europe.217 They have also 
often helped local activists join these groups as foreign fighters.218  
Participants of the second type may have life-management problems or they may be 
in a difficult life situation. For them, joining jihadist activities may present itself as a 
solution to their challenges. Some people become jihadists because they do not want 
to break the bond with their friends or family members that have already participated 
in these activities.219 Occasionally, people may also be motivated by a willingness to 
be saved and to atone for the sins they have committed before conversion or religious 
awakening (such as the use of alcohol/drugs or extramarital relationships) by fighting 
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on the path of Allah.220 ISIS and European jihadists in general have produced a great 
deal of communications material with the aim of encouraging people to take part in 
the conflict in Syria and Iraq by exploiting these themes. This partially explains the 
substantial increase in the number of people with criminal backgrounds in jihadist 
circles and especially among foreign fighters.221 In academic research, such persons 
have been referred to as ‘misfits’, ‘drifters’ and ‘hangers-on’.222 
Traditionally, individuals with foreign fighter experience and terrorist training or those 
that have been active in armed groups have played a key role in jihadist activities. 
According to SUPO, about one quarter of the current counterterrorism target 
individuals have such experience.223 The number of such persons in Finland has 
increased in recent years. However, it is not known how many of these persons have 
actually played the role of key activists in jihadist milieus in any way.  
As in other countries, men are likely to comprise the majority of jihadist activists in 
Finland. The increasing involvement of women in jihadist activism has been one of the 
most important trends in Europe in recent years. Even though there have been female 
participants in jihadist movements throughout the history of the phenomenon,224 
interest in jihadism among women and their willingness to actively promote it have 
only significantly increased during the conflict in Syria and Iraq, especially as a result 
of ISIS’ state-building project and the declaration of the caliphate.225 There has not yet 
been any research conducted on this topic with a focus on Finland. There is also little 
public information on the role of women in the phenomenon, especially outside the 
influx of foreign fighters to Syria and Iraq. For example, SUPO has refused to 
comment on whether there are any women among their counter-terrorism target 
individuals. The fact that several women have also left Finland for Syria and Iraq 
shows that women living Finland are also interested in the phenomenon and are 
willing to take part in jihadist activities.  
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4.2.3 Organisation and links to foreign countries  
Since 2015, the authorities have repeatedly emphasised that jihadist activities in 
Finland have become increasingly organised. For example, in November of the same 
year,226 when SUPO raised the level of the terrorist threat facing Finland for only the 
second time in its history, it mentioned the establishment of networks supporting 
jihadist activities as one motivation for the reassessment.227 In spring 2017, Jyri 
Rantala, SUPO’s then Head of Communications, stated that a jihadist underworld had 
developed in Finland.228 Indeed, jihadist activism in Finland seems to have become 
increasingly organised over the years, at the same time as the number of persons 
involved in it having grown.  
The level of organisation in the phenomenon should not, however, be exaggerated. 
As such, comments made regarding networks or a jihadist ‘underworld’ should not be 
interpreted as corresponding to a coherent milieu consisting of closely connected 
actors in Finland.229 In light of the information that has emerged from this study, this 
does not seem to be the case. In fact, according to this study, the jihadist scene in 
Finland is fragmented and would appear to comprise several different and separate 
actors. Nevertheless, the conflict in Syria and Iraq has made this scene more 
coherent, at least temporarily, as it has become the focal point uniting different 
sectors of jihadist activism.  
The jihadist scene in Finland consists of individuals, small groups, and social networks 
of different sizes, most of which are probably quite loose. They are connected to 
foreign actors in varying ways, especially to armed jihadist groups operating in conflict 
zones. According to SUPO, individuals living in Finland have links to all key terrorist 
organisations (jihadist groups) in major conflict zones.230 If the situation in Finland 
follows the same pattern as in other European countries, there are probably also links 
to the supporters of these actors in other countries, especially in Europe.  
The fragmented nature of the jihadist scene stems at least partly from the historical 
fragmentation and diversity of Finland’s Muslim community. Regardless, Finland has 
been home to individuals and small groups supporting jihadist activities among 
immigrants and their descendants, especially among those whose families come from 
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the conflict zones in which jihadist groups operate.231 Support activities connected to 
Ansar al-Islam are probably the best known of such activities in Finland. The support 
activities for Al-Shabaab discussed above have also received a great deal of publicity. 
The Finnish branches of such support networks have mainly had a limited impact (at 
least superficially) and they have often failed to have any wider effect on the 
development of jihadist activism in Finland.  
At the same time, an increasing number of jihadist activists in Finland are Muslims 
that were born here or emigrated to this country as children. In official reports, this is 
often expressed by saying that the phenomenon has become increasingly 
homegrown. Most of the social networks of people born in Finland that have existed 
during and before their involvement in jihadist activities are more multi-ethic than the 
networks of individuals that moved to Finland as adults. Many of them are also more 
strongly oriented towards the global Muslim community than exclusively towards the 
situation in their parents’ home countries. This is probably one reason for Finland 
having seen more networking among individuals interested in global Jihad and jihadist 
activities across ethnic boundaries in recent years. The conflict in Syria and Iraq has 
been the key uniting factor in the activism of the young generation. Indeed, this 
conflict and the associated mobility of foreign fighters have contributed to the 
establishment of new links.  
Even though the jihadist scene is now more networked and organised than in the 
past, it remains fragmented and has clearly been subject to some kinds of restraints 
relating to the adoption of new and more sophisticated forms of action. For example, it 
is noteworthy that no Sharia4 type organisation has been established in Finland. 
Indeed, while the establishment of such an organisation in Finland has been 
proposed, the idea has never received wider support. One example of these attempts 
is the Facebook page established under the name Millatu Ibrahim Finland.232 Jihadist 
activist organisations working under the same name have also existed in such 
countries as Germany and Denmark.233 However, in the case of Finland, all 
information suggests that it never became more than a short-lived Facebook page 
that only attracted a few dozen people interested in the phenomenon. However, a 
small number of individuals that later fought in the ranks of ISIS were associated with 
the page.  
The second example (which also attracted international attention) concerns 
discussions about setting up Sharia4Finland. When Anjem Choudary (one of the 
founders of al-Muhajiroun) visited Finland in spring 2013, he announced the 
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establishment of Sharia4Finland (as an idea rather than an organisation).234 It would 
appear, however, that the idea has failed to get off the ground. This may be partially 
explained by the fact that there have not been any suitable activists in Finland 
interested in playing a leading role in such an organisation. Choudary visited Finland 
at a time when many of the individuals with a potential Sharia4 leadership profile had 
already left or were about to leave for Syria. The second explanation may be that 
Choudary visited Finland at the invitation of the Rawti Shax organisation and spoke at 
an event organised by it. According to news reports, most of the people attending the 
meeting were Kurds.235 It seems that setting up the Sharia4Finland organisation was 
not in the interests of the local Rawti Shax activists, despite the cooperation between 
Awat Hamasalih (a Rawti Shax leader who lived in Finland at the time) and 
Choudary.236  
Geographically, the small groups involved in jihadist activities have mostly 
concentrated on certain localities and cities (or specific city districts). Nevertheless, 
Finland lacks suburbs, such as Molenbeek in Belgium, that would have an 
exceptionally large concentration of individuals or networks associated with 
jihadism.237 It seems that the activities are concentrated in the same large cities in 
southwest and southern Finland where most Finnish Muslims live. Traditionally, a 
large proportion of the persons connected to the phenomenon have lived in the 
Helsinki region.238 Additionally, details of jihadist activism in the Turku and Helsinki 
regions have emerged during this study. Moreover, there are individuals linked to the 
phenomenon living in different parts of Finland. In fact, individuals who are known to 
have travelled to Syria and Iraq come from various regions.  
It is difficult to single out any meeting places in Finland that would be well-known or 
especially important for the phenomenon, which is also a sign of the fragmented 
nature of jihadist activism in Finland. Elsewhere in Europe, jihadist actors and their 
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activism are associated with specific religious communities and public spaces. There 
has been a great deal of public debate about the possible role of mosques in jihadist 
activities and especially in the radicalisation of new participants. Even though 
promotion of jihadist ideology had largely moved from radical mosques to locations 
outside them by the latter half of the first decade of the 2000s239, dozens of ‘radical 
mosques’ and places of worship with links or suspected links to the phenomenon 
have been closed in different parts of Western and Central Europe during the influx of 
people to Syria and Iraq. 
In Finland, there are signs that people involved in jihadist activities have been seeking 
new recruits among individuals visiting mosques and prayer houses. It is likely that 
there are no mosques or prayer houses in Finland that openly advocate a jihadist 
interpretation of Islam. There may, however, have been a limited number of people or 
small groups in some religious communities expressing interest in jihadist activities. 
Moreover, there have been indications of this at least in the Roihuvuori mosque in 
eastern Helsinki.  
4.3 Jihadist activism in Finland 
What does jihadist activism in Finland mean in practice? In the West, jihadism as a 
violent ideology is specifically associated with violent terrorist attacks against civilians. 
In fact, achieving objectives by violent means is a key component of the phenomenon. 
However, jihadism also includes different types of non-violent activism. This chapter 
provides a detailed discussion of current knowledge on jihadist activities associated 
with Finland.  
4.3.1 Non-violent support activities 
Non-violent activism refers to all activities aimed at promoting jihadism without the use 
of violence. The aim is often to expand the support base of the phenomenon, recruit 
individuals for violent activism or to facilitate access to armed jihadist groups, to give 
examples. Non-violent activism also includes incitement to violence and the 
production, translation, and dissemination of jihadist material. Jihadist activism or 
specific individuals involved therein can also be supported by accumulating economic 
or other essential resources. In many cases, these forms of non-violent activism are 
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connected to each other. In Finland, jihadism has mostly manifested as non-violent 
activism. 
 Radicalisation, recruitment, and facilitation  
The authorities have, in recent years, repeatedly stressed that Finnish-based 
networks supporting jihadist activities are working to radicalise Muslims and to recruit 
new supporters.240 Radicalisation means the activities aimed at making potential 
supporters more sympathetic towards jihadist activities or ideology. The hope is that 
this will ultimately lead to the adoption of the jihadist ideology and support for jihadist 
movements. When the aim is also to commit individuals to act within the framework of 
jihadism, we refer to this as recruitment.241 In practice, however, these two modes of 
activism are often closely connected. They can take place in physical or virtual 
environments and they are often carried out in both simultaneously.  
Recruitment may entail peer-to-peer recruitment or top-down recruitment. The latter 
often refers to the activities of jihadist groups, or other organisations and individuals 
linked to them and which aim at recruiting new members.242 In peer-to-peer 
recruitment, on the other hand, individuals already involved in the activities or 
interested in jihadism recruit people close to them, such as friends or family members. 
It is also noteworthy that people or groups of friends often join jihadist activities at 
their own initiative. In most cases, people only start seeking the necessary contacts 
after they have become interested in jihadism.243  
In Europe, recruitment activities are rarely carried out by the armed groups operating 
outside the region. Instead, they rely on independent parties representing them or 
parties loosely associated with them as the instigators of more extensive grass-roots 
support networks. These have included radical Imams (especially in the 1990s), key 
activists and the networks formed around them, and non-violent jihadist organisations 
promoting the ideology and inspired by the Sharia4 model.244 These organisations 
have systematically worked to recruit new supporters and activists to their ranks. 
There are several differences between facilitation and recruitment. In facilitation, an 
individual that already has links to an armed jihadist group helps another person 
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interested in the activities to join its ranks. The difference between facilitation and 
recruitment is that the aim of recruitment is also to persuade the individual to become 
a member even though facilitators can sometimes also act as recruiters. The spread 
of social media in particular has made virtual facilitation (and recruitment) possible 
over long distances.245  
These forms of activism are all found in Finland, even though it is difficult to say 
anything definite about their extent and exact nature owing to the paucity of available 
information. Most of the radicalisation and recruitment efforts probably take place 
within peer groups (influencing friends and family members).246 The role of peer-to-
peer activism has been highlighted in Finland, as there has been so little organised 
jihadist activism in our country. This was especially true in the years preceding the 
Syrian conflict. Groups operating in foreign conflict zones or jihadist organisations 
operating elsewhere in Western Europe have not targeted Finland in their activities 
(except for a small number of visits). 
The support activities linked to Ansar al-Islam and Rawti Shax among Kurds 
constitute one example of more organised activism connected to recruitment, 
radicalisation, and facilitation. People living in Finland have taken part in the efforts to 
radicalise new supporters for the organisation, especially on the Internet. One specific 
aim of the organisation has been to recruit foreign fighters to Syria and Iraq. The fact 
that only a small proportion of those travelling to the conflict zones from Finland are 
associated with Rawti Shax shows the limitations of these activities. 
Finland has also witnessed some relatively amateurish radicalisation and recruitment 
attempts, in which an individual unknown to the target persons has approached them 
in a public place with the intention of discussing participation in jihadist activities, 
especially in connection with ISIS and the conflict in Syria.247 There were indications 
of such activities in early autumn 2014, when, according to SUPO, a small number of 
persons in Finland were trying to persuade people to travel to the conflict zones in 
Syria and Iraq.248 The latest indications of such activities in open sources are from the 
years 2016 and 2017. However, according to the publicly available information, such 
activities have had little results.  
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Radicalisation and recruitment activities also take place online. Online 
communications play an important role in the interaction between people also in 
contact with each other by other means. This is because the Internet is the key means 
of communication, especially between young people. Moreover, people are also 
known to view jihadist material available online with their friends. As is suggested in 
the report Jihadist online communication and Finland, communications through social 
media may play a particularly important role in Finland because jihadist activism in 
Finland is so fragmented and Finland is such a large country. This makes it quite 
difficult for individuals interested in jihadism to establish the necessary contacts.  
There have also been reports of jihadist support activities and activism in prisons in 
Finland even though the extent of the phenomenon remains unclear and it would not 
yet appear to play a major role in jihadist activism in Finland.249 It has also been 
claimed that individuals arriving in Finland as asylum seekers have been targeted for 
radicalisation and recruitment.250 For example, Yle reported in summer 2015 that ISIS 
was focusing its recruitment efforts on young boys arriving in Finland as 
unaccompanied asylum seekers and that, according to these boys, dozens of boys in 
the Helsinki region were considering joining ISIS.251 Individuals claiming to be 
religious scholars also toured reception centres in Eastern Finland during 2016.252 
There have also been reports of amateurish radicalisation attempts by asylum 
seekers.253 More detailed examination of these phenomena is, however, beyond the 
scope of this report. 
More information is also needed about the radicalisation and recruitment activities 
targeting women and the role of women play in the conflict zones. According to the 
situation overview on violent extremism in Finland published by the Ministry of the 
Interior, women that have travelled to the conflict zones in Syria and Iraq have 
established mutual networks before leaving their country of origin and peer-to-peer 
recruitment seems to have played an important role in this process.254 Giving birth to 
and raising a new generation is seen as a key task of women in Jihad255, even though 
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some of the women have also been motivated by the willingness to take part in 
fighting.256 It is also noteworthy that one of the first known Finnish-language jihadist 
writings concerned the role and tasks of women in Jihad.257 
 
 Producing, translating and disseminating jihadist material 
The Internet has provided an effective platform for jihadist groups to disseminate their 
material. ISIS, in particular, has allocated substantial resources for this purpose. In 
fact, it has been noted in Finland (especially in 2013 and 2014) how material 
produced by ISIS has been disseminated at discussion forums used by Muslims, as 
well as in social media. There are also examples of supporters translating such 
material into Finnish and disseminating it in Finland. The most important example of 
this is An-Nida Media. It has also been noted that a small number of ISIS supporters 
in Finland have produced and disseminated their own (text-based and visual) material 
sympathetic towards ISIS.  
There have, however, been few indications of such activities in open forums and in 
social media, especially after 2015. In many cases, the purpose of disseminating 
jihadist material is to influence attitudes towards jihadist actors or jihadism in general, 
and the aim of the parties disseminating the material may also be to recruit individuals 
if the distribution is followed by attempts to directly contact the consumers of the 
material. In such cases, the discussion usually moves to closed forums. This topic is 
examined in more detail in the report Jihadist online communication and Finland. 
 Fundraising 
Money for a variety of armed groups, such as Al-Shabaab and Ansar al-Islam and 
persons in their ranks, have been collected in Finland and sent abroad from our 
country. Unfortunately, no details of the extent of these transactions are available. 
The transactions are usually carried out through unofficial networks and middlemen 
(especially the Hawala system), which also makes it difficult for the authorities to 
monitor the flow of funds. In Finland, the assets of a small number of individuals and 
associations have been frozen under anti-terrorism legislation, but these parties are 
mainly connected to persons that have travelled to Syria and Iraq and to the trial 
connected to funding for Al-Shabaab.  
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There are many different sources of funding. In the Europe-wide context, they include 
criminal activities (especially tax, loan, and credit frauds), social benefits, and 
fundraising for charity.258 Individual participants have also used their own income and 
savings to fund the activities. It is likely that this has also been the case in Finland. 
There are also indications that money accumulated through legal business activities 
has been transferred to armed groups or people connected to them. There have been 
several cases in Europe connected to the conflict in Syria and Iraq, in which charities 
have been misused to promote the activities of armed jihadist groups. Charities are 
also known to have been established on false grounds, the purpose of which has, 
from the outset, been to collect resources for jihadist groups and/or provide 
individuals wanting to join their ranks with a credible cover story so that resources can 
be collected and people can travel to the conflict zones.259 
The funds collected by criminal means have especially been referred to as war booty 
in the communications of ISIS actors and actors sympathetic to ISIS.260 The use of 
similar means of funding has also been reported in Finland, for example in the trial 
connected to the Syrian conflict.261 One of the persons connected with the trial (who 
was later killed in Syria) subsequently justified his criminal activities in Finland by 
characterising them as the collection of war booty.262 
 Incitement and threats  
The Internet has also provided individuals embracing the jihadist world view with a 
broad range of possibilities for action. Activities mediated online have included 
incitement and threats, both of which have also been used in Finland. Incitement 
refers to attempts to encourage other persons to carry out violent attacks, while the 
making of a threat refers to an individual or community being intimidated by 
threatening them with violence.  
The Internet has been the main platform for incitement and threats. For example, a 
foreign fighter using the name Abu Hurairah al-Finlandi, who had travelled to the 
conflict zone in Syria and Iraq from Finland, threatened Finnish politicians in the name 
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of ISIS. These threats became public when the politicians that had received the 
threats spoke about the messages in their blogs and in social media.263 Another 
person that had travelled to the conflict zone has threatened Shia Muslims living in 
Finland.264 Such activities have also taken place among people living in Finland. For 
example, in October 2017, Abdullah Rintala, a Finnish convert sympathetic to ISIS, 
received a sentence in the Helsinki District Court for ethnic agitation against Shias 
and for distributing depictions of violence.265  
In recent years, the Finnish National Bureau of Investigation has investigated several 
other cases of threats of violence having been posted online. The best-known 
example of these is the threat against the Temppeliaukio Church in Helsinki in June 
2017. The police carried out an operation near the church that attracted considerable 
attention and that was said to have been prompted by suspected preparation of a 
terror attack against the church. Large concrete blocks preventing vehicles from 
driving to the entrance were also placed in front of the church. The operation was 
triggered by a tip received by the police, the reported nature of which was such that it 
could not be ignored. Upon further investigation, threat was able to be ‘ruled out’, 
which can be interpreted to mean that there was no concrete threat of an attack 
behind the tip.266 
 
4.3.2 Violent activism  
Violent activism refers to all activities aimed at promoting jihadism by violent means. 
Traditionally, most jihadist violence has taken place in conflict zones.267 A small 
proportion of the violence does, however, take place outside conflict zones (including 
Western countries). The focus of this sub-section is on the two forms of violent 
activism particularly relevant to the West: the phenomenon of foreign fighters and the 
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violent activities taking place outside the conflict zones. The latter also includes 
travelling to foreign countries to receive training in the use of weapons, if the aim is to 
carry out terrorist attacks outside conflict zones.  
 The foreign fighter phenomenon, ISIS, and the conflict in Syria and 
Iraq 
In the case of Finland, travelling to conflict zones as foreign fighters has been by far 
the most important form of violent jihadist activism in the 2010s. The phenomenon of 
foreign fighters is not unique to jihadism as it is significantly more extensive and older. 
Foreign fighters have joined conflicts of different ethnic and religious origins around 
the world. It is commonly believed that foreign fighting has become more common 
since the 19th century, as a result of such factors as technological advances.268 Since 
the 1980s, Sunni Muslims have, however, been overrepresented in the phenomenon, 
largely as a result of the flow of foreign fighters to Afghanistan.269  
Individuals have been encouraged to travel to conflict zones as foreign fighters by the 
common narrative put forward by many jihadist movements. According to this 
narrative, the Islamic religious community is under serious attack, innocent Muslims 
are suffering in conflict zones, and the personal duty of each Muslim is to help and 
defend their fellow believers in the fight against the enemy.270 This narrative has 
helped to attract foreign fighters to the ranks of jihadist groups in different conflict 
zones, from West Africa to Southeast Asia over the past 40 years. Overrepresentation 
of Sunni Muslims in the phenomenon has become increasingly pronounced in the 
2010s, as the conflict in Syria and Iraq has given rise to one of the largest and most 
extensive mobilisations of foreign fighters in history.271 
Foreign fighters are individuals that travel abroad to take part in a conflict in a country 
in which they are not citizens. Having said that, mercenaries or individuals 
participating in public or secret military operations are not usually considered to be 
foreign fighters even though they meet this general description.272  
It would, however, be misleading to think that all individuals travelling from Western 
countries to Syria and Iraq to join armed groups would have ended up as fighters and 
that combat would be their only form of action. It is also clear that not all men joining 
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jihadist groups operating in the conflict zones in Syria and Iraq are necessarily forced 
to (or even allowed to) take part in fighting.  
As ISIS tried to build its own utopian society and needed a broad range of different 
skills profiles (from administration to healthcare and from coding to education). Many 
of those who travelled to the region have probably ended up in such tasks (with some 
of them simultaneously taking part in fighting) before the extensive collapse of the 
caliphate in 2016 and 2017. It is likely, however, that as the area controlled by ISIS 
has contracted, many of those previously working in other tasks have participated or 
have been forced to participate in the armed activities of the organisation. Individuals 
joining jihadist groups have only had limited influence on their own situation and 
conditions. Persons taking part in non-violent support activities in conflict zones 
provide armed jihadist groups with significant logistical support and these groups 
would not be able to carry out their armed activities without this support, at least not 
on the same scale. Consequently, such persons have also been called foreign 
fighters, even though the term ‘fighter’ might be misleading when understood in a 
literal sense.273 
The conflict in Syria and Iraq has also attracted an exceptionally large number of 
women. For many years, women travelling to the region were referred to as migrants, 
partially because they were prohibited from taking part in violent activities before the 
collapse of the ISIS caliphate. As the area controlled by ISIS shrunk into 
insignificance with the loss of Mosul and Raqqa, female activists have also taken part 
in the fighting, though it is impossible to estimate their total number.274 Even before 
these events, however, their participation in jihadist activities was rarely limited to 
travelling to the conflict zones in Syria and Iraq. Indeed, many women travelling from 
Western countries are known to have attempted to support jihadist activities in 
numerous ways. Raising the next generation of fighters has been considered the most 
important of these tasks by jihadist groups. However, the women themselves have 
often been motivated by a willingness to promote the phenomenon and the activities 
of the armed groups connected to them, for example, by taking part in online 
communications and in radicalisation and recruitment activities in social media.275  
Travel from Finland to Syria and Iraq 
Finnish authorities have identified more than 80 individuals that have travelled to the 
conflict zones in Syria and Iraq. In reality, the figure is probably higher owing to the 
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assumption that there are also cases about which the authorities do not have 
knowledge.276 More than 40 people that left for the region as foreign fighters have 
been identified in this study. It is not fully clear how SUPO, for example, defines the 
total number of people that have left for the region and what kinds of actors are 
included in the total number. In its annual report of 2015, SUPO disclosed that 
approximately 75% of such people identified by then (more than 50 persons) had 
attempted to take part in jihadist fighting.277 The situation overview on violent 
extremism in Finland (1/2017) published by the Ministry of the Interior also states that 
most of the foreign fighters had joined ISIS.278  
In the context of this study, it was revealed that fighters from Finland have not only 
fought in the ranks of ISIS but also in the ranks of Jaish al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar and 
Jabhat al-Nusra, as well as in the ranks of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (formed on the basis 
of the Jabhat al-Nusra).  
Travelling from Finland to the conflict zones in Syria and Iraq was at its height 
between 2012 and 2016, after which fewer people have left for the area. Any 
travelling to the conflict zones after that has mostly taken place without the authorities 
noticing it, as the official estimates of the number of people leaving for the area have 
remained more or less unchanged since early 2017.279 
In addition to the individuals travelling to Syria and Iraq many people are also known 
to have considered leaving for the area but, for various reasons, have ultimately 
decided not to go. Security authorities and non-governmental organisations have 
made several interventions aimed at encouraging those planning to leave to give up 
their plans. A small number of underage people on their way to the area are also 
known to have been stopped at the airport. The best-known of the individuals giving 
up their travel plans is a man who uses the name Abdullah al-Finlandi, who is a young 
Finnish man who had converted to Islam. According to his own account of the events, 
he was preparing to travel to the conflict zone in summer 2013, with the intention of 
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joining Jabhat al-Nusra, but gave up his plans after talking to the representatives of 
SUPO.280  
Several similar cases became apparent during the study, but for reasons pertaining to 
the protection of privacy, they cannot be discussed here in more detail. Many of these 
individuals have been motivated by an interest in jihadism, which has not involved any 
concrete action or advanced plans. In a small number of cases, the individuals 
wanted to follow a family member or a close friend that had already travelled to the 
conflict zones in Syria and Iraq. 
Who are the people that have travelled from Finland to Syria and Iraq? They 
constitute a largely diverse group. Their backgrounds and motives were examined in 
a 2016 study focusing on the phenomenon.281 According to the situation overview on 
violent extremism in Finland (2/2015) published by the Ministry of the Interior, there 
were people from 19 different ethnic groups among the 70 individuals that had left 
Finland for the conflict zones in Syria and Iraq by the year 2015. A total of 62% of 
these were Finnish citizens.  
Somalis, Kurds, and mainstream Finns were some of the groups most strongly 
represented among the more than 40 people identified in our research. If we take into 
consideration the fact that the total number of converts in Finland is small, converts 
among the mainstream population have been particularly overrepresented. In the 
case of the Somalis travelling to Syria and Iraq, there are no indications that the 
foreign fighter flow would be connected to the support activities for Al-Shabaab in the 
earlier years. One of the persons charged with offences in the Al-Shabaab trial is, 
however, an exception in this respect. He travelled to Syria via Turkey with his Finnish 
convert wife and children sometime after spring 2015, in the middle of the appeals 
process arising from the Al-Shabaab related trial.282 At the same time, however, most 
of the others of Somali background seem to be individuals that became interested in 
jihadism during the conflict in Syria and Iraq and later took part in it. There is a clear 
link between Rawti Shax and the cases of Kurds leaving for the area and identified by 
the research group.  
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According to SUPO, the people leaving for the area are aged 18–50 and individuals in 
the age category 21–25 are the largest group. Women comprise more than 20% of 
the people known by the authorities to have left for the area.283 Even though the 
caliphate created by ISIS has been a particular attraction to Western women, a small 
number of Finnish women already went there before its declaration in summer 2014. 
The first of such cases known to the researchers stem from the period between winter 
2012 and spring 2013. During the study, it emerged that most of the approximately 20 
women travelling to the region were of Somali background or converts belonging to 
the mainstream population. A large proportion of these have travelled to the conflict 
region with their husbands, although some have also made the trip alone. In fact, it 
would be wrong to see women merely as passive co-travellers, as many of them may 
have played a key role in the decision to leave, irrespective of whether they have 
travelled alone or with a male companion. It also emerged that, in one case, female 
members of two families played key roles when the adult male offspring of the families 
decided to leave for the conflict zones in Syria and Iraq to join ISIS. Further 
examination of this dimension of the phenomenon will, however, be the task of future 
research.  
About 30 children from Finland have also ended up in the region, either with their 
mothers (or both parents) or as the result of being kidnapped by their fathers. Some of 
these children have reached adulthood in the conflict zones in Syria and Iraq. Many of 
the male children that have travelled to the region and spent long periods there may 
also have received armed training and taken part in fighting. What the children that 
have moved to the areas controlled by ISIS have even more likely been subjected to 
is indoctrination.284 It is estimated that the women that have travelled from Finland to 
the conflict zones in Syria and Iraq may have given birth to up to a dozen children.285  
The people leaving for the conflict areas mainly come from the large cities in Southern 
and Western Finland, which is not surprising because most of Finland’s Muslims (and 
most of the individuals connected to the phenomenon) also live in these cities. A 
handful of people have also travelled to the conflict zones in Syria and Iraq from small 
localities. During the study, it emerged that people leaving for the area from smaller 
municipalities have been in contact with networks in larger cities. If an individual has 
not had access to such concrete peer-to-peer networks, this has been compensated 
for by seeking contact with networks of like-minded people.  
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Some of the people travelling to the conflict zone from Finland have only lived in 
Finland for relatively short periods, which means that they are not particularly relevant 
to the phenomenon from the Finnish perspective. One example of such an individual 
is the Turkish student studying in Jyväskylä who had become radicalised before 
coming to Finland. According to news reports, during his stay as an exchange student 
in this country, he tried (probably unsuccessfully) to disseminate his ideology and 
recruit Muslims to ISIS in such places as the local mosque. He returned to Turkey in 
late 2014 and travelled to Syria in early 2015.286  
Having said that, some of the people leaving for the conflict areas that have only lived 
in Finland for short periods may be linked to persons or networks in this country that 
are relevant to the phenomenon. The man from Bangladesh who has appeared in 
social media under the noms de guerre Abu Musa al-Bengali and Muhammad al-
Muhajir is probably one such person. He moved to Finland in order to pursue studies 
in this country and probably only lived here for about two years (in Kokkola and in the 
Helsinki region) before travelling to the conflict zones in Syria and Iraq at the end of 
June 2014.287 His Finnish wife, a convert, left for the region about six months later, in 
early 2015.288  
According to news reports, a second Bangladeshi using the nom de guerre Abu Ismail 
al-Bengali, who had worked in the same company as Abu Musa, also had a role in 
jihadist circles in Northern Finland before travelling to Syria sometime between 2013 
and 2014. He probably travelled to Syria for the first time in July 2014.289 He was last 
seen in Finland in January 2015, which suggests that he had made at least one trip 
between Syria and Finland.290  
The role of social networks  
What has prompted people to leave for Syria and Iraq? The process and motives 
leading to people departing to the conflict zones have been determined for such a 
small number of people that we have decided that these issues are beyond the scope 
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of this report. However, we can say more about the social contacts relevant to this 
topic that were maintained by these people when still in Finland.  
When examining the known social contacts of the more than 40 people leaving for the 
conflict areas that were identified in this study, the same phenomenon can be 
observed as that which occurred in other European countries: many of the people 
leaving for the conflict zones have friends or family members that have also travelled 
to these areas in Syria and Iraq (see Appendix 2). Previous studies have 
demonstrated that social contacts play an important role in prompting people to join 
social movements or groups carrying out violent attacks. This would also seem to be 
the case here.  
One reason for friendships and family reasons having been particularly important in 
Finland seems to be that our country has lacked visible and charismatic activists, 
radical communities or public spaces open to jihadist activism that could have served 
as meeting places for people interested in and participating in the phenomenon. For 
example, several members of a group of friends (most of whom have been converts) 
frequenting the Roihuvuori mosque were among the people leaving for the conflict 
zones in Syria and Iraq. There have also been married couples, siblings, and cousins 
among the people leaving for these areas. Within these social networks, there have 
been clear indications of peer-to-peer recruitment, facilitation, and radicalisation, as 
well as dissemination of the ideology, even though most of these activities have 
probably taken place via closed platforms inaccessible to researchers. 
Friendships and family relationships are particularly important in the case of 
individuals travelling to the conflict zones in Syria and Iraq from large cities (see 
Figure 1). At the same time, it seems that the individuals living outside the largest 
population centres have been more likely to find the peer-to-peer networks on the 
Internet. The most important example of the latter group is the young convert known 
under the nom de guerre Abu Ibrahim al-Finlandi (also known in Finland as Isis-
Jon).291 He attracted questionable publicity in the international press in spring 2015 
when complaining about how difficult it is to find a wife in Syria.292 The young convert, 
who had been socially reserved and had suffered from life-management problems 
when in Finland, found friends from Norway and Latvia on the Internet. According to 
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Norwegian press reports, all three travelled to Syria. Abu Ibrahim and his Latvian 
friend had met in Helsinki before the departure.293  
The Internet has also played a role in the communications of those already in Syria 
and Iraq with contacts in Finland. It is, however, practically impossible to piece 
together all the communications connected to the departure processes. Nevertheless, 
many of those that have travelled to Syria and Iraq as foreign fighters are known to 
have also encouraged others to leave by acting as sources of inspiration and role 
models, and even as recruiters or facilitators. These persons have disseminated 
jihadist material and occasionally also explained its content in Finnish. Social media 
services, such as Twitter, Facebook, and WhatsApp have allowed mobilisation 
through social bonds. The individuals that have travelled to the region first relay 
information and inspire others to leave, allowing their close associates to also join the 
same armed groups.  
Rawti Shax is the only organisation known to have played a role in the flow of foreign 
fighters from Finland to Syria and Iraq. Many of the publicly known details about Rawti 
Shax stem from an investigation jointly carried out by a special unit of the Italian 
police and the intelligence authorities of a number of other countries in the early 
2010s, and it is difficult to verify or assess them on the basis of other sources.  
Based on the investigation records of the Italian police, recruiting fighters to Iraq has 
been one of the key objectives of the organisation. At least four persons that have 
lived in Finland are mentioned in these records. Three of them had travelled to Syria 
and Iraq. It has also been reported in two other cases that persons close to the 
network have taken their children to Iraq without the consent of the other parent. It is 
believed that one of the persons that have travelled to Syria and Iraq used to be the 
leader of the Finnish Rawti Shax organisation. He had travelled to Syria and Iraq as a 
fighter in March 2014 and had been killed there in December of the same year. He 
was one of the Finns whose forms were among the leaked documents completed as 
part of the ISIS arrival interviews.294 Two other persons that have lived in Finland but 
have since left to fight in Iraq were also named in the investigation. One of them died 
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in conflict and the second decided to travel to Italy when he was not allowed to return 
to Finland.295  
Activities in Syria and Iraq 
What have the individuals travelling from Finland been doing in Syria and Iraq? 
Determining this has been difficult, even for the authorities. The assumption is that 
most of them have joined ISIS. However, this does not say very much about what they 
have been doing. As stated above, not all individuals joining armed groups have taken 
part in fighting, as they have been engaged in a broad range of different tasks, 
depending on their own skills and the needs of the groups. Moreover, even though 
many of those leaving Finland between 2013 and 2015 have claimed to have travelled 
to Syria and Iraq, very few of them have openly described their combat experience or 
other activities in the region in interviews, social media or discussion forums.  
In its own communications, SUPO has emphasised that some foreign fighters coming 
from Finland have risen to important positions, especially in ISIS.296 Based on open 
sources, it is difficult to say what this exactly means. At the time, ISIS still had many 
areas of activities in which individuals that had joined the group could have risen to 
important positions. Not every important positions was alike, however; especially 
considering their potential impact for the development of jihadist activism in Finland. 
In the international research and public debate, none of the ISIS members coming 
from Finland have been described as having an important position. Thus, it remains 
unclear what SUPO actually means with this statement.  
According to official reports, a large proportion of those travelling from Finland to the 
region have sought to take part in violent activities in the ranks of the jihadist groups 
and some of them are also known to have done so. The individual known under the 
nom de guerre Abu Salamah al-Finlandi, one of first persons to travel to the region 
from Finland, was killed in an operation of the Jaish al-Muhajirin wal-Ansar group in 
Aleppo in summer 2013.297 He was known to at least some of those who had travelled 
to Syria and who were charged in the trial in winter 2017–2018. The case ended with 
the acquittal of the defendants of terrorist offences.298 In addition, at least Abu 
Mansour al-Somali, Abu Anas al-Finlandi, and Abu Shu’ayb as-Somali have also died 
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while fighting in the ranks of ISIS. According to media reports, Abu Mansour was 
killed while on sentry duty and Abu Anas in the fighting against the troops of the Free 
Syrian Army. According to his father, Abu Shu’ayb may have been killed in an air 
strike carried out by the anti-ISIS coalition.299 Two individuals from Finland with 
connections to the Rawti Shax organisation and Abu Ismail al-Bengali, who was of 
Bangladeshi background, are also reported to have been killed while fighting in the 
ranks of ISIS.300 In addition, Aby Hurayrah al-Finlandi was killed after carrying out a 
suicide attack for ISIS in Iraq in autumn 2015.301 According to the reports 
disseminated in social media in summer 2018, an individual of Somali background 
that had left Finland and joined the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham group (previously known as 
Jabhat al-Nusra), was assassinated by ISIS in Syria.  
It is estimated that approximately twenty people from Finland have died in the region, 
even though it is almost impossible to verify the reports of these deaths. As a result of 
the problems concerning the availability of information, the actual figure may indeed 
be higher. The deaths of the men killed in fighting and subsequently praised by the 
jihadist groups in their communications have been extensively reported, whereas 
there is considerably less information available on the deaths of women and children.  
Some of those that have left for the conflict areas have probably used the vocational 
skills acquired in Finland to the benefit of ISIS. Individuals that have travelled to the 
conflict zones from Finland have worked in such professions as physiotherapists and 
ambulance drivers.302 Quite a few of them have also worked as recruiters and 
facilitators and been involved in online communications. Abu Mansour, who has 
already been referred to above and who travelled to Syria in December 2012, invited 
his cousin Abu Shu’ayb and his wife (Umm Shu’ayb) to Syria, and the couple travelled 
to the country in early 2013.303 According to the criminal investigation records, Abu 
Salamah al-Finlandi served as the facilitator for the group of friends frequenting the 
Roihuvuori mosque that then left for Syria. However, he died before all members of 
the group had reached Syria, which probably prompted them to change their plans. 
Except for Abu Anas (who died in Syria), it is not known with any degree of certainty 
whether this group has been involved in violent activism in the region. It is likely that 
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Abu Salamah also served as a role model and inspiration for his younger brother and 
the brother’s wife who probably travelled to the conflict zones Syria and Iraq with their 
children in 2015. The brother of Abu Salamah is likely to have also died in the ranks of 
ISIS. 
Women leaving for the area are known to have been quite active on the Internet. The 
widow of Abu Salamah (and later also the widow of Abu Mansour), a young Finnish 
female convert, disseminated material produced by ISIS on a Finnish discussion 
forum intended for Muslims. At the same time, the former wife of a person who had 
travelled to the conflict zones in Syria and Iraq from Roihuvuori, actively disseminated 
material sympathetic towards ISIS on the (now closed) @UmmIrhab Twitter account, 
praising the atrocities of the group. Two Finnish women, Umm Khaled (the convert 
wife of the main defendant in the Al-Shabaab trial) and Umm Musa (convert wife of a 
Bangladeshi fighter that had travelled to the conflict zone from Finland) have also 
appeared in official English-language ISIS publications. Umm Shu’ayb, the wife of 
Abu Shu’ayb, also achieved notoriety in Finland by threatening Shia Muslims living in 
Finland via her Facebook account.304  
 Attacks in Western countries and travel to training camps 
When jihadism-related international terrorism is addressed in the public debate, it 
usually involves attacks carried outside the conflict zones in Syria and Iraq and 
especially against targets in Western countries or Western targets in other parts of 
world. The nature and evolution of the attacks taking place in Europe, their 
geographic distribution and links to wider jihadist networks and armed groups were 
discussed in the third chapter. One important reason for the high level of concern in 
Western Europe regarding the flow of people to Syria and Iraq and especially to the 
ranks of ISIS pertains to the intertwined framework of jihadism, the phenomenon of 
foreign fighters, and international terrorism (carrying out attacks outside the conflict 
zones). A small proportion of the foreign fighters from European countries have taken 
part in terrorist attacks in Europe after returning from Syria and Iraq.305 
To date, the stabbing in Turku in August 2017 has been the only incident in Finland 
that can be considered a jihadist attack. Two people were killed, and several others 
injured in the attack. This is also the only known case of an individual staying in 
Finland or a long-time resident of Finland carrying out a violent jihadist attack in a 
Western country. To the best of our knowledge, there have not been any serious 
plans to carry out jihadist attacks in Finland; at least not to the extent that there would 
have been grounds for pressing charges. After more detailed investigations, the 
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suspected attack plans have turned out to merely be threats by nature, and these 
have been already described above. The best-known example is the case involving 
the Temppeliaukio Church in Helsinki referred to above. 
The stabbing in Turku on 18 August 2017 was carried out by Abderrahman 
Bouanane, who is of Moroccan heritage and had registered as an asylum seeker in 
Finland two years earlier. His uncompromising religious interpretations and 
threatening behaviour arouse so much concern among people close to him in early 
2017 that they reported their concerns to the authorities. However, for a variety of 
reasons, these reports did not lead to any action. In spring and summer 2017, 
Bouanane discussed religious matters with his friends on several occasions. His 
radicalisation seems to have intensified during Ramadan (around June 2017) when he 
probably met an Uzbek individual sympathetic towards ISIS in a mosque in Turku. 
Bouanane carried out the attack after short consideration and without careful 
planning. Before carrying out his attack, Bouanane recorded two video messages and 
uploaded them to at least three Telegram discussion groups.306  
Bouanane carried out the attack alone and he is likely to have also planned it alone. It 
seems that jihadist material available online played a role when he adopted a jihadist 
world view and made plans to commit a violent act. It remains unclear, however, to 
what extent the process involved bilateral online or face-to-face interaction. It is 
almost certain that the person with Uzbek background met by Bouanane had 
influenced his thoughts and plans in some way. A warrant has been issued for the 
arrest of this person and he was still at large at the time report was written. Moreover, 
based on the available material, it is not possible to determine this person’s links to 
jihadist networks or activists in Finland or elsewhere.  
The act carried out by Bouanane was a typical jihadist attack of its time. It took place 
at a time when indiscriminate attacks against civilians using edged weapons had also 
become more common in other countries.307 It is, however, unusual that the 
perpetrator was not killed. This may be one reason why ISIS has not yet taken 
responsibility for the attack in its own communications.  
Assuming that Bouanane’s act is not, in some fundamental manner, connected to 
more extensive networks through his Uzbek acquaintance, the attack was a fairly 
typical ‘inspired’ jihadist attack, as described in the classification given in the third 
chapter. This means that familiarisation with the material and ideology of such an 
                                                     
 
306 Safety Investigation Authority, Stabbings in Turku 18 August 2017 (P2017-1). https://www.tur-
vallisuustutkinta.fi/en/index/tutkintaselostukset/poikkeuksellisettapah-
tumat/puukotuksetturussa18.8.2017.html 
307 Petter Nesser & Anne Stenersen, ‘Jihadi terrorism in Europe: The IS-effect’, Perspectives on 
Terrorism 10, no. 6 (2016). 
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organisation as ISIS or Al-Qaeda significantly contributed to the decision to carry out 
the act and the method of carrying it out, while at the same time the attack itself was 
carried out without the perpetrator having links to such groups or the jihadist activists 
or networks connected to them. Neither is Bouanane the only person with the status 
of an asylum seeker to have carried out attacks, even though only a small proportion 
of all jihadist attacks have been carried out by asylum seekers.308 
The carrying out of the attacks is sometimes connected to travel to conflict zones. Not 
all individuals involved in the planning and carrying out of the attacks have, however, 
received systematic training for the acts; whereas individuals that have spent time at 
training camps have taken part in many of the attacks carried out in recent years. For 
example, some of the perpetrators of the attack in London in July 2005 had spent time 
at an Al-Qaeda camp. There are indications that individuals living in Finland made 
trips to such camps during the first decade of the 2000s, but little is known about the 
extent of this phenomenon and how it relates to the subsequent attacks outside 
Finland.  
                                                     
 
308 For example, according to a study published in summer 2018, asylum seekers and refugees 
were only involved in 16% of all attacks in Europe between 2014 and 2018. See Robin Simcox, 
The Asylum-Terror Nexus: How Europe Should Respond, The Heritage Foundation Backgrounder 
no. 3314 (2018), https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2018-06/BG3314.pdf.  
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5 Conclusions: current state and 
future of jihadist activism in Finland  
In this report, we have examined the history of jihadism, the key developments of 
jihadist activism on the global and European stage and reviewed the jihadist scene in 
Finland. This chapter sums up the key observations relevant to Finland made in the 
previous chapters and assesses the similarities and differences between 
developments in Finland and elsewhere in Western Europe. In this sense, we will also 
examine such issues as why jihadists became more active in Finland at the onset of 
the conflict in Syria and Iraq and especially why the scale of the influx of individuals 
from Finland to the conflict zones has been so large relative to the size of the Muslim 
population in our country. We also discuss the developments and phenomena 
witnessed elsewhere in Europe that have not yet been observed in Finland.  
At the end of the chapter, we look towards the future and discuss how jihadist 
activities are expected to develop in the next few years in Finland and in Western 
Europe as a whole. We also make some recommendations regarding the areas 
requiring further research in order for us to become more familiar with the 
phenomenon and to ensure that policy measures are more solidly based on scientific 
knowledge.  
5.1 Key findings  
The previous chapter examined the ways in which jihadist activities have developed in 
Finland. The main lines of these developments can be summed up as follows: 
• The number of individuals involved in the activities has grown significantly in 
the 2010s. Jihadist activism is still modest in scale in Finland when compared 
to many other Western European countries, but the change is highly 
significant when contrasted with the history of the phenomenon in Finland.  
• Even though networking and organisation among people interested in jihadist 
ideology and activities has increased in recent years, jihadist activism in 
Finland remains relatively fragmented and disorganised. There are still no 
organisations in Finland publicly supporting jihadist activism. It also seems 
that there are few capable key activists in this country willing to organise the 
activities and inspire others. At the same time, however, it should be 
remembered that many of these people are very security-conscious and try to 
keep their activities secret.  
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• The conflict in Syria and Iraq has been the single most important factor 
contributing to the growth of jihadist activism in Finland. The conflict has 
prompted more individuals to travel from Finland to the region than any 
previous conflict involving jihadist groups. Whereas in the past, jihadist 
activists in Finland were occupied by a wide variety of conflicts and issues, 
the conflict in Syria and Iraq has served as a unifying cause for activists and 
supporters coming from different backgrounds.  
• The influx of asylum seekers to Finland in 2015 and 2016 undoubtedly 
increased the number of persons having links to jihadist activities. Based on 
public sources, it is difficult to make any detailed estimates of how and to 
what extent this has impacted the situation in Finland. 
• Jihadist activism in Finland continues to support non-violent activities (such as 
recruitment and fundraising). A significant increase in travel to the conflict 
zones in Syria and Iraq has been the most notable change in the operating 
practices. 
• The first jihadist attack in Finland took place in 2017. The perpetrator was an 
asylum seeker, but he probably did not have any links to jihadist networks in 
Finland. To the best of our knowledge, there have not been any other serious 
attempts or plans to carry out attacks.  
• In a potentially significant change, current and former residents of Finland 
now maintain closer links with jihadist groups operating in the conflict zones in 
Syria and Iraq. This may make it easier to channel more extensive support 
from Finland to conflicts under way in other parts of the world.  
• While men still constitute the majority of jihadist activists, there are also 
indications in Finland that women are becoming increasingly interested in 
jihadism and are more active in jihadist circles. The fact that an increasing 
proportion of the individuals travelling to Syria and Iraq are women is the 
clearest manifestation of this trend.  
• The opportunities provided by social media have also changed Finland’s 
status in relation to the global jihadist movement. It has become increasingly 
easy to obtain jihadist material and to establish personal relationships with 
people in other countries. This has become more difficult after jihadist 
communications started moving to closed channels around 2015 but is not yet 
impossible.  
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• Physical social contacts (friends and family members) are probably still the 
most common avenues for participating in jihadist activities, but social media 
has also opened other routes, especially for people that do not have any 
suitable peer groups in their vicinity.  
• It seems that the most active growth phase connected to the conflict in Syria 
and Iraq was over in early 2019. However, the activism accompanying the 
conflict has left a permanent mark on jihadist activism in Finland.  
• The conflict in Syria and Iraq has made jihadist actors more aware of Finland 
and Finland is more visible than before in the content that they produce. 
When travelling to the conflict zones in Syria and Iraq, foreign fighters take 
information about their own societies with them. This makes it easier to put 
together more targeted communication for audiences in their home countries 
and to establish new connections between foreign jihadist actors and activists 
living in Finland. This will probably have an increasingly strong impact on the 
phenomenon in Finland in the future.  
• At the same time, however, it should also be remembered that there are still 
substantial gaps in our knowledge of jihadist activities in Finland. This does 
not only apply to publicly available information, as the backgrounds of the 
individuals travelling to Syria and Iraq and the factors motivating them are 
probably not fully known to the authorities either. It is of vital importance that a 
more comprehensive and nuanced overview of the situation is developed and 
maintained in order to support the work of the authorities and the efforts to 
prevent and counter the phenomenon. 
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5.2 Jihadist activism in Finland in the light of 
broader trends in Europe 
As described in the third chapter, jihadist activism has grown stronger in the 2010s 
across Western Europe. Accordingly, the developments in Finland have followed the 
general trends. Furthermore, the changes taking place in Finland can also been seen 
as a continuation of a process in which jihadist activism has recently become more 
common in countries that have previously played a peripheral role in the 
phenomenon. The Nordic countries constitute such a region. Jihadist activism started 
gaining ground in Sweden and Denmark earlier than elsewhere in the Nordic region 
and activism in these two countries has been of a more serious nature than in Finland 
or Norway – both in terms of its scope and nature.  
As in Finland, the conflict in Syria and Iraq and the activities of ISIS, together with all 
their direct and indirect consequences, have been the most important reason for 
jihadist activism also becoming more common elsewhere in Europe. As stated in the 
third chapter, we are witnessing by far the largest and most extensive mobilisation of 
foreign fighters in the history of jihadist activism in Europe. A substantially higher 
number of individuals have left many other Western European countries for Syria and 
Iraq than from Finland, where the total number of such people is at the EU average.309 
At the same time, however, if the number of people leaving for the region is examined 
in relation to the country’s population, the Finnish contingent is considerably large. 
The numbers are particularly high in relation to Finland’s Muslim population. Relative 
to the size of the Muslim community, more people have left for Syria and Iraq from 
Finland than from any other Western country.  
The number of people travelling to the region from Finland can also be considered 
exceptional in the sense that jihadist activism has been very modest in every measure 
in this country over the past two decades and, according to current knowledge, there 
have been few such networks and organisations in Finland that have been able to 
recruit people willing to leave for Syria and Iraq and facilitate the process of joining 
armed groups (especially at the start of the conflict). At the same time, however, it 
should also be noted that a substantial number of people have left all Western 
European countries for Syria and Iraq without relying on existing networks. Many of 
those travelling to the region are individuals without any previous (or long-time) 
involvement in jihadist activism. 
                                                     
 
309 Bibi van Ginkel & Eva Entenmann (ed.), ‘The Foreign Fighters Phenomenon in the European 
Union: Profiles, Threats & Policies’, ICCT Research Paper (2016), https://www.nctv.nl/bina-
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In addition to the phenomenon of foreign fighters, the past ten years of jihadist 
activism in Europe have also been characterised by an increase in jihadist attacks 
and foiled attack plots. However, after peaking between 2015 and 2017, the number 
of attacks has, at least temporarily, decreased. The stabbing in Turku was part of this 
trend. The way in which the attack was carried out was also typical of the period. 
Even though there have not been any other attacks and major attack plans have not 
been foiled, the estimates presented by SUPO indicate that, on the basis of the 
agency’s observations, the possibility of an attack in Finland is no longer considered 
as far-fetched as it was before the start of the Syrian conflict in 2012.  
It has also been noted in research and public debate that the European-based jihadist 
networks have become increasingly transnational. Such organisations as Rawti Shax 
and Sharia4 are examples of these actors. The new networks and international 
contacts established as a result of the travel to Syria and Iraq are one major reason 
for this. There have also been signs of such internationalisation in Finland.  
In many ways, then, developments in Finland reflect the development of jihadist 
activism in Europe in general. In fact, the changes taking place in Finland reflect the 
general European trends more strongly than in the past, and that in itself can be 
considered a significant development. There are, however, also features in the 
Finnish situation that make it stand out in comparison to other European countries 
without, however, making Finland a special or exceptional case.  
Jihadist activism in Finland is still small in scale and, according to current knowledge, 
relatively disorganised. Even though jihadist activism is also in many respects 
disorganised elsewhere in Europe, more organised networks and organisations have 
also been established in many countries in the first decade of the 2000s and the 
2010s. It seems that there are no local branches of international or European-wide 
jihadist networks in Finland (except for Rawti Shax). There has also been relatively 
little radicalisation and recruitment activities in Finnish prisons.310 In fact, it is difficult 
to pinpoint any organised cooperation or meeting places essential to the 
phenomenon. Before going any further, it should also be noted that it is partially 
misleading to examine jihadist activism merely on a national level, as the activities 
and networking associated with it are highly transnational and not limited to any 
specific country. 
Furthermore, there have not been any serious attempts to establish Sharia4-type 
organisations in Finland; in other words, organisations that are non-violent, but which 
openly support the jihadist world view. As described in the third chapter, such 
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organisations have been key to the development of the phenomenon in other 
countries and to the mobility of foreign fighters.  
5.3 Factors behind developments in Finland 
What are the factors that have helped to make Finnish jihadist activism into what it is 
today? In many respects, the same explanations hold for developments in Finland as 
in other European countries, especially when it comes to the multidimensional effects 
of the conflict in Syria and Iraq. However, there are three key questions in the Finnish 
context that need further explaining: Why has jihadist activism started to develop later 
in Finland than in most other Western European countries? How can it be explained 
that in relative terms so many individuals have travelled from Finland to Syria and 
Iraq? Why does jihadist activism in Finland continue to be relatively disorganised and 
fragmented? Possible answers to these questions are discussed below, although it 
should be noted that a more detailed analysis would require additional research.  
The country’s remote location and foreign policy have been typical explanations put 
forward for the small scale of jihadist activism in Finland before the 2010s. These 
factors have undoubtedly played a role. Even though the West as a whole is often 
presented as an enemy, jihadist activism has primarily targeted those Western 
countries that have a colonial history in the Middle East or South Asia and/or those 
that have taken part in armed conflicts in these regions (such as the United Kingdom, 
France, and the United States). Moreover, the influential role of these countries in 
world politics is enough to make them familiar to jihadist movements.  
It should be noted, however, that drawing straight lines between a country’s foreign 
policy and jihadist activism is unwise, as jihadists have also been relatively active in 
such countries as Sweden and Switzerland. Moreover, the war in Iraq, which broke 
out in 2003, increased interest in jihadism and provided a stronger inspiration for 
activists linked to the phenomenon in Germany and France (which opposed the war) 
than in the United States (which started the war). The notorious cartoon controversy 
has been the key factor drawing the jihadists’ attention to Denmark. The case of 
Denmark provides a good example of how a country can unexpectedly become a 
symbol and a focus of attention for much larger issues. 
The second common explanation for the low level of jihadist activities in Finland is 
that the Finnish Muslim community is small and most of its members are moderate. 
This is true and is undoubtedly one reason why there is so little jihadist activism in our 
country. Most Muslims living in Finland are and have always been religiously and 
politically moderate. Muslims living in Finland are also a highly fragmented 
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community, linguistically, ethnically, religiously and politically. This makes it difficult to 
talk about a monolithic ‘Muslim community’. The diversity and fragmented nature of 
the Muslim population has made any attempts at organising these communities 
difficult. This has also manifested in jihadist activities. There has been some interest 
in Finland in supporting armed groups operating in other countries, but the number of 
people interested in individual groups or conflicts was extremely small before the start 
of the Syrian conflict. One probable cause for this is that there have been only a 
handful of people with family roots in these conflict regions. 
The low level of jihadist activism or the lack of organisation cannot be exhaustively 
explained with such general factors, however. This is shown by the fact that there has 
been a considerable increase in jihadist activism in recent years even though our 
Muslim community remains small and fragmented and Finland’s geographic location 
remains unchanged. As regards any change in the profile of Finland’s foreign policy in 
the eyes of jihadist activists, a substantial proportion of the individuals leaving for 
Syria and Iraq had travelled to the region before Finland decided to take part in the 
international anti-ISIS coalition and military operation.  
One general observation about jihadist activism in Europe is that individuals actively 
creating networks and preparing plans (so-called entrepreneurs) have contributed 
significantly to its growth and development. It is difficult to name any persons in 
Finland that would have adopted such a role (at least in a visible or successful 
manner) and have the ability to motivate a large group of people to cooperate for long 
periods of time. Such activities are known to have taken place in this country to some 
extent. Such entrepreneurs may try to operate in Finland in a manner that does not 
attract attention and thus does not become public knowledge. However, it seems that 
the objectives of entrepreneurs have been limited to specific ethnic groups or have 
failed to materialise (with a few exceptions).  
Most of the entrepreneurs in other European countries have been individuals 
possessing combat experience or that have been sentenced for terrorist offences. 
Even though not all such persons have any intention of adopting such a role, many of 
the individuals that are known to have contributed to the growth of the phenomenon 
come from such backgrounds. According to SUPO, one quarter of all individuals on 
the list of counterterrorism targets have experience of participating in a terrorist 
organisation or have attended terrorist training. Thus, there may be people in Finland 
with backgrounds giving them the credibility required to function as an entrepreneur. It 
remains unclear, however, whether they have the necessary skills or willingness for 
such tasks.  
Finnish jihadists have occasionally received assistance for the organisation and 
recruitment of activists from abroad. A number of individuals whose visits elsewhere 
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may have been connected to attempts to reinvigorate and structure jihadist activism in 
that location have made also visits to Finland. The most prominent of these figures is 
Anjem Choudary. However, such high-profile visits to Finland seem to have been 
relatively rare and produced few results. Finland still seems to be a relatively 
uninteresting country for international jihadist entrepreneurs.  
An additional explanation for the low level of visible activism may also be that Finland 
has been considered a suitable place for carrying out support activities for armed 
groups without attracting too much attention. This would not be compatible with the 
visible and open propagation of the jihadist world view and recruitment, as that would 
attract the attention of the authorities. Finland has undoubtedly provided a relatively 
free operating environment for jihadist activism, with one reason being that the 
authorities have possessed limited resources and powers to monitor the activities and 
legal action has rarely been taken to restrict them. For example, in contrast to many 
other countries in which the organisation has operated, little action has been taken 
against Rawti Shax in Finland. In fact, Awat Hamasalih, the second in command of 
the organisation, would probably not have moved to Finland if he had considered this 
country a particularly difficult operating environment. In fact, soon after he had been 
deported from Finland, a legal case against him was opened in the United Kingdom 
and he is currently serving a prison sentence.  
How, then, can it be explained that so many individuals living in Finland have travelled 
to Syria and Iraq? There is no simple answer to this question. The reasons discussed 
in the third chapter that have prompted the mobilisation in Europe as a whole have 
unquestionably also played a role in Finland. At the same time, an earlier report 
discussing the flow of people to the conflict zones of Syria and Iraq311 examined the 
factors connected to the broader evolution of the religiousness of young Muslims and 
the views of the people that have left, as well as those of their friends and families, 
concerning the matters motivating them to go (such as a sense of duty and a 
willingness to help Muslims that are suffering). These factors have also served as an 
inspiration for people in other countries leaving for the region and, therefore, do not 
fully explain the unexpectedly large mobilisation in Finland.  
When seeking explanations, we should remember that the number of people that 
have travelled to Syria and Iraq is actually very small. When the number of people 
going to the region is examined in relation to the population of their country of origin, 
social factors are often suggested as explanations to the phenomenon. While factors 
such as the socio-economic status of Muslims, perceived discrimination, and public 
opinion may well play a role on a case-by-case basis, it should also be remembered 
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that we are seeking an explanation to a decision made by a relatively small number of 
people.  
As described above, social networks have played an important role in the mobilisation 
of jihadist activists. This also means that the decision of a single group of friends not 
to travel from Finland to Syria could have substantially changed the number of people 
leaving for the region. At the same time, the departure of a group of friends may 
ultimately have been prompted by the enthusiasm of a single member who has then 
started a campaign to persuade others to join them.  
With this reservation, we can, however, provide a number of potential explanations for 
the unexpectedly large mobilisation from Finland to Syria and Iraq. It seems that 
during this mobilisation, jihadist activism in Finland has started to follow trends in 
Europe more closely. To some extent, this change may be connected to the fact that 
Finland has an increasing number or young Muslims adults or Muslims that are on the 
verge of adulthood who were born and raised in this country but whose parents come 
from another country. Only a fraction of these individuals is interested in jihadist 
activism at any level but those who are interested are more often oriented towards 
‘global Jihad’ than their parents. Their social networks are also more extensive. This 
may have increased the appeal of conflicts such as those in Syria and Iraq and 
jihadist organisations such as Al-Qaeda and ISIS and provided a basis for the 
formation of such multi-ethnic networks that the departure for the conflict region has 
entailed.  
Moreover, advances in social media have undoubtedly changed the situation in 
Finland and in other peripheries of the European jihadist milieu. During the early 
stages of the conflict in Syria and Iraq, there was an exceptional period when jihadist 
content was available online in extraordinary amounts and it was easy to 
communicate openly with individuals outside Finland that were interested in jihadist 
activities (including the fighters that had travelled to Syria and Iraq). This opened up 
new opportunities for interaction, especially in those places in which more established 
networks did not yet exist.  
In the interviews with representatives of Muslim communities conducted for this study, 
many of the interviewees also voiced concern over the religious education of young 
Muslims. This concern was expressed by young people and the generation of their 
parents. Many of the interviewees believed that if young people were more familiar 
with their religion and would consider themselves more closely integrated into their 
religious communities in Finland, they would probably not view the jihadist ideology as 
attractive and as ‘true Islam’. The interviews also relayed the impression of a 
generational gap in the sense that while young people wanted to have an opportunity 
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to discuss religious issues in a more critical manner, the young people felt that the 
older generation was not prepared to engage in such a discussion.  
The extent to which the interest in jihadist activism depend on existing religious 
orientation and its nature has not been exhaustively studied. There is no doubt that 
growing interest in religion has often gone hand in hand with the decision to travel to 
conflict zones as foreign fighters or with the participation in other forms of jihadist 
activism.312 There have also been indications of this in Finland. There have, however 
also been indications that many of those travelling to Syria and Iraq have not 
familiarised themselves with any interpretation of Islam. In sum, it is still difficult to say 
anything about causal relationships in Finland or at the European level.  
5.4 Future prospects of jihadist activism in 
Europe and Finland 
Even though the flow of foreign fighters to the conflict zones in Syria and Iraq more or 
less stopped during 2016 and there has been a considerable decline in attack plans 
during 2018, there are few reasons to expect a permanent decline of jihadist activism 
in Europe. Thomas Hegghammer has summed up the reasons for the pessimism 
widely shared by researchers in relation to four trends.313 These trends and what they 
mean for Finland are reviewed below.  
The first trend mentioned by Hegghammer concerns the potential recruitment base of 
jihadist movements. Even though the socio-economic background of the individuals 
involved in jihadist activism in Europe has varied, a substantial proportion of them 
have been economically underperforming young Muslims. Hegghammer refers to 
studies according to which persons involved in jihadist activities in Europe have been 
below average with respect to their educational levels and employment status. An 
unusually large proportion of these people also have criminal backgrounds. More 
research is required to determine to what extent such matters have influenced 
decisions to leave (i.e. is there any causal relationship?).314 Regardless, in 
Hegghammer’s view, there are few reasons to expect that, considering the current 
social situation, the number of such young people in Europe would be on the decline.  
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313 Thomas Hegghammer, ‘The Future of Jihadism in Europe: A Pessimistic View’, Perspectives 
on Terrorism 10, no. 6 (2016). 
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PUBLICATIONS OF THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR 2019:31 
 
117 
 
 
There is no comprehensive information on the socio-economic backgrounds, 
education or income of the individuals engaged in jihadist activities in Finland. 
According to current knowledge, people such as those travelling to Syria and Iraq 
come from a variety of socio-economic backgrounds, but in the case of the majority, 
they do not seem to be particularly high. It can be assumed that people described by 
Hegghammer will be found in Finland in the future. Some of the individuals that have 
emigrated to Finland occupy a substantially weaker socio-economic position than the 
mainstream population. People with foreign backgrounds who were born in Finland 
(the second generation of immigrants) are still children and young people, as most 
people with immigrant background have arrived in Finland since the 1990s. According 
to the available information, some of these people also face difficulties at school, in 
further education, and in finding employment.315 At the same time, when the 
development of jihadist activities is assessed in the light of such structural factors, it 
should be remembered that engagement in jihadist activism is rare in all socio-
economic groups.  
Another group of people that are considered relevant by researchers from the 
perspective of recruitment to jihadist activism are the participants in countercultural 
salafist communities. There have been disagreements over the relationship of these 
communities with jihadism, but some researchers (e.g. Peter Neumann and Fernando 
Reinares) are of the view that they are closely linked to jihadism as a phenomenon in 
Europe.316 Salafist communities have grown and become more numerous across 
Western Europe and they are now more firmly rooted in their wider social 
environments than at the start of the decade. It is difficult to assess the situation in 
Finland, as no research on salafism in Finland has been carried out. There have also 
been a small number of communities in Finland that can perhaps be characterised as 
countercultural and salafist. The Roihuvuori mosque (which moved to Malmi in 2016), 
which has been linked to the phenomenon in the media, may be the Finnish 
community closest to what researchers have meant in this context.  
The second trend highlighted by Hegghammer is that the number of such individuals 
in Western Europe that have traditionally played a key role in the establishment of 
networks and in the preparation of plans is now substantially higher than in the past 
and will also increase in the future. As has already been noted, persons that have 
fought in the conflict zones in Syria and Iraq and have been sentenced for terrorist 
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crimes have accounted for a large number of such persons. Many individuals 
sentenced for terrorist crimes in Europe have been released or will be released in the 
coming years and they include people that have fought in Syria and Iraq. According to 
one estimate, more than 1,000 people connected to the phenomenon and sentenced 
for terrorist crimes in Europe will be released by spring 2020.317  
Even though only a small number of those people who left for Syria and Iraq have 
returned to Europe, the number of returnees is high when compared to previous 
conflicts.318 Moreover, it cannot be ruled out that more individuals connected to 
jihadism would return from the region. Individuals who have participated in or 
supported the activities of ISIS and are now imprisoned in Syria and Iraq were a 
source of particular concern in Europe in early 2019. There is no certainty regarding 
their ultimate fate and their total numbers are now higher than the number of people 
returning to Europe between 2012 and 2018. It is also estimated that there are more 
than 1,000 children of European citizens that were born in the region or travelled there 
with their parents. 
Based on the research on foreign fighter returnees from previous conflicts, it can be 
expected that not all of them will be interested in continuing jihadist activities when 
they return. The number of people that have already returned from Syria and Iraq and 
that may return from these countries in the future is so large that the security situation 
of individual countries may be significantly affected even if only a small proportion of 
these people are actively engaged in jihadist activism.  
The number of people with a typical entrepreneur background may also be boosted by 
the influx of asylum seekers from the region to Europe. In fact, there may be 
individuals among the asylum seekers that will become interested in the phenomenon 
after arriving to Europe or who already have links with jihadist actors. However, it 
should be remembered in this connection that asylum seekers have not traditionally 
played a particularly significant role in the carrying out of jihadist attacks in Europe. 
There are reasons to believe that there may be more entrepreneurs in Finland in the 
future even though there are currently no signs of such development (in the form 
referred to by Hegghammer). A number of individuals have already returned from 
Syria to Finland. There is little information available on the returnees but during the 
writing of this report, we have got the impression that they have not been particularly 
active. This observation would apply particularly to individuals that had returned to 
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tent/uploads/2017/11/Beyond-the-Caliphate-Foreign-Fighters-and-the-Threat-of-Returnees-TSC-
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Finland before October 2014. It is not clear whether people that had travelled to or 
lived in the area controlled by ISIS or participated in the activities of the group have 
returned to Finland after that point. There are, however, indications that a number of 
such persons have returned to Finland, but there is no certainty in this regard or in 
relation to whether they have participated in jihadist activities after their return.  
More people may yet return from the conflict zones in Syria and Iraq to Finland. For 
example, SUPO has stated that there are persons in Syria and Iraq willing to return to 
Finland.319 It remains unclear whether these people are still engaged in the activities 
of jihadist groups, whether they are staying at refugee camps or in prison or 
elsewhere in the region. ‘Sanna’, who attracted a great deal of publicity in March 
2019, is one such person. She left Baghouz in Syria, the last village of the shrinking 
ISIS caliphate, for the camp established by the SDF near the village, to which many of 
ISIS supporters and those engaged in its activities had fled the fighting. Sanna and 
her 13-year-old daughter, who had travelled to the conflict zone with her parents, 
have expressed their willingness to return to Finland.320  
In the future, there should be more attention to entrepreneurs who may be particularly 
influential to the development of the Finnish situation, both in the framework of 
counterterrorism activities and the prevention of violent extremism. Such persons may 
have a greater impact on the situation than general factors that are often a key 
consideration in the prevention of violent extremism.  
Experience has also proven that it is far from easy to interfere with the activities of the 
entrepreneurs. It may be difficult to bring charges against them because they are not 
necessarily guilty of crimes, at least not in the manner that would be easy to prove. 
Furthermore, taking action against them is also difficult when the individual is a citizen 
of another country, and especially if the individual has arrived in Finland as an asylum 
seeker or a refugee. Unless the individual concerned is a citizen of another European 
country, deportation may have to be ruled out because of the human rights situation 
of the target country or the legislation on the status of refugees or asylum seekers.  
Thirdly, Hegghammer points out that jihadist activism in Europe has traditionally 
strongly reflected the developments in conflicts under way in countries with Muslim 
majorities (especially in the Middle East). Even though the conflict in Syria and Iraq is 
no longer as crucial to the phenomenon as between 2012 and 2014, it does not show 
any signs of reaching a permanent resolution. This is also the case with many other 
                                                     
 
319 Petja Pelli, ‘Isisin leiristä löytyi suomalaisella aksentilla puhuva Sanna, joka haluaa takaisin 
Suomeen’, Helsingin Sanomat 6 March 2019. 
320 For ‘Sanna’s’ interview, see ‘ISIS territory is clearing out. But where will the people go?’, CNN 
6 March 2019; ‘Sumaya’s’ interview, see ‘Malnourished children leave IS territory in Syria’, Sky 
News 5 March 2019. 
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conflicts in countries with Muslim majorities (such as Nigeria, Libya, Yemen, Iraq, 
Afghanistan, and Somalia). At the same time, however, conflicts that have aroused 
emotions in jihadist circles and Muslim communities in general have not led to any 
significant increase in jihadist activities. These conflicts include the campaign against 
the Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar, which has features of a genocide, and the 
persecution of Muslims in China and the Central African Republic. These 
observations are relevant to Finland, other European countries, and the West in 
general. 
The fourth reason Hegghammer cites as a basis for a relatively pessimistic view of the 
future has to do with the opportunities provided by the Internet to communicate with 
specific audiences in Europe and in the West in general. Even though the 
countermeasures taken by the security authorities and service providers have 
significantly reduced the volume of open jihadist online communications, today’s 
communications technology still offers influencing and networking opportunities that 
did not exist 15 years ago. This has already been seen in Finland and it will probably 
also remain the case in the future. However, radicalisation taking place exclusively 
through the web is still rare.  
Even though the peak years of jihadist activism in Europe seem to be behind us for 
now, social conditions in Europe are still more conducive to jihadist activities than they 
were before the conflict in Syria and Iraq. In the future, the phenomenon is likely to 
develop more slowly unless there are new forms of impetus similar to the pull of ISIS 
and Syria.  
In the future, it can be expected that the situation in Finland will more closely reflect 
European-wide trends. There has been a significant increase in the number of 
individuals connected to the phenomenon over the past ten years. At the same time, 
the activism prompted by the conflict in Syria and Iraq took place in a situation where 
there were few jihadist networks that had been established in the preceding years. It 
is unclear how long the effects of this activism will last. Even though there is no return 
to the past, it is still too early to say to what extent the effects of the activism created 
by the conflict and ISIS and the networks arising as a result will be long-lasting.  
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5.5 Need for further research 
As stated in the introduction, this is the first study attempting to provide an overview of 
jihadist activities in Finland. There is little publicly available information on the topic 
and supplementing it with new research takes time. This is because studying a 
marginal and stigmatised phenomenon that shuns publicity is very challenging. The 
phenomenon involves dimensions about which little detailed information is available 
and sometimes not even the authorities monitoring the phenomenon are much wiser.  
At the same time, this study has shown that even though open source-based research 
on jihadist activism is a challenging task, it is nevertheless achievable, provided that 
enough time and resources are available. For example, numerous opportunities to 
carry out interviews for this study had to be refused due to the short duration of the 
project. Many tips remained unused and large amounts of less accessible data had to 
be ignored.  
It should be evident by now that having a truly knowledge-based discussion on the 
phenomenon requires additional research to be carried out. The same applies to 
policy development and political decision-making.  
More research is needed on following topics: 
• The background of those involved in jihadist activism in Finland and what has 
prompted them to become activists 
• Foreign fighting and the travelling to training camps of jihadist groups before 
the conflict in Syria and Iraq 
• Background of the individuals that have left for Syria and Iraq and the 
networks that they have established  
• Transnational contacts of jihadist activists living in Finland 
• Participation of women in jihadist activism (motives, joining processes, forms 
of activity, networks, etc.) 
• Formation and activities of salafist communities in Finland in the 2000s and 
2010s and the way in which they are connected to jihadist activism as a 
phenomenon 
• Support activities of jihadist groups in Finland in the 2000s and 2010s 
• Non-violent support activities in connection with the conflict in Syria and Iraq 
in general, and ISIS in particular, in Finland between 2012 and 2018 
• Internal and external recruitment activities targeting asylum seekers who 
arrived in Finland in 2015 and 2016 and relations with jihadist groups 
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Appendices 
 
APPENDIX 1: Key features of the interpretations of Jihad doctrines 
 
Interpretation of the 
religious teachings 
of Jihad 
Historical 
 
Revolutionary Classical (Az-
zam) 
Global (AQ) Global sectarian (ISIS) 
Grievance justifying 
violence 
External attack Un-Islamic 
government 
External attack  External attack  Lack of faith within the 
community, foreign oc-
cupation  
Main enemy Non-Muslim at-
tacker 
Muslim ruler Non-Muslim at-
tacker 
USA and its allies Islam-internal heretics, 
USA and its allies  
Need for religious 
authority to declare 
Jihad 
Yes No Partially  No No 
Personal religious 
duty of all Muslims 
to take part in Jihad  
No Yes  
(locally) 
Yes Yes Yes 
Restrictions on the 
use of force against 
civilians 
 
Yes No Partially No* No 
 
Based on the chart prepared by Thomas Hegghammer. See Haykel, Hegghammer 
and Lacroix (ed.), Saudi Arabia in Transition, p. 216.  
* Even though according to the interpretation of Jihad held by Al-Qaeda, it is justified 
to use violence against civilians in conflict zones and outside them, the group has 
attempted to specify the situations in which such violence can be used and the 
civilians that can be targeted, and to justify the use of violence by referring to the 
Islamic texts and traditions essential from the perspective of the rules and ethics of 
warfare.  
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APPENDIX 2: Social networking of individuals that have travelled to 
Syria and Iraq 
 
 
The dots in the chart denote the more than 40 individuals that have travelled to the 
conflict zones in Syria and Iraq and that have been identified in this study. The lines 
between the dots denote the relationships between the individuals. The details have 
been collected from social media, interviews, and openly accessible sources, such as 
the mainstream media.  
According to SUPO, more than 80 adults have travelled to the conflict zones in Syria 
and Iraq from Finland and half of them have been identified in this chart. It is not 
entirely clear whether all the individuals identified in this study are included in SUPO’s 
estimate. 
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With regard to social bonds and networks, this chart should be considered as a 
minimum estimate. The chart mainly includes bonds between individuals that are 
likely to exist on the basis of the available material. Determining the social bonds has 
been considerably easier for such persons that have had accounts in social media 
(especially Facebook). There is a total of 17 such persons. However, not all of them 
have open profiles, which would give access to such details as the list of friends. In 
such cases, the existence of bonds outside social media has been determined by 
means of interviews and by collecting information from other open sources.  
Some of the bonds shown in the chart may have been unimportant when the 
individual has become interested in jihadist activities or travelled to the conflict zones. 
They have nevertheless often played a role, especially when close friendships, family 
relations or marriages have been involved. The strength of the social bonds has not 
been assessed in the chart and there is probably considerable variation in this.  
It should also be noted that some of the links may only have been established in the 
conflict zones. People travelling from Finland may also have established networks in 
the conflict zones and this is known to have also happened in a small number of 
cases.  
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